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Psychological Specificity of Trust in Communal Sharing and Market Pricing Relationships

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Streszczenie

W niniejszej rozprawie dążymy do wykazania, że zaufanie rozumiane jako fundamentalny aspekt ludzkich interakcji funkcjonuje inaczej w zależności od kontekstu relacyjnego. Zgodnie z teorią modeli relacyjnych, sposoby myślenia o relacjach odzwierciedlają różne logiki interakcji, ze szczególnie silną różnicą pomiędzy modelem wspólnotowego dzielenia się (CS) a modelem wyceny rynkowej (MP). W szczególności w kontekstach wspólnotowych kluczowe znaczenie ma orientacja na innych, podczas gdy w kontekstach rynkowych – proporcjonalna wymiana.

W niniejszej rozprawie analizowano, czy zaufanie rzeczywiście jest zależne od kontekstu, a jeśli tak, to poprzez jakie mechanizmy różni się w ramach odmiennych struktur relacyjnych. Najpierw przeprowadziliśmy metaanalizę (Artykuł 1) efektów wskazówek CS i MP na zaufanie mierzone za pomocą gry zaufania (TG). Na podstawie 63 efektów z 58 badań ($N = 9742$) stwierdzono, że zarówno wskazówki wspólnotowe, jak i rynkowe zwiększały zaufanie w porównaniu z warunkami kontrolnymi. Wskazówki rynkowe wykazały efekt mały do umiarkowanego ($\delta = 0,25$), a wspólnotowe efekt mały ($\delta = 0,16$), przy braku istotnych różnic między nimi. Wynik ten podważa założenie, że te tryby relacyjne prowadzą do odmiennych poziomów zaufania.

Aby zbadać tę pozorną zbieżność, przeprowadziliśmy przegląd systematyczny (Artykuł 2), koncentrujący się na roli emocji w kontekstach CS i MP. Na podstawie 31 opublikowanych badań eksperymentalnych wykazaliśmy, że emocje kształtują zaufanie zarówno w interakcjach CS, jak i MP, jednak ich rola jest różna: emocje incydentalne wywierają silniejszy wpływ na zaufanie w kontekstach rynkowych, natomiast procesy oparte na emocjach są bardziej centralne w relacjach wspólnotowych.

Na koniec przeprowadziliśmy serię sześciu prerejestrowanych eksperymentów (Artykuł 3; $N = 4086$), badających, w jaki sposób kontrola (monitorowanie) wpływa na zaufanie w różnych

kontekstach relacyjnych. Monitorowanie było postrzegane jako bardziej akceptowalne i było częściej wprowadzane w relacjach MP niż CS. Powodowało ono również przesunięcie percepcji interakcji CS w kierunku bardziej rynkowego charakteru. Co istotne, monitorowanie silniej obniżało zaufanie w kontekstach wspólnotowych. Efekt ten zależał od perspektywy: w przypadku osób, którym powierzano zaufanie, monitorowanie obniżało zaufanie w obu kontekstach, natomiast w przypadku osób obdarzających zaufaniem – tylko w relacjach wspólnotowych.

W ramach tych badań pokazujemy, że zaufanie nie jest jednorodnym konstruktem, lecz procesem zależnym od kontekstu, kształtowanym przez normy relacyjne, mechanizmy emocjonalne oraz znaczenie kontroli. Wyniki te podważają uniwersalne modele zaufania i dostarczają zintegrowanych ram teoretycznych do rozumienia, jak zaufanie funkcjonuje w różnych typach relacji społecznych.

Słowa kluczowe: nastawienie wspólnotowe, kontrola, emocje, nastawienie rynkowe, relacje, zaufanie

Abstract

In this dissertation, we aim to demonstrate that trust, a fundamental aspect of human interactions, operates differently across relational contexts. According to Relational Models Theory, relational mindsets reflect distinct interaction logics, with the most striking differences between the communal sharing (CS) model, which emphasizes other-oriented care, and the market pricing (MP) model, which emphasizes self-oriented calculation in market contexts.

This dissertation examines whether trust is indeed context-dependent and, if so, through which mechanisms it varies across relational frameworks. First, we conducted a meta-analysis (Article 1) of the effects of CS and MP cues on trust measured with a trust game (TG). Across 63 effect sizes from 58 studies ($N = 9,742$), both communal and market cues increased trust relative to control conditions. Market cues produced a small-to-medium effect ($\delta = 0.25$) and communal cues a small effect ($\delta = 0.16$), with no significant difference between them. This finding challenges the assumption that these relational modes lead to distinct levels of trust. However, we further posit that although the effects of the CS and MP cues on trust in TG are similar, the mechanisms underlying these effects may differ.

To investigate this apparent convergence, we conducted a systematic review (Article 2) focusing on the role of emotions in CS and MP contexts. Based on 31 published experimental studies, we show that emotions shape trust in both CS and MP interactions, but their roles differ: incidental emotions exert a stronger effect on trust in MP contexts, whereas emotionally grounded processes are more central in communal relationships.

Finally, we conducted a series of six preregistered experiments (Article 3; $N = 4,086$) examining how control (monitoring) affects trust across relational contexts. Monitoring was perceived as more acceptable and was introduced more often in MP than in CS relationships. It

also shifted the perception of CS interactions towards a more market-like one. Importantly, monitoring reduced trust more strongly in communal contexts. This effect depended on perspective: for trustees, monitoring reduced trust in both contexts, whereas for trustors it reduced trust only in communal relationships.

Across these studies, we demonstrate that trust is not a unitary construct but a context-dependent process shaped by relational norms, emotional mechanisms, and the meaning of control. These findings challenge universal models of trust and provide an integrated framework for understanding how trust operates across different types of social relationships.

Keywords: communal mindset, control, emotions, market mindset, relationships, trust

Introduction

Despite extensive research on trust, it has largely been treated as a general construct, with limited focus on how it varies systematically across relational contexts. This represents a critical gap in understanding how trust operates across different types of relationships. To address this gap, this dissertation investigates the psychological specificity of trust as a function of the nature of the relationship. We propose that trust is not a unitary process but rather emerges through distinct psychological mechanisms that depend on the relational context in which it is embedded. Specifically, we argue that communal sharing and market pricing relationships give rise to different pathways to trust, shaped by relational norms, emotional processes, and the role of control. Based on this framework, we derive a set of hypotheses concerning (a) the effects of relational mindsets on trust, (b) the role of emotions in shaping trust across contexts, and (c) the context-dependent relationship between trust and control.

Trust

Trust is defined as acceptance of vulnerability based on positive expectations of others' intentions and behavior, and relying on their actions despite uncertainty and a lack of control over the situation (Rousseau et al., 1998). Trust is widely recognized as an essential part of social and economic life. It shapes all human interactions, specifying how people will or will not interact with others. Thus, understanding the factors that influence the decision to trust or distrust others is crucial across the entire spectrum of social interactions. Without trust, nobody would reveal personal secrets or ask for help in times of need, and people would not form long-term close relationships (Rempel et al., 1985). Similarly, without trust, nobody would accept worthless pieces of metal or paper in exchange for goods and services, or show up for work in exchange for the promise of deferred compensation—in short, market transactions would not

function effectively (Alós-Ferrer & Farolfi, 2019). Therefore, the primary purpose of trust is to foster good relationships and support coping in situations marked by uncertainty (Rousseau et al., 1998). However, the notion of ‘goodness’ might differ, depending on the type of relationship. Therefore, we posit that trust might have a different meaning, depending on the relational mindsets.

Relational Mindsets

People connect in multiple relationships that differ in expectations for a partner, as well as in levels of intimacy, degree of interdependence and closeness, emotional and empathetic aspects, and types of expectations (Berscheid & Regan, 2016). Fiske (1991, 1992) proposed distinguishing between four modes of relation: communal sharing (CS), authority ranking (AR), equality matching (EM), or market pricing (MP). These types are determined by different behavioral rules and require different kinds of thinking (Fiske, 2004; McGraw & Tetlock, 2005). However, despite the robustness of this framework, its implications for trust remain insufficiently explored. Within this approach, communal sharing and market pricing are two relational extremes. Communal sharing relationships (CSRs) are defined as gratuitous, asymmetric relationships that provide benefits to partners without obligation to repay, intended to increase the recipient's happiness and well-being. In this type of relationship, people are naturally helpful, kind and generous, and focus on others’ benefit without any consideration for a reward (Fiske, 2004; Fiske et al., 2019).

In contrast, MP relationships are defined by transactional and exchange-based interactions. They are governed by the principles of fairness and equivalence, focusing on fulfilling self-interests through exchange (Fiske, 1992). MP relationships are governed by the principle of exchange with out-group members. People involved in such interactions usually care

about the outcome of their investment and whether the return is of a comparable value (Rai & Fiske, 2011). MPRs are also ran by direct and comprehensible rules with clear division of tasks and responsibilities, the scope of inputs and outputs, the timing, and the nature of the interaction between parties involved, allowing all parties precise insight into the situation (Fiske, 1991, 1992; Fiske & Haslam, 2005). This relational mode focuses on rational and logical thinking, control (personal and situational), efficiency, and equality in proportion of exchange, and does not allow for emotional bonding and intimacy (Jiang et al., 2014; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Zaki et al., 2021). Finally, MP relationships typically take place between sellers and buyers or employers and employees (Fiske, 2004), but under certain circumstances (e.g., a threat to personal control or a high level of attachment insecurities), even close relationships can be regulated by rules characteristic of market-pricing behavior (Gasiorowska & Ecer, 2026; Gasiorowska & Zaleskiewicz, 2021).

Relational Specificity of Trust

In CS relationships, trust plays a role in sustaining the relationship, while in MP relationships, it serves as a useful tool but is not indispensable (Fiske, 1991, 1992). These CS relationships, often seen in close family and friendship bonds, require trust as an integral component for maintaining emotional closeness, mutual dependence, and long-term commitment (Rusbult et al., 1999). The absence of trust in CS relationships would prevent their establishment, as trust is fundamental to the emotional and interpersonal connection required in these interactions. Trust in MP relationships is valuable but not indispensable; control mechanisms such as contracts, monitoring, and formal regulations often replace the need for trust to ensure that each party adheres to their commitments (Gulati, 1995; Lewicki et al., 2006). In MP relationships, the presence of formal control mechanisms mitigates risks and manages

uncertainty, providing assurance that agreements will be honored (Lazzarini et al., 2004). In fact, long ago, Rousseau et al. (1998) noted that: *“Trust takes different forms in different relationships—from a calculated weighing of perceived gains and losses to an emotional response based on interpersonal attachment and identification. Market-based exchanges may emphasize calculus more, whereas communal relationships might emphasize identification”* (p. 398). This reflects that, although theoretical accounts suggest that the functioning of trust varies across relational contexts, empirical support so far appears fragmented and inconclusive. Therefore, we intend to elaborate on this thought and investigate how these patterns tend to emerge and what the essential contributing factors are to this difference in trust based on a specific type of relationship.

Although multiple factors have been identified as the governing aspects, recent experimental explorations have challenged the commonly held assumption about trusting others. An unresolved concern is the influence of emotional states on trust, which has largely been ignored, even though most trust decisions are made in affect-rich contexts (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Similarly, control has been identified as a structural complement to trust, intended to establish and maintain it (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). However, it remains unclear whether the role of emotions and control differs systematically across relational contexts. Thus, we intend to explore the affective and behavioral influence of emotions and control in explaining trust difference in CS vs. MP interactions.

Specifically, this dissertation advances the view that trust is a context-dependent construct rather than a universal entity shaped by relational norms, affective processing (emotions), and structural mechanisms such as control. Importantly, trust in marital relationships, friendships, trading, and organizational contexts has been widely studied in various scientific

disciplines. However, we intend to incorporate an understanding of relational mindsets, differentiating between conditions that increase trust in one kind of interaction but decrease it in the other, and we also aim to discuss beneficial social aspects that can reduce distrust. This attempt might also help identify the relationship-centered strategy for not applying market norms to communal interactions, as indicated in previous research (Gasiorowska & Zaleskiewicz, 2021).

Aims of the Dissertation

We argue that how people perceive one another and regulate their actions depends on the type of relationship they are in. In other words, different types of relationships lead to different mindsets, which in turn can influence how people think about and respond to the reality around them. For example, previous research has shown that even subtle market-mindset cues can promote agency and efficient task solving but can hinder pro-sociality and generosity, even among young children (Gasiorowska et al., 2016). Exposure to market-mindset cues also promotes utilitarian decision-making (Zaleskiewicz et al., 2020) and leads people to experience a greater sense of control (Gasiorowska & Zaleskiewicz, 2021). Also, regarding trust, it is important to note that most studies examined this phenomenon within specific fields, making it difficult to compare trust across domains. This is the reason we are oblivious to the process, how the development and decline of trust in the CS relationships differ from MP relationships. In this investigation, we intend to develop a coherent frame to compare how trust operates in CS vs. MP relationships and how emotions and control explain the psychological specificity of trust in defined types of relationships.

We prepared three articles to figure these points out with particular focus on difference of trust in CS vs. MP relationships (a meta-analytical synthesis of evidence), influence of emotions

in the established equation (a systematic review), and the effect of control in explaining the differential functioning of trust in both kinds of relations (a series of experimental studies). In the first article, we systematically review and quantitatively integrate prior experimental studies examining how activating communal versus market mindsets affects behavioral trust. Using the Trust Game (TG; (Berg et al., 1995) as the standard behavioral measure, we examine (1) whether exposure to a market mindset leads to higher initial transfers in the TG compared to a control condition, (2) whether a communal mindset also increases trust-related behavior, and (3) whether the effects of these two mindsets differ in magnitude. Additionally, we explore whether these effects vary across types of experimental manipulations and whether study-level factors, including specific features of the Trust Game, moderate the observed outcomes.

In the second article, we conducted a systematic review of peer-reviewed experimental studies to better understand how trust operates differently in CS and MP relationships under the influence of emotions. Importantly, in this synthesis of evidence, we integrated both aspects of affect, incidental and integral emotions, in relation to trust depending on the defined types of relationships. We identified the types of emotional manipulations employed and compiled the ways these emotions were manipulated in previous studies, categorizing them as incidental or integral based on the authors' details. We further attempted to interpret the pattern of association between emotions and trust in communal or market-based interactions.

In the third article, we aimed to unfold how individuals perceive the introduction of instances of control in defined relational contexts. In a series of six experiments, we investigated how participants responded to the acceptance and willingness to introduce control in CS vs. MP conditions. We also examined how the presence of control affects the perception of the nature of a relationship, such as whether participants perceive a CS relationship as less communal and

more market-like when elements of control are exercised. In contrast, in MP relationships, such instances of control may serve as a functional or beneficial factor. Further, we explored how the level of trust impacted the acceptance and willingness to introduce control and, finally, we provided behavioral evidence to strengthen the understanding of the observed pattern, demonstrating how control plays a distinct role in shaping trust in CS vs. MP relationships.

As a whole, the present dissertation, comprising the three articles mentioned above, intends to present a theoretically coherent and empirically sound understanding of the specificity of trust in CS vs. MP relationships, covering the role of emotions and control in explaining the observed pattern of interaction.

Communal and market cues and trust in the Trust game: meta-analysis (Article 1)

Market and communal relational mindsets are typically presented as cognitions that evoke opposing norms of social interaction, with the communal mindset associated with generosity and other-interest, and the market mindset typically linked to self-interest and reduced prosociality (Gasiorowska et al., 2016). Prior research suggests that these two relational mindsets can be activated by subtle contextual cues, influencing individuals' expectations and behaviors within social and economic interactions (Zaleskiewicz & Gasiorowska, 2017). Moreover, relational mindsets can be activated even outside the relationships they typically pertain to (Clark & Mills, 2012). For example, people can adopt a market-focused perspective in marital contexts or apply a communal perspective in economic exchanges. Contextual cues, such as recent experiences or the framing of a situation, can therefore influence individuals' relational expectations, shaping how they perceive and respond to different situations.

From a theoretical perspective, the communal mindset appears inherently conducive to trust, as trust constitutes one of its defining features (Le et al., 2018). Yet, despite this theoretical

expectation, empirical evidence is mixed: while some studies confirm that activating communal cognitions, such as through interaction with an ingroup member, increases trust (Fujino et al., 2020; Parlasca et al., 2019), others report negligible or even opposite effects (Trifiletti & Capozza, 2011; Vermue et al., 2018). In contrast, the market mindset seems, at least conceptually, incompatible with trust. Because it emphasizes proportionality, calculation, and self-interest, one might expect that activating a market mindset would suppress trust and empathy. However, empirical findings suggest more complexity: whereas some studies show that market cues undermine interpersonal trust (Kuzminska et al., 2023; Xin & Liu, 2013), others find that market-oriented thinking enhances behavioral trust in structured exchanges (Al-Ubaydli et al., 2013; Kuzminska et al., 2024). This conceptual and empirical tension raises two intriguing questions. First, if a communal mindset should naturally foster trust, why are the findings inconsistent? Second, if market mindset is expected to erode trust, why does evidence sometimes suggest the opposite?

The aim of the first article was therefore to address these inconsistencies and conduct a meta-analysis examining whether trusting behavior is systematically shaped by contextual cues that activate distinct relational mindsets—specifically, market pricing and communal sharing (Fiske, 1991, 1992). To operationalize trust, we rely on the Trust Game (TG; Berg et al., 1995), the most widely used behavioral measure of trust. We test whether MP and CS relational cues influence transfers in the TG relative to a control condition, and explore whether these effects are moderated by different manipulations or study-level characteristics. Based on 63 effect sizes ($N = 9,742$), addressing our preregistered research question: whether market and communal mindsets result in higher transfers in the TG compared to a control condition, we used a three-level analysis, with studies at level 2 and papers at level 3. This model provided a significantly

better fit than a model without clustering, $\Delta LL = 42.86$, $\chi^2(2) = 55.74$, $p < .001$, AIC = 35.99 vs. 89.73. Extending the model to include effects nested within studies did not improve fit, $\Delta LL = 14.99$, $\chi^2(1) = 1.17$, $p = .279$, AIC = 35.99 vs. 36.81.

A baseline meta-analysis with random effects at study and paper levels showed a pooled effect of the relational mindset of $\delta = 0.18$, $SE = 0.04$, 95% CI [0.10, 0.27], $Z = 4.13$, $p < .001$, with substantial residual heterogeneity, $Q(62) = 191.67$, $p < .001$. The total variance not attributable to sampling error was $I^2 = 75.84\%$, distributed across Level 2 (L2, within reports), $I^2 = 30.39\%$, and Level 3 (L3, between reports), $I^2 = 45.45\%$.

In a second step, we added the manipulation type (communal mindset vs. market mindset) as a moderator to the analysis described above. Although the estimated difference between the two types of manipulations (market minus communal) was notable in magnitude ($\delta = 0.14$), it did not reach statistical significance, $SE = 0.11$, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.36], $Z = 1.18$, $Q_M(1) = 1.20$, $p = .229$, likely reflecting the low number of studies in the market set¹. Residual heterogeneity remained substantial, $Q_E(61) = 187.29$, $p < .001$, total $I^2 = 75.58\%$, L2 $I^2 = 31.96\%$, and L3 $I^2 = 43.62\%$. Although the effect of the specific relational mindset was nonsignificant, we decided to follow our preregistered protocol and separately investigate whether transfers in the TG were affected by the market mindset vs. the control condition and by the communal mindset vs. the control condition.

The meta-analysis for the market mindset ($k = 11$) revealed a significant pooled effect, $\delta = 0.25$, $SE = 0.05$, 95% CI [0.16, 0.33], $Z = 5.71$, $p < .001$. These results indicate a small-to-medium effect (Lovakov & Agadullina, 2021) of the market manipulation (compared to the

¹ As a robustness check, we conducted a Bayesian meta-regression with *bayesmeta* package in R. It revealed a small positive average effect on trust and moderate heterogeneity, with a positive but uncertain trend suggesting slightly larger effects under market than communal mindset conditions (see Supplemental Materials for details).

control condition) on transfers in TG. The model showed that the included studies were nonsignificantly heterogeneous, $Q(10) = 13.36$, $p = .204$, total $I^2 = 3.75\%$, L2 $I^2 = 3.75\%$, L3 $I^2 = 0$.

The meta-analysis for the communal mindset ($k = 52$) revealed a significant pooled effect, $\delta = 0.16$, $SE = 0.05$, 95% CI [0.06, 0.25], $Z = 3.07$, $p = .002$. The included studies were significantly heterogeneous, $Q(51) = 173.92$, $p < .001$, with a total variance not attributable to sampling error of $I^2 = 78.90\%$. Most of the heterogeneity can be attributed to differences between papers at L3, $I^2 = 44.51\%$, but it also existed within papers at L2, $I^2 = 34.39\%$. Influence diagnostics (hat values and Cook's distance) did not identify any excessively influential studies.

Next, because the specific methods used to manipulate relational mindsets varied qualitatively across the two mindset subsets, we conducted moderation analyses by manipulation type separately for each subset. For all other moderators, we used meta-regression models with mindset type as a predictor and a study-level variable as a moderator. Due to the small number of studies extracted, especially those with the market mindset manipulation, we were not able to analyze all the moderators we had planned in our preregistration. The structure of game (regular vs. simplified/mini TG), the round investigated (one-shot vs. first round in the iterated game), the payoff type (real vs. hypothetical), the size of initial endowment (in US dollars), and whether the trustee received an initial endowment did not significantly predict the effect sizes, nor did they interact with the relational mindset manipulation. The only significant moderation emerged for the multiplier: larger multipliers were associated with stronger positive effects of the relational mindset manipulation. We decomposed this interaction by examining the relationship between the multiplier and the effect size separately for the market mindset and the communal mindset subsets. In the market mindset subset, larger multipliers were associated with stronger positive

effects, $\delta = 0.08$, $SE = 0.04$, 95% CI [0.003, 0.15], $Z = 2.03$, $p = .043$. In contrast, in the communal mindset subset, the multiplier was not related to effect sizes, $\delta = -0.06$, $SE = 0.05$, 95% CI [-0.16, 0.04], $Z = -1.20$, $p = .230$.

Also, we conducted precision-effect testing and precision-effect estimate with standard error (PET–PEESE) analyses using inverse-variance weighted meta-regressions with cluster-robust (CR2) standard errors (Stanley, 2017; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014) that provide a more robust evaluation of publication bias in multilevel meta-analysis settings. Overall, the results suggest the existence of a real (but weak) effect of relational mindset on trust and the absence of small-study bias in our dataset. A visual inspection of the funnel plots for both subsets, together with the results of the multilevel Egger-type regressions, provided no evidence of publication bias or small-study effects.

In line with the preregistration, we conducted a p -curve analysis using the *dmeter* package for R (Harrer et al., 2021) on the 26 statistically significant results ($k = 5$ from the market mindset subset and $k = 21$ from the communal mindset subset). The pattern of results also strongly supports the presence of true effects rather than selective reporting, random noise, or publication bias. To provide additional evidence regarding the robustness of the findings, we conducted a z -curve analysis using the *zcurve* package for R (Bartoš & Schimmack, 2022) on the 29 statistically significant results ($k = 28$ usable for model fitting). Taken together, the results suggest that the body of evidence has moderate expected replicability, a low false discovery risk, and no strong indication of missing nonsignificant studies.

In conclusion, our analysis reveals that both market and communal mindsets significantly increase trusting behavior (compared to a control condition), with effect sizes that are statistically indistinguishable. This pattern suggests that trust may emerge through multiple

psychological pathways—one rooted in relational concern and another in strategic reciprocity—challenging theories that position these relational orientations as inherently incompatible. By synthesizing existing findings, this meta-analysis provides initial behavioral evidence consistent with the dual-pathway hypothesis, showing that market and communal mindsets, despite their different motivational origins, can converge on similar behavioral expressions of trust.

Emotions and Trust in CS vs. MP Relationships: Systematic Review (Article 2)²

Major findings from the available research indicate that trust promotes collaboration (De Dreu et al., 2006) and facilitates the reaching of integrative agreements (Thompson et al., 2010). It further advocates that interpersonal trust is fragile and a complex process to build and maintain (Williams & Belkin, 2016). However, emotional expressions are recognized as cues about a person's character and social intentions when deciding whether to trust (Van Kleef et al., 2012). Thus, evidence suggests that judgments of trustworthiness are likely based on the trustee's verbal and nonverbal emotional expressions (Chen et al., 2011). Belkin and Rothman (2017) suggested exploring the influence of this affective expression (emotional expression) on trust in interpersonal relationships. Affect encompasses both personal experience-oriented and situation-driven emotions, scientifically categorized as incidental and integral emotions. Combined, an incidental emotion refers to mood regulated by the intrinsic stimulation or any environmental aspect, whereas an integral emotion focuses on the perception of the target or processing of the information of the target (Västfjäll et al., 2016). They further stated that these two types of emotions play a substantial role in decision-making and judgment, as a whole. However, past

² Khan, M., Zeb, S., Khan, H. A., Sohail, M., Batool, R., & Gasiorowska, A. (2025). A Systematic and Critical Review of Trust Based on Communal Vs. Market Cognitions: Emotions in Perspective. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 47(3), 153-165.

research presents a limited understanding of these emotional effects on trust based on relational context, leaving a critical condition unaddressed.

Belkin and Rothman (2017) presented the cognitive appraisal of emotions in terms of warmth and competence, the two dimensions that encompass the CS vs. MP explanation of social functioning proposed by Fiske et al. (2002; 2007). Past research demonstrated that positive affect (positive emotions) is positively related to cooperation and helping behavior (Lount Jr., 2010), this further indicates one's integrity and moral compass (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2012). On the other hand, anger reflects the potential for aggression and malicious intent toward others, and this negative affect also covers the expresser's morality (Sinaceur et al., 2011). Also, happiness conveys a person's confidence (Knutson, 1996) and serves as an expression of power during negotiation (Pietroni et al., 2009). Alternatively, some studies presented anger as the expression of power, e.g., (Adam & Brett, 2018; Belkin et al., 2013), whereas anger during bargaining and related attempts has been taken as a reflection of weakness and lack of emotional control (Sinaceur et al., 2011). Whereas neutral expressions and no display of emotion have been considered a sign of competence (Hareli et al., 2009).

In the second article, we aimed at combining these points with the proposed assumption of trust to operate distinctively in CS vs. MP relations, and explored the role of emotions in explaining this difference. We argued that the difference might lie in the emotional orientation associated with communal connections (Berscheid & Regan, 2016) versus the non-emotional orientation of market interactions (Vohs, 2015). Past research suggests that MP relations involve the principle of control (Zaleskiewicz et al., 2017), which contradicts the emotional element pertinent to communal interactions. Thus, we intended to draw a parallel between CS and MP mindsets, considering emotions in perspective through a systematic synthesis of prior research.

Using PRISMA protocols, we conducted a comprehensive review of experimental studies to find a) if trust operates differently in CS vs. MP relationships, b) If emotions are more central to CS than MP relations, and c) which type of emotions relate better to CS vs. MP interactions. The systematic and critical synthesis of findings from 31 experimental studies conducted in eight countries between 2004 and 2021 confirmed the emotional grounding of communal connections and the calculative standing of market interactions that define trust in these relations. Furthermore, emotions were pertinent to communal relations, and they were equally involved in both CS and MP relations. Lastly, incidental (not relevant to the task) emotions were found to be more influencing in MP than CS interactions.

The studies were coded as featuring communal-sharing and market-pricing mindsets, as described by Fiske (1992). As defined, communal-sharing relations operate on the principles of care and warmth, whereas market-pricing relations entail a calculated proportionality governing give-and-take. The aligned manipulations, such as friends vs. foe decision for emotions and touch stimulation, were categorized as communal mindsets, whereas economic interaction and customer service experience, etc., were categorized as market-pricing manipulations. Thus, 12 out of 31 studies were categorized as communal and 17 fell under market cognitions. Further, we categorized the kind of emotions considering the way Västfjäll et al. (2016) defined incidental and integral types of emotion. The former entails the experience of emotion unrelated to the task at hand, but the latter emerges or stems from the task at hand. Thus, the use of movie clips or autobiographical memories before any trust decision was coded as incidental; however, the emotional experience, considering the familial expressions or characteristics of the decision and related aspects, before making a trust decision, was captured under integral emotions. We

presented all these codes and categories in the article with respective frequencies and percentages.

In results, we found that communal sharing relations were influenced more by the trustee's emotions than in the market interactions (Myers & Tingley, 2016; Schniter & Sheremeta, 2014). Also, participants rated smiling faces as more trustworthy (Strachan et al., 2016) in communal sharing conditions. Further, even in market-pricing relations people with happy emotional expressions regarded their coworkers as more trustworthy than those with sad or neutral states (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Similarly, in the cooperative context, happy partners were trusted more than angry ones (Belkin & Rothman, 2017). All in all, we documented the difference in trust based on a specified relational mode. Also, in the present synthesis of evidence incidental emotions were processed more in communal relations but their influence was more pronounced in market interactions than in communal ones (details in the table, article 2).

Control and Trust in CS vs. MP Relationships (Article 3)³

When partners perceive high levels of risk or uncertainty, both trust and control play a role in reducing these uncertainties (Das & Teng, 2001). However, scholars maintained varying perspectives on this trust-control nexus. Some propose that trust and control tend to complement each other, where control facilitates the establishment and maintenance of trust in specific contexts (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). While others suggest control as a substitute for trust, importantly in low-trust situations (David & Han, 2004). Additionally, these two mechanisms might coexist independently in certain contexts, particularly when people already have established trust and merely use control to manage ongoing risks (Costa & Bijlsma-Frankema,

³ Kuzminska, A. O., Khan, M., Kesebir, P., Zaleskiewicz, T., & Gasiorowska, A. (2026). When control undermines trust: Relational models and the context-dependent nature of monitoring. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*

2007). Despite this detailed debate, the question of whether control differs between CS and MP relationships remains underexplored.

In communal contexts, control seems to be manifesting in harmful forms such as emotional and physical abuse, economic manipulation, coercion, intimidation, and social isolation, all of which can damage trust and degrade relationship quality (e.g., Graham-Kevan & Archer, 2008; Johnson, 2006; Stark, 2007). Controlling behaviors may reflect underlying power imbalances, with one partner attempting to dominate decision-making or restrict the other's actions (Stark, 2007). Even subtle attempts to exert control in close relationships are viewed negatively and labeled as intrusive. Intrusiveness can present itself in two ways: covertly, when done secretly and without consent (for example, accessing a partner's email without their knowledge), or overtly, when one directly interferes in another's personal life, such as by becoming overly involved in their decisions or activities (Petronio, 1994). These actions are linked to disagreements, anger, resentment, and a breakdown of trust (e.g., Hawk et al., 2008; Petronio, 1994). For example, research found that snooping through a partner's phone was strongly associated with diminished trust, predicting increased conflict and a higher likelihood of relationship dissolution (Arikewuyo et al., 2021; Vinkers et al., 2011).

However, in business and economic relationships, control is typically viewed as something more acceptable than in close relationships (Gulati, 1995; Lazzarini et al., 2004). Trust and control are seen as interchangeable tools for reducing uncertainty: high trust reduces the need for formal control, whereas low trust increases it (Inkpen & Currall, 1997; Williamson, 1975). This line of reasoning reflects the economic utility of trust—it promotes cooperation, lowers transaction costs, and facilitates information sharing (Arrow, 1974; Gulati, 1995; Powell, 1996). Empirical work in organizational behavior supports aspects of this view—for instance,

Costa (2003) found that trust within work teams positively correlates with cooperation and negatively with monitoring behaviors. However, not all theoretical approaches that focus on MP relationships accept a substitution link between trust and control. Specifically, the complementarity view present in the economic and organizational literature argues that trust and control are not inversely related but may rather reinforce one another, such that formal control mechanisms can foster trust by providing structure and clarity (Vuorenmaa, 2024). Particularly in inter-organizational collaborations, formal contracts and institutional safeguards enhance predictability, which is crucial in environments marked by high uncertainty or ongoing change (Dodgson, 1993; Luhmann, 1997).

Further, research on the interplay between trust and control presents that means of control, such as signing contracts and formal agreements, are vital in certain contexts where trust alone may be insufficient, especially in MP relationships (Schilke & Cook, 2013). However, in CS relationships, the introduction of instances of control, like formal contracts or agreements are viewed as detrimental to the relationship, as it undermines the foundational role of trust (Clark et al., 2010), reduces the emotional quality of the relationship, and tend to increase transactional perceptions (Follingstad et al., 2002).

In line with these thoughts, in this article we aimed at focusing on how trust operates differently across CS vs. MP relations and that the presence of instances of control might play varying roles depending upon the nature of the relationship. As in CS relationships, trust is an essential component of relationship building and maintenance; negative emotional experiences and formal means of control in CS relationships damage relational quality and hinder relationship satisfaction (Clark et al., 2010). In contrast, in MP relationships trust, though essential, can be replaced by formal means of control, which would alter the perception of a

relationship to be more efficient and effective, even in the absence of trust (Fiske, 1992; Fiske & Haslam, 2005). Exploring this, we conducted a series of experiments to find the causal influence of control in shaping trust within these relational mindsets.

First, we tested and established that people find control more acceptable and express a greater willingness to use it in market-pricing relationships than in communal sharing ones (Experiment 1). The hypotheses, recruitment, sample size, exclusion criteria, and data analysis were preregistered at: https://aspredicted.org/2TB_Z5T. Power analysis with G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) for the paired-sample t-test assuming a small effect size of $d_z = 0.25$, at $\alpha = .05$ with a power of $1 - \beta = .95$ revealed that we need a sample of 210 participants to detect such an effect. However, our final sample consisted of $N = 217$ individuals (105 women, 107 men, 5 others, $M_{age} = 37.33$, $SD = 11.80$) and based on our preregistered analysis plan, we conducted multilevel regression using Bayesian estimator in MPlus 8.10, and we included random intercepts for participants. The results supported our hypothesis that people perceive monitoring as more acceptable in market relationships than in communal ones.

Then, we examined whether introducing instances of control into a relationship would lead people to perceive it as more market-like and less communal-like, compared to when such control is absent (Experiments S1 and S2 presented in Supplementary Materials). Next, in line with our predictions, we investigated whether introducing control would lead to lower levels of declared trust overall, with this trust-reducing effect being more pronounced in communal sharing contexts than in market pricing ones. Here, we also systematically tested whether this effect depended on the individual's role: the person introducing control or the person subject to it. In results, we found decrease in trust both in communal and market relations and findings were more pronounced in the agent of action's perspective, as predicted. The hypotheses,

recruitment, sample size, exclusion criteria, and data analysis were preregistered at:

https://aspredicted.org/XLM_Z5J. We conducted a Monte Carlo power simulation using the data from a previous study for a priori power to conduct a sensitivity analysis with monitoring and relational model interaction. The simulation indicated that to detect a similar effect with $\alpha = .05$ and power of $1 - \beta = 0.95$, we needed a sample of 1200 participants. The final sample, after removing those who failed attention check, consisted of $N = 1171$ individuals (599 women, 564 men, 8 other/prefer not to tell, $M_{\text{age}} = 46.11$, $SD = 15.46$). As preregistration, we first tested the measurement model with one dependent variable constructed as a latent variable out of the three items with confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in Mplus 8.10 using Bayesian estimation and then we computed a multilevel regression analysis. In results, we demonstrated that the introduction of monitoring significantly decreased trust; however, this decrease varied by perspective and relational mode. From the trustor's perspective, monitoring significantly decreased trust in CS situations but had no significant effect in MP situations. From the trustee's perspective, monitoring significantly decreased trust in both CS and MP situations, with the detrimental effects being significantly stronger from the trustee's perspective than from the trustor's perspective in both relational models.

In Experiment 3, we attempted to conceptually replicate the results of Experiment 1 in a more collectivistic country, namely South Africa. Another change in this experiment was that we explicitly manipulated the degree of pre-existing trust in communal and market relations and again measured people's acceptance of monitoring and their willingness to use it in three different situations, just as in the previous experiments. The hypotheses, recruitment, sample size, exclusion criteria and data analysis were preregistered at: <https://aspredicted.org/ngys-gw38.pdf>. We based our sample size calculation on the results of Experiment 1. We ran a Monte

Carlo power simulation for a priori power with $\alpha = .05$ and the power of $1 - \beta = 0.95$ and found that we would need 580 participants for a two-group design to detect the proposed effect. However, with our 2x2 between-subjects design, we aimed to recruit 1160 participants. The final sample consisted of $N = 826$ South African individuals (399 women, 424 men, 3 other/prefer not to tell, $M_{\text{age}} = 29.91$, $SD = 13.43$). They were assigned to one of two conditions framed as “Friendship Task” ($n = 391$) referring to communal relations or “Wall-street Task” ($n = 353$) labelled for market-pricing interaction. As preregistered, we conducted a multilevel analysis and found that the main effect of the relational model was significant, such that participants perceived monitoring in MP relationships more positively than in CS relationships. We also found a significant main effect of trust, such that participants perceived monitoring more positively in the medium trust condition than in the high trust condition. However, contrary to our expectations, we did not find a significant interaction effect between the two manipulations.

Finally, moving beyond hypothetical scenarios, we used a behavioral economic game to explore real-time trust decision-making. We examined behavioral monitoring trust decisions to substantiate our findings, employing an adapted version of the Cheap Talk Game (CTG; Gneezy, 2005)—a situation that requires trust. The hypotheses, recruitment, sample size, exclusion criteria, and data analysis were preregistered at: <https://aspredicted.org/yp3y-jx35.pdf>. We performed a Monte Carlo simulation power analysis using Mplus 8.10. Assuming a relational model manipulation effect equal to $\beta = .16$ (the effect we found in Experiment 1), significance of $\alpha = .05$, and power of $1 - \beta = .95$, we would need a sample of 900 participants to detect the desired effect in the multilevel logistic regression planned for data analysis. After removing invalid cases, the final sample included $N = 744$ Australian participants (416 women, 317 men, 11 other/prefer not to tell, $M_{\text{age}} = 36.50$, $SD = 12.47$). To test the effectiveness of our

experimental manipulation of relational model, we calculated a mixed ANOVA and found a significant main effect of the manipulation of relational modes. Then we conducted a multilevel probit⁴ regression with relational model (MP vs. CS) as an IV on a between-subjects level and paying for monitoring (yes/no) as the DV to test our preregistered hypothesis. We also included random intercepts for participants and rounds. In line with our predictions, we found a significant main effect of condition (relational model) on the propensity to use monitoring, $\beta = .16$, Post. $SD = .06$, 95% CI [.03, .24], $p < .001$, such that participants were 1.57 times more likely to apply monitoring when the task was framed as the Wall-Street task (Odds = .17) than when it was framed as the Friendship task.

Overall, our findings indicated that the relational model affected the propensity to exercise costly monitoring, such that this tendency was higher in the MP framing than in the CS framing. Importantly, this effect remained significant after controlling for prior experience of deception and previous monitoring imposed by participants.

Discussion

This dissertation presents three papers addressing the specification of trust in CS vs. MP relationships. Based on our assumption that trust is not a unitary process, but rather emerges through distinct psychological mechanisms depending on the relational context in consideration. Specifically, we argue that the experience of trust is different in communal sharing and market pricing relationships, and that could be shaped by relational norms, emotional processes, and the role of control. On this understanding, we investigated how trust operates in CS vs. MP relational mindsets (b) the role of emotions in shaping trust, and (c) the role of control in defining trust across these contexts.

⁴ This was the deviation from preregistration: we preregistered conducting logit regression, but Mplus 8.10 allows only for probit regression in cross-classified data structure.

First, we conducted a meta-analysis investigating trust in CS vs. MP relationships based on a Trust Game interaction. The findings showed no significant difference in the two specified types of relationships. In our second systematic synthesis of experimental studies, we found a substantial role of emotions in both CS vs. MP relationships, suggesting a potential explanation for differences in trust. Lastly, our series of experimental studies documented a role of control in understanding the difference in trust in CS vs. MP relationships. We concluded that the presence of instances of control is acceptable, and people were more likely to introduce control in MP than in CS relations. Also, the initial level of trust was found to be crucial to willingness and acceptance of control, with a high level of trust opposing any such attempt. Further, in a real-time behavioral interaction, participants were more likely to assert control in the MP framing than in the CS situation. Thus, on a holistic account, we are able to present the difference in the experience of trust in CS vs. MP relationships. Also, to explain this difference, we identified a role of emotions and an element of control being pertinent to a specific type of relationship.

Based on a meta-analysis, both market pricing and communal sharing cues significantly increased transfers in the Trust Game compared to control conditions. Market mindset manipulations produced a small-to-medium effect ($\delta = 0.25$), while communal mindset manipulations showed a small effect ($\delta = 0.16$). Importantly, although the effect of market cues was larger in magnitude, the difference between the two mindsets was not statistically significant. Second, heterogeneity analyses revealed low variability across studies in the market mindset, but moderate heterogeneity in the communal mindset. However, our examination of potential moderators, including manipulation type, game parameters, and study characteristics, revealed no systematic factors that differentially influenced how market vs. communal cues foster trust. This suggests that the convergent effects are not merely artifacts of particular

experimental designs or contextual factors. Rather than viewing trust as a unitary construct, our results suggest that trust may be better conceptualized as a behavioral outcome that can emerge from multiple, distinct psychological processes. The Trust Game, as a behavioral measure, captures participants' willingness to accept vulnerability for potential mutual benefit, but the motivations underlying this willingness may vary substantially. This multiplicity challenges theories that position market and communal mindsets as inherently incompatible. Instead, our findings suggest that both relational frameworks recognize the importance of cooperation and mutual benefit, though they arrive at this recognition through different routes. Under market cues, individuals may trust because they understand the strategic value of cooperation, while under communal cues, they may trust because they value their partner's welfare.

Next, based on a systematic review, we found that emotions are central to explaining trust in both CS and MP relationships. In terms of cooperation, happy partners are trusted more than angry ones (Belkin & Rothman, 2017), and participants trusted their coworkers more under the influence of positive emotions than sad ones (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Specifically, under the influence of emotional experiences unrelated to the task (incidental emotions) participants transferred more money during trust game interactions (Capra, 2004; Myers & Tingley, 2016; Schniter & Sheremeta, 2014). Further, incidental emotions were not only asserted as a robust determinant of trust but also highlighted as an obvious indicator of our daily judgments in past research (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Thus, we collected a similar set of evidence confirming as well as demonstrating this influence with examples under our categorization of incidental vs. integral emotions and trust in CS vs. MP relationships.

Moreover, based on experimental evidence, the reason for these differential effects might lie in the signal that is sent when control is introduced in communal and market contexts. In MP

relationships, control is likely to be interpreted diagnostically (“the other party introduces control because they are cautious or even rational”; “they simply care about their outcomes and want to assure they get the best possible result”). In contrast, in communal relationships, it may be seen as strategic or manipulative (“they don’t really trust me”). In other words, those subjected to others’ control may recognize and interpret the reasons for introducing control differently, depending on the context (communal vs. market). It is even possible that in the typical MP context, introducing control is, to some extent, independent of trust, and people do not connect the use of control with whether the other party trusts them or not. Rather, control is simply part of the generally accepted and normative behavior in those types of relationships. However, in the communal context, control is likely more directly related to trust, and introducing control has a much stronger effect on individuals’ emotional reactions. For example, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) wrote that: “When asked for their emotional perception of control, most agents who react negatively say that they perceive the controlling decision as a signal of distrust and a limitation of their choice autonomy”. Thus, we contribute to understanding the preliminary psychological bases of our processing when making trust decisions specific to the type of relationship we are in.

Further, establishing this understanding will guide in tailoring and managing our relationships involving trust with clear intentions and specifications. Dirks and de Jong (2022) suggested a cross-domain and cross-disciplinary advancement of trust research on theoretical grounds. They specifically referred to the underexplored influence of emotions and heuristics on trust in organizational contexts. By integrating the two distinct, communal and market, spheres of interaction, we aim to extend our knowledge about both overlapping and distinct aspects of closer vs. distant interactions. For instance, signing contracts, investigating whereabouts and

related attempts may question commitment in close relationships (Rusbult et al., 1999).

However, similar attempts, joint agreements, time allocation and other such practices ensure the smooth flow of managerial functioning and build trust (Jørgensen & Åsgård, 2019). Dwelling on these basic principles and motives of the particular type of relationship would help us expect and deliver the desirable outcomes.

Limitation and future research

There are several limitations in our exploration. First, we intended to establish the psychological specification of trust in CS and MP relationships in general, rather than in terms of individual or cultural understandings or practices of CS and MP mindsets. Similarly, the concept of control might be experienced differently at a personal or regional level. Past research suggests that people from different nationalities and cultural backgrounds adhere to different norms and have different perceptions of those norms. For instance, people from dignity cultures generally value autonomy more than those from honor cultures, who prioritize social respect and rigid roles. Such differences result in different orientations towards coercive control and dealing with conflict or resolution (Smith et al., 2017).

Second, we conducted a systematic review on the role of emotions, and it cannot fill the primary data synthesis or exploration of similar patterns in ongoing interactions. Further research involving different research designs, such as manipulating emotions and then finding how these trust experiences are shaped through CS and MP mindsets, will be very insightful to advance in this direction.

Lastly, we did not consider the temporal aspect of a relationship and assumed that its timing and maturity might influence these findings differently. Previous research also shows that dyadic trust and beliefs about the relationship develop over time, and the context of the

relationship shapes it in a definitive direction (Yılmaz et al., 2023). We propose that investigating these ideas in future research might provide a more promising understanding of these points, strengthening our understanding of trust based on the specification of a relationship.

Conclusion

This dissertation demonstrates that the experience of trust is not universal, but rather depends critically on the relational context. The role of emotions and control highlighted the differences in the core principles of communal-sharing and market-pricing relationships. Emotions are pertinent to trust in both types of relationships, and they shape the respective positive or negative direction of outcomes. While the inverse association accurately describes trust-control dynamics in communal relationships, market relationships show greater compatibility between trust and control mechanisms. These findings advance our theoretical understanding of governance mechanisms across different social and economic contexts and provide practical guidance for managing trust and control in diverse relational settings.

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Market and Communal Mindsets Both Increase Trust:
A Meta-Analysis of Trust Game Behavior^a

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Abstract

Trust is fundamental to social and economic interactions, yet research yields inconsistent predictions about how relational mindsets affect trust. Although communal sharing (CS) is assumed to promote trust through relational concern, some experimental studies show nonsignificant or even opposite effects. Similarly, while market pricing (MP) is typically associated with reduced prosociality, recent work suggests it may also foster trust in structured economic exchanges. To clarify these inconsistencies, we meta-analyzed experimental studies using the Trust Game (TG) to test whether experimentally activating communal or market mindsets reliably alters trusting choices. Across 63 effect sizes from 58 studies ($N = 9,742$), we compared TG transfers following CS and MP manipulations with control conditions and examined study- and game-level moderators. Both CS and MP cues increased trust relative to control conditions. Market cues produced a small-to-medium effect ($\delta = 0.25$) and communal cues a small effect ($\delta = 0.16$), with no significant difference between them. Moderator analyses found no systematic differences across manipulation types, study design, participant characteristics, or TG variations. Within the MP subset, higher multipliers strengthened the effect of market cues on trust, suggesting strategic reciprocity. Publication bias analyses provided no evidence of small-study effects. Overall, these findings challenge the view that communal and market mindsets produce opposing effects on trust. Instead, they suggest dual psychological pathways to trust—relational concern and strategic reciprocity—through which both mindsets may promote trusting behavior.

Keywords: meta-analysis, trust, market mindset, communal mindset, Trust Game

1 Introduction

Trust plays a fundamental role in social interactions, influencing cooperation and decision-making in both personal and economic contexts (Rempel et al., 1985; Zak & Knack, 2001). Extensive research has examined the determinants of trust and its functions across relational contexts. For example, individuals with strong family ties exhibit lower trust toward strangers (Ermisch et al., 2009) and trust in leadership has positive consequences for the employees' performance (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). Because trust operates within broader relational norms, different relational models may influence how trust is extended or withheld. In particular, a critical yet understudied question is how contextual cues activating communal sharing (CS) and market pricing (MP) relational norms (Fiske, 1992) shape trust-related decisions.

Market and communal relational mindsets are typically presented as cognitions that evoke opposing norms of social interaction, with the communal mindset associated with generosity and other-interest, and the market mindset typically linked to self-interest and reduced prosociality (Gasiorowska et al., 2016). From a theoretical perspective, the communal mindset appears inherently conducive to trust, as trust constitutes one of its defining features (Le et al., 2018). Yet, despite this theoretical expectation, empirical evidence is mixed: while some studies confirm that activating communal cognitions—such as through interaction with an ingroup member—increase trust (e.g., Fujino et al., 2020; Parlasca et al., 2019), others report negligible or even opposite effects (e.g., Trifiletti & Capozza, 2011; Vermue et al., 2018). In contrast, the market mindset seems, at least conceptually, incompatible with trust. Because it emphasizes proportionality, calculation, and self-interest, one might expect that activating a market mindset would suppress trust and empathy. However, empirical findings suggest more complexity: whereas some studies show that market cues undermine interpersonal trust (Kuzminska et al., 2023; Xin & Liu, 2013),

others find that market-oriented thinking enhances behavioral trust in structured exchanges (Al-Ubaydli et al., 2013; Kuzminska et al., 2024). This conceptual and empirical tension raises two intriguing questions. First, if a communal mindset should naturally foster trust, why are the findings inconsistent? Second, if market mindset is expected to erode trust, why does evidence sometimes suggest the opposite?

To address these inconsistencies, we conduct a meta-analysis examining whether trusting behavior is systematically shaped by contextual cues that activate distinct relational mindsets—specifically, market pricing and communal sharing (Fiske, 1991, 1992). To operationalize trust, we rely on the Trust Game (TG; Berg et al., 1995), the most widely used behavioral measure of trust. We test whether MP and CS relational cues influence transfers in the TG compared to a control condition and explore whether the effects are moderated by different manipulations or study-level characteristics. Based on 63 effect sizes ($N = 9,742$), our analysis reveals that both market and communal mindsets significantly increase trusting behavior (compared to a control condition), with effect sizes that are statistically indistinguishable. This pattern suggests that trust may emerge through multiple psychological pathways—one rooted in relational concern and another in strategic reciprocity—challenging theories that position these relational orientations as inherently incompatible. By synthesizing existing findings, this meta-analysis provides initial behavioral evidence consistent with the dual-pathway hypothesis, showing that market and communal mindsets, despite their different motivational origins, can converge on similar behavioral expressions of trust.

1.1 The Relational Consequences of Market and Communal Mindsets

Communal sharing and market pricing are two relational extremes: in CS, people are guided by others' benefit, while in MP, they focus on the proportionality of costs to benefits (Fiske, 1992). The relational context is associated with rules governing behavior, so the way people view each other and regulate their actions depends on the type of relationship they are

in. In other words, different types of relationships engage different mindsets, which may influence how individuals think about and respond to the reality surrounding them.

When people engage in MP relations, they use the market mindset: they care about how much they can gain from their investment and whether the repayment is of comparable value. The market mindset emphasizes independence, individualistic efficiency, and self-control; it also triggers the motivation to use proportional thinking—a sensitivity to ratios and rates, and a proneness to make such comparisons (Fiske, 1992; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Zaleskiewicz et al., 2020). In contrast, the communal mindset emphasizes helpfulness and generosity (Fiske, 2004; Fiske et al., 2019).

Prior research suggests that these two relational mindsets can be activated by subtle contextual cues, influencing individuals' expectations and behaviors within social and economic interactions (e.g., Zaleskiewicz & Gasiorowska, 2017). Moreover, relational mindsets can be activated even outside the relationships they typically pertain to (Clark & Mills, 2012). For example, people can adopt a market-focused perspective in marital contexts or apply a communal perspective in economic exchanges. Contextual cues—such as recent experiences or the framing of a situation—can therefore influence individuals' relational expectations, shaping how they perceive and respond to different situations.

1.2 The Role of Trust in Market Pricing and Communal Sharing Relationships

Trust enables individuals in close relationships to feel secure, rely on one another, and sustain meaningful social bonds over time (Rempel et al., 1985). It fosters emotional intimacy, strengthens relationship satisfaction, and promotes long-term stability (e.g., Larzelere & Huston, 1980; Simpson, 2007). Longitudinal research shows that higher levels of trust predict a greater willingness to be interdependent, resulting in more enduring relationships (Wieselquist et al., 1999). Trust also promotes benevolent interpretations of a partner's actions, reducing unnecessary conflict and strengthening emotional security

(Murray et al., 2009). Consequently, given that trust is such a crucial component of communal interactions, one would expect the communal mindset to reliably foster trust, as communal norms emphasize benevolence, shared identity, and care for others' welfare. Indeed, communal motivation contributes to greater relationship satisfaction and well-being (Le et al., 2018), and increases the likelihood of providing help, particularly in response to a partner's distress (Clark et al., 1987). However, empirical results are far from uniform. Some studies show that communal activation increases trust (Hancock et al., 2023; Kuzminska et al., 2023), while others report minimal or context-dependent effects (e.g., Trifiletti & Capozza, 2011; Vermue et al., 2018). For instance, while ingroup membership is considered a communal cue (Fiske, 1992) and is typically associated with higher trust, Trifiletti and Capozza (2011) showed unexpected evidence of higher outgroup trust among southern Italian participants. Similarly, outgroup favoritism in trust was found among participants from the UK and the Netherlands (Vermue et al., 2018). These results suggest that communal cues may not always translate into behavioral trust.

Conversely, market logic may, on the surface, seem largely undesirable for satisfying social interactions. Market mindset has been shown to promote "asocial selfish individualism" (Fiske, 1992), egoistic self-focus (Gasiorowska et al., 2016; Mukherjee et al., 2013; Vohs et al., 2006), lower intimacy and emotional connectedness (Caruso et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2014; Mead & Stuppy, 2014), and even increased engagement in unethical behavior (Kouchaki et al., 2013; Piff et al., 2012). Having a market mindset was shown to negatively affect interpersonal outcomes, including empathy and perspective-taking (van Laer et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2018), and trigger competitive mindsets that lead to more selfish behavior in economic games (Kay et al., 2004). However, concluding from these findings that the market mindset universally undermines trust overlooks the crucial role trust plays in market-based exchanges. Fair and reciprocal trade creates mutual benefits for

individuals and organizations. Historically, cooperative exchange with out-group members has been a key driver of human progress (Fukuyama, 2011). Market transactions rely on trust arising from expectations of fair exchange and reputational accountability (Aghion et al., 2010; McCannon et al., 2018). Without trust, markets become inefficient, as fear of fraud and exploitation discourages participation (Fukuyama, 2011; Zak & Knack, 2001). As Akerlof (1970) argued, a breakdown in trust would ultimately lead to the collapse of the socio-economic system. Although formal agreements and legal regulations structure business interactions, they cannot eliminate all uncertainty (McCannon et al., 2018). In the presence of residual uncertainty, actors must still rely on trust to assess risk and enable exchanges. Indeed, some studies demonstrate that activating market mindset may, under certain conditions, enhance behavioral trust—particularly when proportional reciprocity is salient (Al-Ubaydli et al., 2013; Kuzminska et al., 2024).

Across both relational logics—communal and market—trust thus serves distinct psychological roles. In communal contexts, it reflects emotional closeness and benevolent concern, while in market contexts, it represents a strategic expectation of fairness and reciprocity. These two forms differ motivationally but serve a similar coordinating function: they reduce uncertainty, facilitate cooperation, and enhance the quality of interpersonal and economic exchanges. This conceptual overlap offers a possible resolution to the empirical puzzle identified earlier: behavioral trust can be enhanced by both communal and market cues, although for different psychological reasons. While communal cues may foster trust through empathy and concern for others' welfare, market cues might enhance trust through strategic considerations and expectations of proportional reciprocity.

This meta-analysis investigates how relational cues used in experimental research to activate market and communal mindsets systematically influence trust behavior in the Trust Game (TG). We selected the Trust Game as our focal paradigm for three reasons: its

widespread use as the standard behavioral measure of trust, its structural flexibility that allows participants to interpret the same decision through different relational lenses, and the extensive body of existing research that enables meta-analytic synthesis.

1.3 Relational Cues in the Trust Game

The Trust Game has the following formal structure: Person A sends a portion of their initial endowment to Person B. What Person B receives is Person A's multiplied offer (usually by 3). Person B can then send back a chosen amount of money to Person A. A higher allocation (Person A's offer) is typically considered an indicator of trust shown by Person A, while a higher return by Person B is an indicator of Person B's trustworthiness (Berg et al., 1995; Camerer, 2003).

The Trust Game's structure presents an inherent paradox that makes it uniquely suited for studying relational mindsets. Its rules and well-defined structure resemble characteristics of MP relationships rather than those of CS relationships: Person A's trusting behavior is contingent on their expectation of direct and immediate reciprocity and is expressed in a quantifiable way (Berg et al., 1995). Such an explicit cost-benefit calculation is rarely present in CS relationships, where one's vulnerability is not aimed at gaining a directly measurable compensation. Yet despite these market-like features, research demonstrates that the Trust Game is remarkably malleable to relational framing. Participants' decisions may therefore express either a calculated investment (market frame) or a gesture of goodwill (communal frame), depending on contextual cues (Espín et al., 2016).

Studies have consistently shown that social dilemmas, including the Trust Game, can be framed in ways that change people's perceptions of the relationship. For example, labeling the Prisoner's Dilemma Game as the "Community Game" rather than the "Wall Street Game" has been shown to increase cooperation (Kay & Ross, 2003; Liberman et al., 2004). These findings suggest that the way a game is relationally framed can significantly influence

participants' perceptions and behaviors, aligning them more closely with communal sharing norms or market pricing norms. In the Trust Game, such frames are likely to activate different motivational logics of trust. Communal cues may elicit trust grounded in benevolence and shared identity, whereas market cues may foster trust grounded in proportional reciprocity and strategic reliability. Understanding whether these cues produce distinct or convergent effects on trusting behavior is therefore central to the understanding of how relational mindsets shape trust. Moreover, previous research (Espín et al., 2016) documented two main motives behind people's allocations in the TG—strategic self-interest (i.e., maximizing own gain) and efficiency concerns (i.e., maximizing total surplus). These two predominant motives may reflect the dual pathways through which trust can emerge, activated differentially depending on the mindset participants bring to the situation. The Trust Game's structure is thus sufficiently flexible to accommodate both relational logics: participants can interpret the same behavioral decision through either a communal lens (viewing transfers as expressions of care and mutual benefit) or a market lens (treating transfers as strategic investments expecting proportional returns).

2 Research Aims

The present meta-analysis addresses the theoretical and empirical tensions surrounding the link between relational mindsets and trust. To clarify the inconsistent patterns described above, we systematically review and quantitatively integrate prior experimental studies examining how activating communal versus market mindsets affects behavioral trust. Using the Trust Game (TG; Berg et al., 1995) as the standard behavioral measure, we examine (1) whether exposure to a market mindset leads to higher initial transfers in the TG compared to a control condition, (2) whether a communal mindset also increases trust-related behavior, and (3) whether the effects of these two mindsets differ in magnitude. Additionally, we explore whether these effects vary across types of experimental

manipulations and whether study-level factors, including specific features of the Trust Game, moderate the observed outcomes.

3 Method

This meta-analysis followed the PRISMA protocol and was preregistered at <https://osf.io/ec83t>. We conducted a systematic literature search in March 2023, updated in July 2025, across multiple databases (Scopus, PsycINFO, Web of Science, EThOS, APA PsycExtra, ProQuest Dissertations & Theses) and relevant conference proceedings. We also contacted the authors to obtain unpublished data. We included experimental studies with random assignment that manipulated market or communal mindsets, measuring trustor transfers in Trust Games where participants believed they interacted with humans. Studies required healthy adult participants and available English-language reports (published or unpublished) from 1995-2025.

After removing duplicates, four independent reviewers (two per study) assessed eligibility against the preregistered criteria. Then, they independently extracted study characteristics, including design, demographics, setting, manipulation type, game structure, and outcome measures (inter-rater reliability: Cohen's $\kappa = .78$), with discrepancies resolved through discussion. Effect sizes were extracted or calculated from available statistics. Authors were contacted when data were insufficient. Quality assessment adapted NIH tools, with two reviewers scoring each study to generate a quality index for moderator analyses.

Detailed information on search strategies, inclusion criteria, coding procedures, and quality assessment tools is presented in the Online Appendix.

4 Analytical Approach

We carried out the meta-analysis using random-effects models with a restricted maximum likelihood estimator (Veroniki et al., 2016; Viechtbauer, 2005) in R using the *metafor* package (Viechtbauer, 2010). This was a deviation from the preregistration, as we initially planned to use CMA software (Borenstein et al., 2011). We ultimately conducted all meta-analyses using the *metafor* package in R because it supports multilevel modelling. Additionally, in keeping with Open Science principles, we opted to use freely available and widely accessible analytical methods to ensure greater transparency and reproducibility.

First, we conducted analyses for all extracted effects. Second, we compared the effect sizes of the market and communal manipulations. Third, we conducted additional moderation analyses to examine potential study-level moderators. However, the conclusions from these analyses are limited, as the market mindset subset contained a small number of studies ($k = 11$). Moreover, we did not have sufficient unpublished data to conduct the planned sensitivity analysis comparing published vs. unpublished studies. Instead, we conducted analyses to identify influential cases using Cook's distance and hat values to detect studies that have a disproportionate influence on the overall effect estimates.

To assess potential publication bias and selective reporting, we conducted a visual inspection of funnel plots and multilevel Egger-type regressions (Viechtbauer, 2010), in which effect sizes were regressed on their standard errors while retaining the nested random-effects structure. Because the preregistered trim-and-fill procedure is not suited for multilevel models, we instead applied PET–PEESE analyses (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). In line with our preregistration, we also conducted a *p*-curve analysis (Simonsohn et al., 2014). Finally, we supplemented these preregistered approaches with a *z*-curve analysis (Bartoš & Schimmack, 2022) to provide complementary data regarding the evidential value of the included studies.

5 Results

5.1 Descriptive statistics

The final sample included 41 reports containing 58 studies, which contributed 63 effect sizes to the meta-analytical calculations; specifically, 11 with the market mindset manipulation and 52 with the communal mindset manipulation. The total number of participants was 9,742 (for a detailed review, see Table S1 from the Online Appendix). Of the total sample, 13 studies did not report gender proportions, and in the remaining studies, approximately 49% were women. The largest portion of the data was collected in the USA (25.13%), followed by mixed online samples (11.79%), Germany (6.70%), China (6.38%), Kenya (5.48%), and Italy (5.08%). Moreover, 44.7% of participants represented the general adult population, 46.6% were from the university student population, and 8.7% were unidentified in the study. The sample sizes ranged from 21 to 837, with a mean of 156 and a median of 110. These data suggest that the population sampled is roughly equally split between genders and between the general population and university students, but with a wide spread of nationalities, as there are 19 different countries in the sample.

5.2 Market vs. Communal Mindset and Trust

To address our preregistered research question—whether market and communal mindsets result in higher transfers in the TG compared to a control condition—we used a three-level analysis, with studies at level 2 and papers at level 3. This model provided a significantly better fit than a model without clustering, $\Delta LL = 42.86$, $\chi^2(2) = 55.74$, $p < .001$, $AIC = 35.99$ vs. 89.73 . Extending the model to include effects nested within studies did not improve fit, $\Delta LL = 14.99$, $\chi^2(1) = 1.17$, $p = .279$, $AIC = 35.99$ vs. 36.81 .

A baseline meta-analysis with random effects at study and paper levels showed a pooled effect of the relational mindset of $\delta = 0.18$, $SE = 0.04$, 95% CI [0.10, 0.27], $Z = 4.13$, $p < .001$, with substantial residual heterogeneity, $Q(62) = 191.67$, $p < .001$. The total variance

not attributable to sampling error was $I^2 = 75.84\%$, distributed across Level 2 (L2, within reports), $I^2 = 30.39\%$, and Level 3 (L3, between reports), $I^2 = 45.45\%$.

In a second step, we added the manipulation type (communal mindset vs. market mindset) as a moderator to the analysis described above. Although the estimated difference between the two types of manipulations (market minus communal) was notable in magnitude ($\delta = 0.14$), it did not reach statistical significance, $SE = 0.11$, 95% CI $[-0.09, 0.36]$, $Z = 1.18$, $Q_M(1) = 1.20$, $p = .229$, likely reflecting the low number of studies in the market set. Residual heterogeneity remained substantial, $Q_E(61) = 187.29$, $p < .001$, total $I^2 = 75.58\%$, L2 $I^2 = 31.96\%$, and L3 $I^2 = 43.62\%$. As a robustness check, we conducted a Bayesian meta-regression with *bayesmeta* package in R. It revealed a small positive average effect on trust and moderate heterogeneity, with a positive but uncertain trend suggesting slightly larger effects under market than communal mindset conditions (see Online Appendix for details).


Although the effect of the specific relational mindset was nonsignificant, we decided to follow our preregistered protocol and separately investigate whether transfers in the TG were affected by the market mindset vs. the control condition and by the communal mindset vs. the control condition.

The meta-analysis for the market mindset ($k = 11$, see Figure 2) revealed a significant pooled effect, $\delta = 0.25$, $SE = 0.05$, 95% CI $[0.16, 0.33]$, $Z = 5.71$, $p < .001$. These results indicate a small-to-medium effect (Lovakov & Agadullina, 2021) of the market manipulation (compared to the control condition) on transfers in TG. The model showed that the included studies were nonsignificantly heterogeneous, $Q(10) = 13.36$, $p = .204$, total $I^2 = 3.75\%$, L2 $I^2 = 3.75\%$, L3 $I^2 = 0$. No studies showed outlier effects based on boxplot inspection (see Figure S4 in Online Appendix). However, influence diagnostics (hat values and Cook's distance, see Figures S2 and S3 in Online Appendix) identified one potentially influential study (Kuzminska et al., 2024). After excluding it from the analysis, the meta-analytic pooled

effect of market mindset manipulation on the transfers in the Trust Game slightly increased and remained significant, $\delta = 0.29$, $SE = 0.05$, 95% CI [0.20, 0.38], $Z = 6.30$, $p < .001$, with no evidence of residual heterogeneity, $Q(9) = 8.10$, $p = .524$, total $I^2 = 0$, L2 $I^2 = 0$, and L3 $I^2 = 0$.

Figure 2.

Forest Plot of the Market Mindset Subset ($k = 11$). Studies are chronologically and alphabetically ordered.




The meta-analysis for the communal mindset ($k = 52$, see Figure 3) revealed a significant pooled effect, $\delta = 0.16$, $SE = 0.05$, 95% CI [0.06, 0.25], $Z = 3.07$, $p = .002$. The included studies were significantly heterogeneous, $Q(51) = 173.92$, $p < .001$, with a total variance not attributable to sampling error of $I^2 = 78.90\%$. Most of the heterogeneity can be attributed to differences between papers at L3, $I^2 = 44.51\%$, but it also existed within papers at L2, $I^2 = 34.39\%$. Influence diagnostics (hat values and Cook's distance) did not identify any excessively influential studies. The largest Cook's distance (.13) was observed for *Cronk & Wasielewski, 2008*, though it remained well below conventional thresholds for concern (see Figure S5 in Online Appendix). Regarding hat values, the largest value was observed for *Bader & Keuschnigg, 2020*, but it remained well below conventional thresholds for concern (see Figure S6 in the Online Appendix).

Based on boxplot inspection (see Figure S7 in the Online Appendix), we identified two potential outliers: *Kang et al. (2011)*, which showed a strong positive effect, and *Trifiletti & Capozza (2011)*, which showed a strong negative effect. This removal slightly decreased residual heterogeneity, $Q(49) = 159.27$, $p < .001$, total $I^2 = 77.30\%$, L2 $I^2 = 31.51\%$, and L3 $I^2 = 45.79\%$. The overall effect size remained unchanged, $\delta = 0.16$, $SE = 0.05$, 95% CI [0.06, 0.26], $Z = 3.18$, $p = .002$.

Figure 3.

Forest Plot of the Communal Subset ($k = 52$). Studies are chronologically and alphabetically ordered.



5.3 Study-level moderators

Because the specific methods used to manipulate relational mindsets varied qualitatively across the two mindset subsets, we conducted moderation analyses by manipulation type separately for each subset. For all other moderators, we used meta-regression models with mindset type as a predictor and a study-level variable as a moderator. Due to the small number of studies extracted, especially those with the market mindset manipulation, we were not able to analyze all the moderators we had planned in our preregistration.

5.3.1 Type of manipulation

Market Mindset. Given the limited number of studies in the market mindset subset ($k = 11$), individual manipulation types were rarely repeated across studies. The most frequently used manipulation involved pictorial primes showing schematic silhouettes of people engaging in economic exchanges ($k = 3$). We conducted a moderation analysis comparing these pictorial primes to all other types of market manipulations ($k = 8$). The difference in effect sizes between pictorial and non-pictorial manipulations was not significant, $\delta = -0.13$, $SE = 0.11$, 95% CI $[-0.34, 0.09]$, $Z = -1.16$, $p = .246$. The residual heterogeneity for this model was not statistically significant, $Q_E(9) = 12.16$, $p = .204$, $L2 I^2 = 0$, and $L3 I^2 = 23.87\%$. These findings indicate that studies using images did not produce different effects compared to other methods.

Communal Mindset. The communal mindset subset included more studies ($k = 52$). Among the various manipulation types, ingroup vs. outgroup manipulations were the most frequently employed ($k = 26$), while all other communal manipulation types collectively comprised the remaining studies ($k = 26$). We conducted a moderation analysis comparing the effects of ingroup/outgroup manipulations against all other types of communal mindset interventions. The difference in effect sizes between ingroup/outgroup and other manipulations was not

significant, $\delta = -0.07$, $SE = 0.09$, 95% CI [-0.26, 0.11], $Z = -0.80$, $p = .426$. The model indicated substantial residual heterogeneity, $Q_E(50) = 170.99$, $p < .001$, total $I^2 = 78.60\%$, L2 $I^2 = 37.14\%$, L3 $I^2 = 41.46\%$. These findings show that studies using ingroup/outgroup manipulation did not produce different effects compared to other methods used to manipulate the communal mindset.

5.3.2 *Parameters of the Trust Game*

In this set of analyses, we examined whether several structural parameters of the Trust Game moderated the effects of relational mindset manipulations. None of these parameters, except for the multiplier, showed significant main or interaction effects. The structure of game (regular vs. simplified/mini TG), the round investigated (one-shot vs. first round in the iterated game), the payoff type (real vs. hypothetical), the size of initial endowment (in US dollars), and whether the trustee received an initial endowment did not significantly predict the effect sizes, nor did they interact with the relational mindset manipulation. Across these models, the relational mindset effect itself remained nonsignificant, and residual heterogeneity was substantial (See Table 1).

The only significant moderation emerged for the multiplier: larger multipliers were associated with stronger positive effects of the relational mindset manipulation. We decomposed this interaction by examining the relationship between the multiplier and the effect size separately for the market mindset and the communal mindset subsets. In the market mindset subset ($k = 11$), larger multipliers were associated with stronger positive effects, $\delta = 0.08$, $SE = 0.04$, 95% CI [0.003, 0.15], $Z = 2.03$, $p = .043$. Accounting for this moderator reduced the heterogeneity, $Q(9) = 9.24$, $p = .415$, total $I^2 = 2.37\%$, L2 $I^2 = 2.37\%$, and L3 $I^2 = 0$. In contrast, in the communal mindset subset, the multiplier was not related to effect sizes, $\delta = -0.06$, $SE = 0.05$, 95% CI [-0.16, 0.04], $Z = -1.20$, $p = .230$. Accounting for

this moderator did not reduce the heterogeneity within this subset, $Q(50) = 148.24, p < .001$, total $I^2 = 77.96\%$, L2 $I^2 = 40.95\%$, and L3 $I^2 = 37.01\%$.

5.3.3 *Quality of the studies*

We also tested whether study quality, as indexed by the Quality Index, moderated the effect of relational mindset manipulations. Neither the main effect of study quality nor its interaction with relational mindset reached significance, and the relational mindset effect also remained nonsignificant. Including study quality as a moderator did not meaningfully reduce heterogeneity compared with the baseline model (see Table 1).

5.3.4 *Other features of the studies*

We further explored whether additional study characteristics moderated the effects of relational mindset manipulations. The experimental design (between- vs. within-subjects) did not significantly predict effect sizes within the communal mindset subset, where this analysis was feasible. Likewise, the study setting (in-person vs. online) and the type of study population (students vs. adults) did not moderate the relational mindset effect, and their inclusion did not reduce heterogeneity. Finally, we examined whether the proportion of women among participants affected the results. Neither the main effect of gender composition nor its interaction with the relational mindset was significant, and the relational mindset effect itself remained nonsignificant. A robustness check assuming an equal gender distribution (50/50) across studies where the information about gender was not provided yielded the same pattern of results. Overall, none of these study-level moderators meaningfully accounted for the residual heterogeneity in effect sizes (see Table 1).

Table 1. Moderation analysis for the effects of relational mindsets on the behavior in the Trust Game. Results from meta-analytic regression.

Predictors in meta-regressions	<i>k</i>	Hedges' <i>g</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>Z</i>	<i>Q</i> (df)	<i>I</i> ²		
							Total	Level 2	Level 3
Structure of the game	63					183.96 (59)	76.90	30.76	46.14
Intercept		0.18	0.04	[0.09, 0.26]	3.96***				
Relational mindset		0.05	0.05	[-0.04, 0.14]	1.02				
Regular vs. Simplified/mini TG		-0.00	0.05	[-0.09, 0.09]	-0.09				
Relational mindset × Regular vs. Simplified/mini TG		0.02	0.05	[-0.07, 0.12]	0.49				
Game rounds	63					181.56 (59)	76.82	28.16	48.66
Intercept		0.19	0.05	[0.10, 0.28]	4.18***				
Relational mindset		0.08	0.05	[-0.02, 0.18]	1.48				
One-Shot vs. First Round of Iterated Game		-0.05	0.05	[-0.15, 0.04]	-1.07				
Relational mindset x One-Shot vs. First Round of Iterated Game		-0.05	0.06	[-0.17, 0.08]	-0.73				
Payoffs	61					181.30 (57)	76.63	34.6	42.03
Intercept		0.17	0.04	[0.08, 0.25]	3.81***				
Relational mindset		0.06	0.04	[-0.03, 0.14]	1.3				
Real vs. Hypothetical Payoffs		-0.02	0.04	[-0.11, 0.07]	-0.45				
Relational mindset x Real vs. Hypothetical Payoffs		-0.02	0.04	[-0.11, 0.07]	-0.4				
Size of Initial Endowment	60					179.44 (56)	77.44	33.01	44.43
Intercept		0.17	0.05	[0.08, 0.26]	3.75***				
Relational mindset		0.04	0.05	[-0.05, 0.13]	0.94				
Size of Initial Endowment		-0.06	0.04	[-0.14, 0.02]	-1.57				
Relational mindset x Size of Initial Endowment		-0.01	0.04	[-0.09, 0.07]	-0.18				

Predictors in meta-regressions	<i>k</i>	Hedges' <i>g</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>Z</i>	<i>Q</i> (df)	<i>I</i> ²		
							Total	Level 2	Level 3
Initial endowment for a trustee	62					185.94 (58)	77.97	24.75	53.23
Intercept		0.19	0.05	[0.09, 0.28]	4.00***				
Relational mindset		0.05	0.05	[-0.04, 0.14]	1.07				
Initial endowment for a trustee		-0.05	0.05	[-0.14, 0.04]	-1.17				
Relational mindset × Initial endowment for a trustee		0	0.05	[-0.09, 0.09]	-0.09				
Multiplier	63					157.48 (59)	73.95	39.52	34.43
Intercept		0.18	0.04	[0.10, 0.26]	4.28***				
Relational mindset		0.06	0.04	[-0.02, 0.14]	1.50				
Multiplier		-0.04	0.04	[-0.11, 0.04]	-0.99				
Relational mindset × Multiplier		0.05	0.02	[0.01, 0.10]	2.31				
Quality of the studies	63					182.40 (59)	76.88	27.53	49.35
Intercept		0.18	0.04	[0.09, 0.26]	3.93***				
Relational mindset		0.05	0.05	[-0.04, 0.14]	1.12				
Quality of the studies index		-0.03	0.04	[-0.12, 0.05]	-0.77				
Relational mindset × Quality of the studies index		0.00	0.04	[-0.07, 0.07]	-0.04				
Experimental design (between-subjects or within-subjects)	52					173.78 (50)	80.02	28.02	52.00
Intercept		0.15	0.05	[0.05, 0.26]	2.86**				
Experimental design		-0.04	0.05	[-0.13, 0.05]	-0.84				

Predictors in meta-regressions	<i>k</i>	Hedges' <i>g</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>Z</i>	<i>Q</i> (df)	<i>I</i> ²		
							Total	Level 2	Level 3
Study setting (in person vs. online).	63					183.31 (59)	76.99	28.31	48.68
Intercept		0.18	0.04	[0.09, 0.27]	4.04***				
Relational mindset		0.05	0.04	[-0.03, 0.14]	1.20				
Study setting		0.03	0.04	[-0.05, 0.11]	0.72				
Relational mindset × Study setting		0	0.03	[-0.06, 0.07]	0.11				
Study population (Students vs. Adults).	58					158.50 (54)	75.62	41.49	34.13
Intercept		0.16	0.04	[0.08, 0.25]	3.73***				
Relational mindset		0.06	0.05	[-0.03, 0.15]	1.33				
Study population		0.04	0.04	[-0.05, 0.12]	0.89				
Relational mindset × Study population		-0.05	0.04	[-0.14, 0.03]	-1.32				
Study population (the proportion of women).	45					136.29 (41)	80.15	28.77	51.39
Intercept		0.19	0.06	[0.07, 0.32]	3.00**				
Relational mindset		0.08	0.09	[-0.09, 0.25]	0.91				
The proportion of women		0.03	0.1	[-0.16, 0.22]	0.30				
Relational mindset × The proportion of women		0.15	0.19	[-0.22, 0.51]	0.80				
Study population (The proportion of women adjusted)	63					172.95 (59)	75.97	33.67	42.30
Intercept		0.18	0.05	[0.09, 0.28]	3.88***				
Relational mindset		0.08	0.06	[-0.04, 0.20]	1.31				
The proportion of women adjusted		0.01	0.07	[-0.13, 0.15]	0.10				
Relational mindset × The proportion of women adjusted		0.09	0.14	[-0.18, 0.37]	0.68				

*Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.*

5.4 Supplementary Analyses: Publication Bias, P-Curve, and Z-curve

5.4.1 Publication Bias

Because the classical Egger's test (Egger et al., 1997) in the *metafor* package is only implemented for single-level models, we applied an extended version within the multilevel framework. Following recommendations by Viechtbauer (2010), we specified a regression of effect sizes on their standard errors while retaining the nested random-effects structure. In this approach, a significant coefficient for the standard error would indicate funnel plot asymmetry (i.e., small-study effects). For publication bias diagnostics, we conducted these multilevel Egger-type regressions separately for the market and communal mindset subsets. We had preregistered to apply Duval and Tweedie's (2000) trim-and-fill method to address missing studies. However, this method has not been extended to multilevel meta-analytic models and performs poorly under conditions of heterogeneity (Peters et al., 2007). Therefore, we relied on regression-based approaches that are compatible with the nested structure of our data. Specifically, we conducted precision-effect testing and precision-effect estimate with standard error (PET–PEESE) analyses using inverse-variance weighted meta-regressions with cluster-robust (CR2) standard errors (Stanley, 2017; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014) that provide a more robust evaluation of publication bias in multilevel meta-analysis settings. The underlying logic of PET–PEESE is that, in the absence of publication bias, sampling variance should not systematically predict the magnitude of observed effects. The PET model tests this by regressing observed effect sizes on their standard errors. If the intercept (representing the effect size when sampling error approaches zero) is significantly different from zero, it indicates a genuine underlying effect beyond small-study bias. The PEESE model refines this estimation by using squared standard errors as predictors, providing a more accurate estimate of the true effect size when an initial PET suggests bias. In practice, a significant PET slope indicates the presence of small-study

effects, whereas a nonsignificant intercept implies that the apparent effect may be largely driven by publication bias. Conversely, when the PET intercept is significant, the PEESE estimate can be interpreted as a bias-adjusted estimate of the underlying true effect (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014).

A visual inspection of the funnel plots for both subsets (see Figures S8 and S9 in Online Appendix), together with the results of the multilevel Egger-type regressions, provided no evidence of publication bias or small-study effects. For the total sets of the effects ($k = 63$), both slope for the standard error and the intercept were nonsignificant, $\delta = 0.73$, $SE = 0.55$, 95% CI $[-0.35, 1.81]$, $Z = 1.32$, $p = .185$, and $\delta = 0.05$, $SE = 0.10$, 95% CI $[-0.15, 0.26]$, $Z = 0.51$, $p = .608$. The coefficients were also insignificant for the market mindset subset ($k = 11$), respectively, $\delta = 1.22$, $SE = 0.85$, 95% CI $[-0.44, 2.87]$, $Z = 1.44$, $p = .150$, and $\delta = 0.08$, $SE = 0.13$, 95% CI $[-0.17, 0.33]$, $Z = 0.62$, $p = .537$, and for the communal mindset subset ($k = 52$), respectively, $\delta = 0.57$, $SE = 0.62$, 95% CI $[-0.64, 1.79]$, $Z = 0.92$, $p = .355$, and $\delta = 0.06$, $SE = 0.12$, 95% CI $[-0.17, 0.29]$, $Z = 0.48$, $p = .631$. These results are consistent with the visual evidence from the funnel plots, indicating no asymmetry and therefore no systematic signs of publication bias in either subset.

The PET model for the whole dataset ($k = 63$) estimated an intercept of $\delta = 0.16$, $SE = 0.03$, 95% CI $[0.10, 0.22]$, $Z = 5.11$, $p < .001$, and a slope of $\delta = 0.04$, $SE = 0.24$, 95% CI $[-0.44, 0.51]$, $Z = 0.15$, $p = .511$. As the PET intercept was significant, we followed the standard PET–PEESE decision rule (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014) and used the PEESE model as a refined measure of the effect. Again, the intercept was significant, $\delta = 0.15$, $SE = 0.02$, 95% CI $[0.11, 0.19]$, $Z = 7.30$, $p < .005$, and the slope was not, $\delta = 0.72$, $SE = 0.78$, 95% CI $[-0.80, 2.24]$, $Z = 0.94$, $p = .351$. Overall, these results suggest the existence of a real (but weak) effect of relational mindset on trust and no small-study bias in our dataset.

For the market mindset subset ($k = 11$), the PET intercept was positive but not significant, $\delta = 0.11$, $SE = 0.10$, 95% CI $[-0.10, 0.31]$, $Z = 1.03$, $p = .312$, and the PET slope was not significant, $\delta = 1.08$, $SE = 0.76$, 95% CI $[-0.41, 2.58]$, $Z = 1.42$, $p = .156$. However, the PEESE regression produced a larger and significant intercept, $\delta = 0.18$, $SE = 0.06$, 95% CI $[0.06, 0.29]$, $Z = 2.89$, $p = .004$, and a nonsignificant slope, $\delta = 3.57$, $SE = 2.42$, 95% CI $[-1.17, 8.31]$, $Z = 1.48$, $p = .140$. No publication bias was detected in the market mindset subsample, but evidence for a true effect is weak or inconclusive. However, as suggested by Stanley (2017), PET-PEESE might not perform correctly in cases of a small number of studies; hence, the results for the market subset should be treated with caution.

For the communal mindset subset ($k = 52$), the PET intercept was significant, $\delta = 0.16$, $SE = 0.03$, 95% CI $[0.10, 0.23]$, $Z = 4.99$, $p < .001$, with a nonsignificant slope of $\delta = -0.14$, $SE = 0.26$, 95% CI $[-0.63, 0.37]$, $Z = -0.53$, $p = .600$. The PEESE regression produced a smaller but still significant intercept, $\delta = 0.14$, $SE = 0.02$, 95% CI $[0.10, 0.19]$, $Z = 6.47$, $p < .001$, and a nonsignificant slope, $\delta = 0.33$, $SE = 0.82$, 95% CI $[-1.28, 1.93]$, $Z = 0.40$, $p = .690$. Consistent with the decision rule, the PEESE intercept was retained as the bias-adjusted estimate. Taken together, these PET–PEESE analyses indicated no evidence of small-study effects or publication bias in the communal subset, with the bias-adjusted estimates closely resembling the original effect size estimates.

5.4.2 *P-curve analysis*

In line with the preregistration, we conducted a *p*-curve analysis using the *dmeter* package for R (Harrer et al., 2021) on the 26 statistically significant results ($k = 5$ from the market mindset subset and $k = 21$ from the communal mindset subset). Twenty-six of these studies reported $p < .025$. Statistical tests for right-skewness were significant ($ps < .001$ for both the full and the half test), providing strong evidence that the results are not due to publication bias or selective reporting (see Figure S10 in Online Appendix). In contrast, tests

for flatness were nonsignificant ($p = .996$ for the binomial test), indicating that the distribution does not resemble what would be expected under the null hypothesis. The estimated average statistical power of the effects was 59%, with a 95% CI of [38.7%, 75.7%], indicating moderate strength. The analyses conducted separately for the market and communal subsets showed similar patterns. In the market subset, four out of five significant effects reported $p < .025$, tests for right-skewness were significant ($p = .019$ for the full test and $p = .027$ for the half test), and tests for flatness were nonsignificant ($p = .814$). The estimated average power was 49%, 95% CI [8.2%, 86.3%]. In the communal subset, 22 out of 24 significant effects reported $p < .025$, tests for right-skewness were significant ($p < .001$ for the full test and $p = .001$ for the half test), and tests for flatness were nonsignificant ($p = .997$). The estimated average power was 61%, 95% CI [38.9%, 78.4%]. Overall, this pattern of results also strongly supports the presence of true effects rather than selective reporting, random noise, or publication bias.

5.4.3 *Z-curve analysis*

To provide additional evidence regarding the robustness of the findings, we conducted a z-curve analysis using the *zcurve* package for R (Bartoš & Schimmack, 2022) on the 29 statistically significant results ($k = 28$ usable for model fitting; see Figure S11 in the Online Appendix). The observed discovery rate (ODR; the proportion of significant results among all studies included in the meta-analysis) was 46%, 95% CI [34%, 59%]. The expected discovery rate (EDR; the true proportion of significant findings that would be observed if all conducted studies were available) was very similar at 52% (95% CI [13%, 63%]). This similarity suggests little evidence of selective reporting, as selective reporting typically produces a higher ODR than EDR. The expected replication rate (ERR) was estimated at 51.7%, 95% CI [17.2%, 59.3%], meaning that just over half of the significant results would be expected to replicate if the studies were repeated with the same design and sample size,

pointing to moderate replicability of the findings. The Soric false discovery rate point estimate was low at 5.7%, indicating that only a small proportion of the significant results are likely to be false positives. Though the confidence interval was quite wide (95% CI [3.7%, 78.2%]), reflecting substantial uncertainty about the true false discovery rate. The file-drawer ratio was close to 1 (1.08, 95% CI [0.69, 6.78]), suggesting that for every significant study reported, there may be roughly one nonsignificant study missing. However, because the estimate is close to 1 and the confidence interval is wide, there is no strong evidence of a substantial file-drawer problem. Finally, the Q statistic was negative, $Q = -16.86$, 95% CI [-23.80, -9.48], potentially reflecting an excess of results that are just significant (close to the $p = .05$ threshold). However, as we know from the p -curve analysis, this is not the case, with most of the significant p -values being lower than .025.

The z -curve analysis could not be conducted for the market subset, as it includes fewer than 10 significant effects. In contrast, the z -curve analysis for the communal subset showed ODR = 46%, 95% CI [32%, 60%], EDR = 46%, 95% CI [13%, 60%], and ERR = 51.1%, 95% CI [17%, 60%], pointing to moderate replicability of the findings in this subset. The Soric false discovery rate was low at 6.2% (95% CI [3.6%, 36.3%]), and the file-drawer ratio was close to 1 (1.18, 95% CI [0.68, 6.89]). Again, the Q statistic was negative, $Q = -13.78$, 95% CI [-19.54, -7.15]. Taken together, the results suggest that the body of evidence has moderate expected replicability, a low false discovery risk, and no strong indication of missing nonsignificant studies. However, the negative Q statistic highlights a potential distortion in the distribution of results, warranting some caution in interpreting the findings.

6 Discussion

This meta-analysis examined, across 63 effects ($N = 9,742$), how contextual cues activating market pricing and communal sharing mindsets influence trust-related behavior in

the Trust Game. Our analysis provided several key findings that challenge conventional views about the relationship between the two relational mindsets and trust.

First, both market pricing and communal sharing cues significantly increased transfers in the Trust Game compared to control conditions. Market mindset manipulations produced a small-to-medium effect ($\delta = 0.25$), while communal mindset manipulations showed a small effect ($\delta = 0.16$). Importantly, although the effect of market cues was larger in magnitude, the difference between the two mindsets was not statistically significant. Second, heterogeneity analyses revealed low variability across studies in the market mindset, but moderate heterogeneity in the communal mindset. However, our examination of potential moderators—including manipulation type, game parameters, and study characteristics—revealed no systematic factors that differentially influenced how market vs. communal cues foster trust. This suggests that the convergent effects are not merely artifacts of particular experimental designs or contextual factors. Finally, publication bias analyses, including *p*-curve and *z*-curve analyses, supported the evidential value of these findings while also indicating potential selective reporting practices in the literature.

6.1 Theoretical contribution: Dual pathways to trust

The present meta-analysis reveals that both market pricing and communal sharing mindsets significantly increase trust-related behavior in the Trust Game, with statistically indistinguishable effect sizes. This similarity challenges assumptions about the antagonistic relationship between market and communal mindsets, suggesting that both relational frameworks can support trusting behavior—albeit through fundamentally different psychological mechanisms. The Trust Game’s inherent structure—requiring voluntary vulnerability, offering the potential for mutual benefit, and allowing room for both generous and calculated responses—appears sufficiently flexible to accommodate both relational logics. Participants can interpret the game through a communal lens, viewing it as an

opportunity for mutual care or through a market lens, considering it in terms of a strategic investment. In both cases, transfers increase, but most likely for different reasons: communal cues foster trust grounded in altruism and relational concern, whereas market cues encourage trust based on proportionality and expectations of reciprocity. Thus, while the behavioral outcome—greater trust—is similar across both mindsets, the psychological processes underlying this trust seem distinct.

In communal sharing relationships, trust emerges from emotional and relational considerations. Communal cues may increase trust through enhanced empathy, perspective-taking, and concern for others' welfare (Clark & Mills, 2012). When participants are primed with communal mindsets, they may view their counterparts as deserving of care and support, leading to higher transfers that reflect genuine benevolence rather than strategic calculation. This pathway aligns with research indicating that communal mindset fosters helping behavior, particularly in response to others' needs (Clark et al., 1987), and enhances relationship satisfaction through emotional connectedness (Le et al., 2018). The trust generated through communal cues may be more unconditional and less contingent on expectations of reciprocity. Participants with the communal mindset might send larger amounts simply because they care about their partner's outcome, viewing the interaction as an opportunity to express solidarity and mutual support rather than to maximize personal returns.

Conversely, market pricing cues likely increase trust through different mechanisms centered on proportional thinking and strategic reciprocity expectations (Kuzminska et al., 2024). When operating under the market mindset, participants may recognize that trust can be instrumentally valuable by creating reputational benefits and encouraging reciprocal behavior. The market mindset emphasizes fair exchange and proportional relationships, leading participants to view generous transfers as investments that should yield

commensurate returns. This pathway aligns with economic theories of trust as a rational response to incentive structures (Berg et al., 1995). Market-oriented participants may increase their transfers because they better appreciate the multiplicative structure of the Trust Game, recognizing that higher initial investments create larger-sized pies for potential redistribution. Their trust is conditional and strategic, grounded in expectations of proportional reciprocity rather than unconditional care. This interpretation is consistent with our meta-analytic finding that in the market mindset subset, higher multipliers were linked to stronger effect sizes.

In sum, the results of this meta-analysis carry several implications for understanding the nature of trust itself. Rather than viewing trust as a unitary construct, our results suggest that trust may be better conceptualized as a behavioral outcome that can emerge from multiple, distinct psychological processes. The Trust Game, as a behavioral measure, captures participants' willingness to accept vulnerability for potential mutual benefit, but the motivations underlying this willingness may vary substantially. This multiplicity challenges theories that position market and communal mindsets as inherently incompatible. Instead, our findings suggest that both relational frameworks recognize the importance of cooperation and mutual benefit, though they arrive at this recognition through different routes. Under market cues, individuals may trust because they understand the strategic value of cooperation, while under communal cues, they may trust because they value their partner's welfare.

6.2 Alternative Explanations for Convergent Effects

Beyond the dual-pathway mechanism, several alternative explanations merit consideration regarding why opposing mindsets produce similar behavioral outcomes. First, both market and communal cues might activate broader social norms that transcend specific relational frameworks. Research suggests that various forms of social priming can enhance cooperative behavior by making social relationships salient (Hertel & Fiedler, 1998).

Whether participants consider communal bonds or market exchanges, either mindset may

increase the salience of social interaction, leading to more trusting behavior compared to control conditions where social considerations are less prominent. Alternatively, the observed effects might partially reflect contrast with control conditions rather than absolute increases in trust. Both market and communal manipulations make specific relational considerations salient, potentially leading participants to engage more thoughtfully with the social dimensions of the Trust Game. Control conditions, by contrast, might leave participants uncertain about how to interpret the situation, leading to more conservative, risk-averse behavior.

6.3 Limitations and Future Directions

Several limitations should be considered when interpreting these findings. First, although the number of studies in the communal mindset subset was relatively large ($k = 52$), the market mindset subset included only $k = 11$ studies. This imbalance substantially limits the robustness of direct comparisons between the two mindsets and, in particular, the reliability of moderator analyses. Aside from the multiplier effect, none of the examined moderators—whether study-level characteristics or Trust Game features—emerged as a significant predictor of effect size. This null pattern may reflect the limited distribution of studies across specific levels of the moderators rather than a true absence of moderating influences. Another limitation concerns the heterogeneity of operationalizations within certain manipulations. For example, in the communal mindset subset, ingroup vs. outgroup conditions were defined in highly diverse ways, ranging from simple demographic similarity (e.g., same gender) to explicit group membership cues (e.g., belonging to the same association). Such heterogeneity complicates the interpretation of these effects and raises the possibility that observed differences may reflect not only parochial biases but also idiosyncratic associations with specific target groups.

Further, while our results suggest that both communal and market mindsets increase trust in the Trust Game similarly, our meta-analysis could not directly test the distinct psychological mechanisms presumed to underlie these effects. Future research should therefore move beyond behavioral outcomes and employ process measures to capture the divergent pathways. For instance, communal cues are likely to promote trust via mechanisms rooted in empathy, social identification, and relational concern, consistent with theories of prosocial motivation and parochial cooperation (Romano et al., 2017). In contrast, market cues may foster trust through strategic reasoning and proportionality, aligning with economic accounts of trust as a rational response to incentive structures. The Trust Game's structure is flexible enough to accommodate both relational logics, but disentangling these processes will require designs that systematically vary task parameters.

Finally, future studies would benefit from preregistered experimental designs that explicitly manipulate both mindset inductions (vs. a control condition) and the structural features of the Trust Game (e.g., multiplier size, stake level, relationship framing). Such designs would allow for more definitive tests of the hypothesized mechanisms, reduce researchers' degrees of freedom, and provide stronger cumulative evidence for whether market and communal mindsets shape trust through genuinely distinct psychological processes.

6.4 Conclusion

The convergent effects of market and communal mindsets on trusting behavior illustrate the multifaceted nature of trust as a psychological and behavioral phenomenon. Even though these mindsets evoke largely conflicting relational norms, both frameworks appear capable of fostering trusting behavior—likely through distinct underlying mechanisms. This finding highlights the importance of considering multiple pathways to trust

and suggests that effective trust-building interventions may benefit from appealing to different motivational systems, depending on individual differences and contextual factors.

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
Online Appendix

Systematic Literature Search and Study Selection

To answer our research questions, we initially conducted a systematic literature search in March 2023 and further updated it in July 2025. We searched Scopus, PsycINFO, Web of Science, EThOS, APA PsycExtra, and ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. We did not use EThOS to search in 2025, as it has been unavailable since December 2023. Additionally, we reviewed relevant conference proceedings from SABE, IAREP, SPSP, APS, SJDM, and EASP. To ensure comprehensive data collection, we also contacted authors who had previously published studies on market mindset manipulations to inquire about unpublished results. Our search strategy employed a combination of keywords such as *Trust Game*, *Investment Game*, along with *experiment*, *manipulation*, *treatment*, and *condition*. We excluded studies involving pediatric populations using the Boolean operator "*NOT child*"* (see Table S1 at <https://osf.io/ec83t>). This process initially identified 3,144 documents for screening (see Figure S1). We removed duplicates and used Covidence software for screening. Four independent reviewers (two per record) assessed study eligibility based on the predefined inclusion criteria specified in our preregistration. We resolved discrepancies through discussion among the four reviewers.

Figure S1.

Flow Diagram of the Systematic Literature Search Following the American Psychological Association Meta-Analysis Reporting Standards (MARS).



Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

According to our preregistered criteria, we required eligible studies to employ an experimental design with at least two conditions and random assignment (in both between-subjects and within-subjects designs), excluding systematic reviews, narrative reviews, and single-group studies. Participants had to be explicitly informed that they were interacting with other humans; hence, we excluded studies involving non-human counterparts (e.g., AI,

robots, or algorithms). We considered only studies with healthy adult participants. Included studies had to manipulate either a market mindset (e.g., via monetary incentives, game framing, or trustee characteristics) or a communal mindset (e.g., relational priming or cooperation framing). We accepted any control condition, including passive control groups. The primary outcome of interest was the trustor's transfer in the TG, the simplified TG, or the mini-TG, including transfers in one-shot games and in the first round of iterated games. The study setting was unrestricted, allowing for online, laboratory, and field studies, both computer-based and paper-and-pencil. While we considered studies conducted in any language, we analyzed only those for which the reports were available in English. We included both published and unpublished manuscripts, including preprints and dissertations, from 1995 (when the paper by Berg et al. was published) to 2025. This was a deviation from preregistration, as we initially intended to include studies from 1995 to 2023. The systematic literature search was first conducted on 15 December 2023, with a subsequent update performed on 30 June 2025. One unpublished study was also included in the final sample.

Data Coding

After selecting eligible studies, four independent reviewers (two per study) extracted key characteristics of each study (inter-rater reliability of Cohen's $\kappa = .78$), including its design, sample size, participants' demographics (country of origin, percentage of women, mean age, population type), setting (online, laboratory, field), publication status, and experimental manipulation type (market mindset vs. control or communal mindset vs. control). We also extracted study-level moderators such as game structure (one-shot vs. iterated Trust Game and TG vs. mini-TG vs. simplified TG format), monetary incentives (included vs. not included), game parameters (initial endowment size, multiplier size), and participant interaction features (anonymity level, communication permissions, and ingroup vs. outgroup trustee status). The primary outcome extracted was the trustor transfer in TG (in

case of an iterated game, the transfer from the first round). We extracted effect sizes (Cohen's d or Hedge's g) if available, or calculated them from means, standard deviations, proportion of "trust" decisions, or inferential statistics. In 16 cases, we lacked sufficient data to calculate effect sizes, so we contacted the study authors. We excluded studies with insufficient data after two attempts of contact over a period of four weeks. Each coder in the pair conducted independent coding and cross-checked their extractions, with disagreements discussed and resolved collaboratively by the four-member team.

To evaluate potential biases, we adapted quality assessment tools from the NIH Quality Assessment Tool for Controlled Intervention Studies and Observational Cohort Studies (see Table S3 at <https://osf.io/ec83t>). Two independent reviewers scored each study (same as those who coded the data), and we computed a quality index to serve as a moderator in subsequent analyses.

Figure S2.

Cook's Distances for Effect Sizes in the Market Mindset Subset ($k = 11$).




Figure S3.

Hat Values for Effect Sizes in the Market Mindset Subset ($k = 11$).




Figure S4.

Boxplot of Effect Sizes in the Market Mindset Subset ($k = 11$).




Figure S5.

Cook's Distances for Effect Sizes in the Communal Mindset Subset ($k = 52$).




Figure S6.

Hat Values for Effect Sizes in the Communal Mindset Subset ($k = 52$).




Figure S7.

Boxplot of Effect Sizes in the Communal Mindset Subset ($k = 52$).




Figure S8.

Funnel Plot of Studies Included in the Meta-analysis for the Market Mindset Subset ($k = 11$).




Figure S9.

Funnel Plot of Studies Included in the Meta-analysis for the Communal Mindset Subset ($k = 52$).





Figure S10.


P-curve Plot



Note: The observed p -curve includes 29 statistically significant ($p < .05$) results, of which 26 are $p < .025$. There were 34 additional results entered but excluded from p -curve because they were $p > .05$.

Figure S11.

Z-curve plot



Auxiliary Bayesian Meta Regression for the main meta-analysis

As a robustness test for our main findings, we conducted a Bayesian meta-regression with *bayesmeta* package for R. We included an intercept to estimate the baseline meta-analytic effect ($k = 63$) and a centered relational-mindset predictor to test whether the strength of this effect was moderated by the market vs communal relational mindset. The model was estimated using weakly informative priors ($\beta \sim \text{Normal}(0, 1)$, $\tau \sim \text{Half-Cauchy}[\text{scale} = 10]$).

We found a significant posterior estimate for the overall intercept, $\delta = 0.17$, Posterior $SD = 0.04$, 95% CI [0.09, 0.24], representing the average standardized effect size (Hedges' g). Bayesian factor for the intercept provided strong evidence for the existence of the true effect, $BF_{01} = 0.004$. The slope parameter for the relational-mindset moderator was positive, $\delta = 0.14$, Posterior $SD = 0.10$, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.33], suggesting that studies manipulating a market mindset tended to result in somewhat larger effects than those manipulating a communal mindset. However, the credible interval included zero, indicating that this difference is uncertain. Consequently, the Bayes factor for the slope, $BF_{01} = 3.75$ indicates moderate, but not strong, evidence in favor of the null hypothesis over the alternative. Between-study heterogeneity was moderate, with $\tau = 0.23$, Posterior $SD = 0.04$, 95% CI [0.17, 0.31], Bayesian factor for τ provided strong evidence against a fixed-effects model with no heterogeneity, $BF_{01} = 5.11 \times 10^{-10}$.

Overall, the Bayesian meta-regression indicates a small but credibly positive average effect on trust across studies, accompanied by substantial heterogeneity. The positive but uncertain slope suggests that inducing a market rather than a communal mindset may slightly increase trust behavior, though the moderator effect remains probabilistic rather than conclusive.

Table S1. Experimental Studies That Manipulated Communal or Market Relational Mindsets and Measured Trust Using the Trust Game

Studies	Relational Mindset	Hedges g	N	Participants' country	Gender (% of women)	Population	Design	Setting	Mindset Manipulation	Type of game	Rounds	Real Payoffs	Initial Endowment (in US dollars)	Did Person B receive any money?	Multiplier	Quality Index
Ainsworth et al., 2014, E1	Communal	-0.21	72	USA	65	Students	BS	Lab	Other	Regular	One Shot	Yes	10.00	No	3	7
Ainsworth et al., 2014, E2	Communal	-0.33	127	USA	71	Students	BS	Lab	Other	Regular	One Shot	Yes	10.00	No	3	7
Al-Ubaydli et al., 2013	Market	0.51	65	USA	-	Students	BS	Lab	Other	Simplified	One Shot	Yes	8.00	No	3	6
Bader & Keuschnigg, 2020	Communal	0.23	837	Mturk	34	Adults	WS	Online	Ingroup	Regular	One Shot	Yes	1.00	Yes	2	8
Bartolomeo & Papa, 2016	Communal	0.14	152	Italy	-	Students	BS	Lab	Other	Regular	One Shot	No	-	Yes	3	6
Bartoš & Levely, 2021	Communal	0.03	188	Afghan population	0	Adults	BS	Field Study	Ingroup	Regular	One Shot	Yes	2.00	Yes	3	9
Batsaikhan et al., 2021	Communal	-0.40	160	Singapore	56	Students	BS	Lab	Ingroup	Regular	One Shot	Yes	7.60	Yes	3	7
Bocian et al., 2016	Market	0.28	113	Poland	-	Students	BS	Lab	Other	Regular	One Shot	Yes	3.00	No	3	8
Chaudhuri et al. 2016	Market	0.60	75	New Zealand	-	Students	BS	Lab	Other	Regular	Iterated	Yes	0.78	Yes	3	6
Clerke & Heerey, 2021	Communal	0.31	65	Canada	71	Students	WS	Lab	Other	Regular	Iterated	Yes	-	No	3	12
Cronk & Wasielewski, 2008	Communal	-0.58	140	USA	55	Students	BS	Online	Other	Regular	One Shot	Yes	10.00	Yes	3	8
Cronk, 2007	Communal	-0.34	50	USA	-	Adults	BS	Field Study	Other	Regular	One Shot	Yes	1.33	Yes	3	5
Declerck et al., 2020, E1	Communal	0.18	341	Belgium, Germany	-	Students	BS	Lab	Other	Simplified	One Shot	Yes	13.68	Yes	3	13
Declerck et al., 2020, E2	Communal	0.13	341	Belgium, Germany	-	Students	BS	Lab	Other	Simplified	One Shot	Yes	13.68	Yes	3	13

Studies	Relational Mindset	Hedges g	N	Participants' country	Gender (% of women)	Population	Design	Setting	Mindset Manipulation	Type of game	Rounds	Real Payoffs	Initial Endowment (in US dollars)	Did Person B receive any money?	Multiplier	Quality Index
DegliAntoni et al., 2024	Communal	0.12	263	Italy	60	Adults	BS	Lab	Ingroup	Simplified	One Shot	Yes	27.05	Yes	2	8
Drązkowski et al., 2017	Communal	0.61	60	Poland	51	Students	BS	Lab	Other	Regular	One Shot	Yes	5.00	Yes	3	11
El-Bialy et al., 2021	Communal	0.09	152	Syrian refugees in Germany	-	Adults	BS	Field Study	Ingroup	Simplified	One Shot	Yes	1.77	Yes	3	6
Erle et al., 2018	Communal	0.18	193	Germany	48	Adults	WS	Online	Other	Regular	Iterated	No	13.16	No	3	10
Etang et al., 2010	Communal	0.45	280	New Zealand	40	Adults	BS	Field Study	Ingroup	Regular	One Shot	Yes	2.00	Yes	3	5
Finseraas et al., 2019	Communal	0.04	485	Norway	10	-	BS	Field Study	Ingroup	Simplified	One Shot	Yes	12.00	Yes	3	7
Fujino et al., 2019	Communal	0.57	21	Japan	-	Adults	WS	Lab	Ingroup	Regular	Iterated	Yes	10.00	No	3	9
Gandelman et al., 2024	Communal	0.31	94	Uruguay	51	Adults	BS	Lab	Ingroup	Simplified	Iterated	Yes	8.00	Yes	3	12
Gandelman et al., 2024, E1	Communal	-0.05	128	Uruguay	51	Adults	BS	Lab	Other	Simplified	Iterated	Yes	8.00	Yes	3	12
Gandelman et al., 2024, E2	Communal	0.26	64	Uruguay	51	Adults	BS	Lab	Other	Simplified	Iterated	Yes	8.00	Yes	3	12
Güth et al., 2008	Communal	-0.09	24	Germany	-	Students	BS	Lab	Ingroup	Regular	One Shot	Yes	1.32	Yes	3	6
Hillebrandt et al., 2010	Communal	0.54	24	UK	100	-	BS	Lab	Other	Regular	Iterated	Yes	-	No	3	8
Hutchings et al., 2021	Communal	0.04	177	USA	56	Adults	BS	Online	Ingroup	Regular	One Shot	Yes	0.30	Yes	2	12
Jacquemet et al., 2024	Communal	0.35	120	France	57	Students	BS	Lab	Other	Mini	Iterated	Yes	2.16	Yes	4	5
Kang et al., 2011	Communal	1.14	30	USA	-	Students	BS	Lab	Other	Regular	Iterated	No	1.00	No	3	7
Keck & Karelaia, 2012	Market	0.06	63	France	60	-	BS	Lab	Other	Regular	One Shot	Yes	2.88	Yes	2	7
Kuzminska et al., 2024, E1	Market	0.27	131	USA	47	Adults	BS	Online	Pictures	Regular	One Shot	Yes	1.25	No	3	15

Studies	Relational Mindset	Hedges g	N	Participants' country	Gender (% of women)	Population	Design	Setting	Mindset Manipulation	Type of game	Rounds	Real Payoffs	Initial Endowment (in US dollars)	Did Person B receive any money?	Multiplier	Quality Index
Kuzminska et al., 2024, E2	Market	0.47	581	Poland	53	Students	BS	Lab	Other	Regular	One Shot	Yes	2.70	No	3	12
Kuzminska et al., 2024, E3a	Market	0.06	480	USA	47	Adults	BS	Online	Pictures	Regular	One Shot	Yes	12.41	No	2	15
Kuzminska et al., 2024, E3b	Market	0.30	451	USA	47	Adults	BS	Online	Pictures	Regular	One Shot	Yes	12.41	No	4	15
Kuzminska, 2016	Market	0.47	69	Poland	64	Students	BS	Online	Other	Regular	One Shot	No	-	No	3	9
Levine & Schweitzer, 2015, E1a	Communal	0.52	158	USA	60	Adults	BS	Lab	Other	Simplified	One Shot	Yes	2.00	No	3	7
Levine & Schweitzer, 2015, E1b	Communal	0.59	154	Mturk	63	-	BS	Lab	Other	Simplified	One Shot	Yes	2.00	No	3	8
Levine & Schweitzer, 2015, E2	Communal	0.51	121	Mturk	63	-	BS	Lab	Other	Simplified	One Shot	Yes	2.00	No	3	7
Parlasca et al. 2019, E1	Communal	0.21	274	Kenya	51	Adults	BS	Field Study	Ingroup	Simplified	One Shot	Yes	5.00	Yes	3	8
Parlasca et al. 2019, E2	Communal	0.22	260	Kenya	51	Adults	BS	Field Study	Ingroup	Simplified	One Shot	Yes	5.00	Yes	3	8
Peters & Fonseca, 2020	Communal	0.46	160	Australia	52	Students	BS	Lab	Ingroup	Regular	One Shot	Yes	6.91	No	3	11
Póvoa et al., 2020, E1	Communal	-0.05	190	Brazil	-	Students	WS	Lab	Ingroup	Regular	One Shot	Yes	3.13	No	3	5
Póvoa et al., 2020, E2	Communal	0.16	190	Germany, Brazil	-	Students	WS	Lab	Ingroup	Regular	One Shot	Yes	3.13	No	3	5
Póvoa et al., 2020, E3	Communal	0.24	190	Mozambique, Brazil	-	Students	WS	Lab	Ingroup	Regular	One Shot	Yes	3.13	No	3	5
Reed et al., 2019, E1	Communal	0.50	75	USA	44	Adults	BS	Online	Other	Mini	One Shot	-	0.10	No	3	9
Reed et al., 2019, E2	Communal	0.70	79	USA	44	Adults	BS	Online	Other	Mini	One Shot	Yes	0.10	No	3	9
Rudnicki et al., 2019, E1	Communal	0.04	62	Belgium	100	Students	BS	Lab	Other	Regular	One Shot	Yes	11.19	Yes	3	7
Rudnicki et al., 2019, E2	Communal	0.27	60	Belgium	100	Students	BS	Lab	Other	Regular	One Shot	Yes	11.19	Yes	3	7

Studies	Relational Mindset	Hedges g	N	Participants' country	Gender (% of women)	Population	Design	Setting	Mindset Manipulation	Type of game	Rounds	Real Payoffs	Initial Endowment (in US dollars)	Did Person B receive any money?	Multiplier	Quality Index
Sun et al., 2021	Communal	0.43	43	China	53	Students	WS	Lab	Other	Regular	One Shot	-	1.55	No	3	8
Telga et al., 2018, E1a	Communal	-0.27	40	Spain	82	Students	WS	Lab	Ingroup	Mini	Iterated	Yes	1.18	No	5	15
Telga et al., 2018, E1b	Communal	0.33	77	Spain	100	Students	WS	Lab	Ingroup	Mini	Iterated	Yes	1.18	No	5	9
Telga et al., 2018, E1c	Communal	-0.43	58	Spain	100	Students	WS	Lab	Ingroup	Mini	Iterated	Yes	1.18	No	5	14
Telga et al., 2018, E2	Communal	-0.43	38	Spain	100	Students	WS	Lab	Ingroup	Mini	Iterated	Yes	1.18	No	5	10
Trifiletti & Capozza, 2011, E1	Communal	0.26	40	Italy	-	Students	BS	Lab	Ingroup	Regular	One Shot	No	11.12	NA	3	8
Trifiletti & Capozza, 2011, E2	Communal	-0.76	40	Italy	-	Students	BS	Lab	Ingroup	Regular	One Shot	No	11.12	No	3	8
Vermue et al., 2018, E1	Communal	0.41	36	UK	75	Students	WS	Lab	Ingroup	Regular	Iterated	Yes	4.52	No	3	11
Vermue et al., 2018, E2	Communal	0.01	59	UK, The Netherlands	80	Students	BS	Online	Ingroup	Regular	Iterated	Yes	6.67	No	3	15
Vermue et al., 2018, E3	Communal	-0.18	107	UK, The Netherlands	86	Students	BS	Online	Ingroup	Regular	Iterated	Yes	6.67	No	3	10
Vermue et al., 2018, E4	Communal	-0.07	36	UK, The Netherlands	75	Students	BS	Lab	Other	Regular	Iterated	Yes	4.52	No	3	10
Zhang & Zhang, 2011	Market	0.28	197	China	-	Students	BS	Lab	Other	Regular	One Shot	Yes	1.60	Yes	3	4
Zhang et al., 2021, E1	Communal	0.70	62	China	50	Students	BS	Online	Other	Regular	One Shot	Yes	1.56	Yes	3	10
Zhang et al., 2021, E2	Communal	0.16	74	China	50	Students	BS	Online	Other	Regular	One Shot	Yes	1.56	Yes	3	10
Zou et al., 2022	Market	0.00	246	China	-	Students	BS	Lab	Other	Simplified	One Shot	Yes	6.00	Yes	3	7



A Systematic and Critical Review of Trust Based on Communal Vs. Market Cognitions: Emotions in Perspective

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A Systematic and Critical Review of Trust Based on Communal Vs. Market Cognitions: Emotions in Perspective

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ABSTRACT

Trust researchers have recently professed the dynamic nature of trust based on cognitive and affective considerations of the context – personal vs. professional. It presents that communal sharing (personal) cognition has a different formulation of trust than the market pricing (professional) mindset. Also, incidental processing of emotion impacts the level of trust differently than the integral one. Thus, we conducted a comprehensive literature review of experimental studies, based on PRISMA guidelines,—the first in the vein of similar efforts to address these two aspects particularly demonstrating the difference of personal vs. professional dynamics. Our review included 31 peer-reviewed studies published from 2004 to 2021, including over 5000 participants aged 18 to 83 years from 8 countries. Further, the theoretical integration of dimension of trust and Fisk's model of relationships clarifies how trust varies across contexts. Also, we concluded that the influence of emotions is pertinent in communal and market processing, but incidental emotions encourage trust in market settings more than in communal or close interactions. Thus, the difference in two (personal vs. professional) institutions require distinctive understanding of trust and emotions for effective management.

Introduction

“We’re not just a team, we’re family,” a popularized slogan of the day, is being challenged and debated around the facts separating the two distinct institutions. The renowned organizational psychologist, Adam Grant (2024) pronouncedly called out the managers, saying that the company is not a family. Family offers unconditional bonding and there is no concept of abandonment for a child from the parents, in general. However, companies have certain conditions for the offer and they do fire employees. Thus, both (personal vs. professional) institutions frame different dynamics for trust, and the emotional connection varies depending on the intrinsic vs. extrinsic motives of the provider. Based on this idea, we present a systematic review, addressing a cross-domain impact of trust to compare personal vs. professional (family vs. workplace) dynamics. We will begin with why we need to resolve this concern, then what we have and do not have in trust literature, and finally, how we

contribute to this agenda and further the research in this domain.

The foremost reason to understand the distinction between personal and professional settings is the unrealistic overlap of expectations and demands. This family metaphor blurred the boundaries of the two distinct institutes. On one hand, it creates a culture of collegial bonding and energizes team members to pursue mutual goals (Green et al., 2017) but on the other hand, it raises serious concerns about trust and control (Luna, 2021). Further, Parker et al. (2020) shows that managers struggle to trust their employees when they cannot see them or when they are working remotely which often causes them to ask for details, time allocation, and work output for the duty hours of the employees. This micromanagement drops employee's motivation and impairs productivity. However, such instances of control are generally marked as an important managerial task essential for the satisfactory completion of a project and it builds trust (Jørgensen & Åsgård, 2019). Thus, calling it family makes it hard for both parties to introduce

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and accept such instances that question trust. Contrary to this, close family bonding attempts like signing contracts, investigating whereabouts, checking phone calls, etc. hampers trust (Rusbult et al., 1999). Thus, understanding the differing nature of these domains guides people in managing this cross-domain impact. The goal is not to conflate the distinct nature of trust in personal life with professional ones and the other way around.

Trust, viewed through a multidisciplinary lens, is a willingness to bear vulnerability based on an optimistic approach toward another person's behavior (Rousseau et al., 1998). It is inevitably essential for effective functioning, effective management, and functioning of systems (Donaldson, 2001). Though maintained as an imperative feature of a relationship, the question of how, trust, operates in diversified contexts is yet to be explored in detail. Also, theoretically, multiple factors have been identified as the governing aspects of this attribute, but recent experimental explorations have challenged the commonly held assumption about trusting others. Before proceeding further toward the factor we focus on, we present a brief overview of what has been established in trust research.

Dirks and de Jong (2022) summarized the trust research in three waves. The first wave (1995–2007) covered the conceptual clarification of the construct, the second one added the alternative perspective to trust (2007–2021), and now the current one (2021 to date) focuses on cross-domain impacts. Based on these specifications, trust is a state, not a trait and it is likely to fluctuate depending upon the context. Also, it is a psychological mechanism that allows the trustor to suspend uncertainty through positive expectations (Möllering, 2001). This clarification of the concept further includes the dimensionality of the construct also formulating the theoretical mechanism involved in trust. McAllister (1995) presented cognition-based and affect-based trust. The former is an evidence-based process in which people use cues or some information directly to judge one's credibility. However, in affect-based trust, people have genuine concern and care for others with emotional bonding, a basis of connection. Thus, these two types of trust operate differently with distinct content. Further, the distinction between trust and distrust (Lewicki et al., 1998) and the polymorphous nature of trust across time (Lewicki, 1996) have been researched, with substantial detail.

Theoretically, the unidimensional and two-dimensional models viewed trust and distrust as having the same three components: cognition, affects,

and intentions. The only difference is that the latter identified them as two distinct concepts in contrast to the former. The perspective following these two approaches, the transformational model defined that trust has different forms and transforms itself over time. These perspectives emerged in response to the attempt to explain the difference in trust for deeper connection moving beyond the trust involved in basic transactional exchange (Fiske, 1991). Shapiro et al. (1992) originally proposed the model and Lewicki (1995, 1996) elaborated on it by comparing the articulation of trust development in business research vs. trust in personal, intimate relations (Sheppard, 1995). Lewicki (1995, 1996) presented calculus-based trust (CBT), reflecting that it involves not just vulnerability but also an estimation of the benefit from the multiple forms of transactions (Williamson, 1975, 1981). It operates on the cost and benefit analysis while trusting the other party (Deutsch, 1973).

Lewicki et al. (1998) furthered that trust has a 'bandwidth,' thus, it can vary in scope and degree depending upon the nature of the relationship. They exemplified it as ranging from calculated decisions of cost and benefit - the calculative trust - to emotional decisions based on interpersonal connection and close identification (Rousseau et al., 1998) called people trust" (Williamson, 1993). Similarly, Social exchange theory also explains people's trust in detail. It covers reciprocal attempts of help and resource exchange with time without a formal contract (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). Such interactions rely upon and produce/build trust. The reciprocity increases trust and benefits both parties involved in the interaction. Therefore, summarized that close interactions and the affective dimension of trust support the communal relation model based on sharing without an intention of repayment/recompense (Dirks & de Jong, 2022). We will conclude this theoretical viewpoint in the following section integrating the dimensions of trust and relationship types. This will streamline our motive to distinguish personal vs. professional domains.

In continuation, scientists pointed out some directions to be explored in trust research. They named it cross-domain impacts and cross-disciplinary theoretical advancement. Another aspect is the underexplored influence of emotions and heuristics on trust in organizational context and the causality-driven approach to investigating trust (Dirks & de Jong, 2022). Further, taking the role of emotions in trusting others, researchers claimed that emotions are more pertinent to personal commitments than professional ones (Legood et al., 2023). This argument stemmed

from the cognition-based explanation. Thus, there is a debate to address the role of emotions in personal vs. professional dynamics to resolve this enigma.

Some of the work on the interaction of emotion and trust has taken emotional experiences into account, not emotional expression while developing trust (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Mislin et al., 2015) but the full spectrum of the influence affective expression (emotion expression) has on trust in interpersonal relationships is optimal to explore (Belkin & Rothman, 2017). Moreover, personal experience-oriented and situation-driven emotions are the two scientific categories called incidental and integral emotions. Combined, an incidental emotion refers to intrinsic stimulation or any environmental aspect, for instance, you are feeling down because of bad health (called incidental emotion because it is unrelated to the task at hand i.e., trust decision) and can impact your decision like trusting others. However, an integral emotion focuses on the perception of the target or processing of the information of the target (Västfjäll et al., 2016). For instance, you feel down because you are not finding anything good to wear for today's event (emotion related to the task, not finding suitable attire).

The fact that both incidental and integral affects simultaneously guide decisions or judgments has gained little attention up till now. Separate research on these types of affects is available and limited to the typical consideration of the question not integrating the other forms of affect. However, these affective interactions are common, as people are always experiencing emotions while making decisions, and even a neutral mood provides information to be considered in some decisions (Russell, 2003). Also, the options under consideration for making a decision evoke some effect, too, irrespective of the degree or intensity it holds (Dhar & Wertenbroch, 2000). Positive affect presents that everything is safe and no additional effort is needed to survive, whereas negative emotion evokes a potential threat and a need to do something. Thus, the affective component in decision-making governs the consequences for the outcome and information processing in this way. It may serve as information, a spotlight to focus on different pieces of information, to take action, or to compare apples and oranges (Cabanac, 1992).

Västfjäll et al. (2016) concluded that these two (above mentioned) types of emotion play a substantial role in judgment and decision-making. However, few attempts have been made to compare incidental and integral emotions despite several suggestions to fill this gap. Additionally, the research suggests that

incidental emotions may have beneficial and detrimental influences on trust decisions as they may bias the process. For instance, DeSteno et al. (2000) elaborated that sadness and anger are the two distinct emotions that bias one's estimates of the likelihood of sad and angry events while making decisions.

Belkin and Rothman (2017) presented this cognitive appraisal of affect as warmth and competence, the two dimensions of social functioning proposed by Fiske et al. (2004, 2007). The evidence suggests that positive emotions are positively related to cooperation and helping behavior (Lount, 2010), which indicates one's integrity and moral values (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011). In contrast, anger presents the potential for aggression and malicious intent toward the partner, and this negative emotion reflects the expresser morality (Sinaceur et al., 2011). Moreover, the expression of happiness signals the greater confidence of the expresser (Knutson, 1996) and power in negotiation attempts (Pietroni et al., 2009). Alternatively, some studies documented anger as the expression of power (Adam & Brett, 2015; Belkin & Rothman, 2017), whereas anger in bargaining contexts and related events suggests it to be a sign of weakness and lack of emotional control (Sinaceur et al., 2011). Further, neutral and no display of emotion has been regarded as a sign of competence (Hareli et al., 2009).

From here, we refer to the (as pointed out above) widely discussed typologies of personal vs. market relationships as proposed by Fiske (1991, 2004; Fiske & Haslam, 2005). Relationships integrate various characteristics of intimacy, nearness, autonomy, strength, emotional involvement, expectations, and many other aspects (Berscheid, 1994; Berscheid & Regan, 2016). Some connections are formal or contractual and governed by documented rules; others are informal or spontaneous and governed by emotional attachment (Fiske, 1991; Fiske & Haslam, 2005). It includes communal sharing, market pricing, equality matching, and authority ranking, directing the specific relational context which defines the norms regulating one's behaviors about how to respond to each other and regulate the actions depending upon the type of bonding (Clark & Mills, 2012; Fisk, 1992). In general, the specific kind of relationship invokes the respective mindset (cognitions) that makes people think in a particular way as a distinctive pattern of processing is observed in the first two modes as communal sharing and market pricing (Fiske, 2004; McGraw & Tetlock, 2005).

Market pricing presents the most pervasive option in Western society and culture, and many theorists postulated the nature of human social behavior driven

by cost-benefit ratios. It further conveyed that people in market relationships use the mental grammar, associated cognition/market cognition means recurrent calculation of their gain out of the investment as if it is of comparable value (Fisk, 1992; Zaki et al., 2021). Moreover, these relationships are often considered the opposite of communal sharing or sharing cognition that contains gratuitous and asymmetrical bonding (Clark & Mills, 2012; Fisk, 1992; McGraw & Tetlock, 2005).

Communal relationships translate the sharing perspective, offering benefit to the other in the bond, not to get anything in response or any comparable return but to enhance the companions' betterment and happiness. Help, friendliness, generosity, and even altruism are the core facets of communal cognitions (Clark & Mills, 1993). Contrarily, market thinking focuses on autonomy, self-control, and individualistic efficiency. In these contacts, intimacy and emotional connection have no space (Jiang et al., 2014; Mead & Stuppy, 2014; Vohs, 2015), and the scientific literature presents these aspects as indispensable qualities to show trust (Mikulincer, 1998; Rempel et al., 1985). They are also termed as asocial selfish individuals in market cognition, generating opposition to such market relational mode and the willingness to show trust spontaneously in sharing cognitions (Fisk, 1992). Also, evidence suggests the detrimental influence of market cognition on trust (Xin & Liu, 2013), and sharing cognition or communal mindset fosters trust to a greater extent (Zaleskiewicz et al., 2015). The theoretical model of trust, presented above, essentially overlaps the explanation of communal vs. market relations. Thus, personal trust resonates with communal sharing, and calculative trust defines market pricing.

Further, as we proposed at the start that trust operates differently in communal relations than in market ones, we explain our argument with the idea that this distinction stems from the closer emotional connections inherent in communal relationships (Berscheid & Regan, 2016). However, in comparison to this, professional, non-emotional nature of market relations (Vohs, 2015) signifies the point of difference. Market relations are often governed by principles of control (Zaleskiewicz et al., 2015), which inherently conflict with the emotional connection central to communal relationships. Thus, with the integration of these relational and emotional aspects, we intend to challenge the metaphor of 'organizations as families,' and present that it conflicts with the structural principles of professional, control-driven organizational functioning.

Combining trust and emotion, Campellone and Kring (2013) found that anger on faces rather than happy and neutral ones hampered trust in the initial interaction. However, after repeated interaction and exposure to the other party's behavior, this effect may not last. Further, the emotional distinction elaborates the process to the next level, like incidental emotions influence trust decisions. For instance, when the emotion of affection and acceptance is induced compared to a neutral state, it increases trust in new interactions (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Schweiger et al., 2014). Thus, it concludes that trust formation in the initial phases is, to some extent, automatized and governed by affective cues. Also, people with Market cognitions are less sensitive to affective cues than those in the Communal Sharing mode (Fiske et al., 2019; Zaleskiewicz et al., 2015), suggesting a similar difference in trust between these two relational modes. Thus, we expect the type of emotion (positive or negative) exhibited by the trustee and processed by the trustor (integral) and experienced by the trustor that influences the decision of trust (integral) may affect (increase or decrease) trust. We further assume this effect to be more pronounced while processing sharing cognitions than market mindsets. Additionally, Figure 1, presents the overview of our attempt to integrate dimensions of trust and type of relational model focusing on communal vs. market dynamics and the role of emotion.

Objectives

Taking the above discussion, we planned a systematic review to learn why companies are not a family by knowing how trust operates distinctively in the communal sharing vs. market pricing relationships for the smooth functioning of the specific kind of relation. We argue that people are spoiling the very essence of bonding due to deluded cognitive processing, valuing exchange in closer relations, and expecting unconditional/sharing-driven responses in exchange relations by not rightly understanding the dynamic of relational mode.

Also, we present an integration of cognition-based and affect-based dimensionality of trust with the theoretical explanation of communal and market relationships. Further, this review will address the question of emotion being more pertinent to communal than market settings and how this can help masses regulate their functioning in these two domains of life. We would identify the type of emotional manipulation people have used in their studies by categorizing them as incidental or integral based on the information available in the papers and




Figure 1. Interdisciplinary Integration of Theoretical Model for Trust in Personal vs. Professional Dynamics.

further present a distinction of the type of relation as communal or market based on interaction researchers covered in their trust works. Scientifically, we would explore the cross-domain impact of trust using cross-disciplinary theoretical integration, the key to research on trust in the existing era as guided in literature (Dirks & de Jong, 2022). Thus, we headed off with the following research questions to address our proposition:

1. How trust operates in communal vs. market relationships
2. Are emotions more pertinent to communal sharing than market pricing relationship
3. How incidental vs. integral emotions shape communal vs. market relationships

Method

Literature search strategy

We conducted a systematic literature search based on PRISMA guidelines (Page et al., 2021) for only peer-reviewed articles from the three databases: Psych-Info, Web of Science, and Scopus. Also, for additional papers, we considered manual searching from Google Scholar and reference lists of the selected articles. The search string/keyword can be found in the [supplementary material](#) for each database.

The study has the following inclusion and exclusion criteria:

1. We considered only the peer-reviewed articles reporting experimental studies with emotions

and trust (e.g., systematic review, correlational, and qualitative studies excluded). All between and within-subject design studies included with or without the control group condition.

2. We included studies based on the general population, healthy adults only, and studies with children excluded (children vs. adults excluded).
3. We focused on the manipulation based on emotions (integral vs. incidental) and the processing of communal vs. market cognitions in interpersonal relationships.
4. In terms of outcome variables, we included studies on trust building, the processes that increase trust from a neutral or positive initial state, one that has not been damaged __ and trust repair, the attempts, to increase trust once a preexisting level of trust has damaged by the actions of one party, the transgressor.
5. The studies low in quality based on quality index assessment were excluded.

Study selection and retrieval

After agreeing on the study's inclusion and exclusion criteria, we conducted de-duplication in Zotero, and two independent authors started reviewing the titles and abstracts of the articles using Zotero to find relevant papers for full-text screening. If there was insufficient information, the whole paper was considered to decide whether the paper fulfilled the criteria of the review or not. Any disagreement was discussed and resolved with the experienced team member. Lastly, the full-text review was carried out

independently, again. Finally, based on a mutual agreement with the whole team by cross-checking and conflict resolution, potentially relevant papers were included for data extraction.

Quality assessment

We assessed the quality of the studies or potential risk of bias using seven items based on the National Institutes for Health (NIH) Study Quality Assessment Tool for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (National Institute of Health, 2021). We included the relevant questions from the mentioned protocols (see [Supplemental Table](#) for exact wording). These covered the adequately formulated question, specified inclusion-exclusion criteria, risk of selection bias, measurement bias, and publication bias. Two independent reviewers rated the studies according to the quality check, and based on the scores (the higher the score, the higher the quality and the lower the risk of bias), the studies were categorized and reported as good, fair, or poor.

Data extraction

We extracted the desired data and placed them into an Excel spreadsheet, version LTSC MSO (16.0.14332.20587) 64-bit (see [Table S1 – Supplementary Material](#)). It included the information about authors, year of publication, location of study, the aim of the study, sample of the study, study design, manipulation of emotion, presence or absence of control group, the tool for measuring trust, and findings of the study with effect size (effect sizes were not reported in some of the studies). We categorized cognition processing as communal vs. market cognition and emotional manipulation as integral vs. incidental emotions from the details available in the study. We also focused on the role of age in the trustworthiness rating of young adults vs. older adults. We gave special attention to the conflictual cases and built consensus for the type of cognition, emotional processing, and related issues among the team members.

Results

We present the results of our systematic review based on descriptive analysis of the studies at the start and then gradually introduced the specific content analysis of the included articles. We identified 8454 articles from the three databases, and after the de-duplication in Zotero, moved a total of 7923 in the title and

abstract screening phase. Two independent authors reviewed the titles and abstracts of the articles using Zotero to find relevant papers for full-text screening. Then, a sum of 253 papers was considered for the full-text review phase, carried out by two independent researchers again. We excluded 225 full texts because of inappropriate design or manipulation, sample or low-quality index, etc. Lastly, we finalized thirty-one potentially relevant papers for data extraction based on mutual agreement. [Figure 2](#) presents the PRISMA flow diagram of the study selection and screening process.

Descriptive analysis of selected studies

The current systematic and critical review included 31 studies published from 2004 to 2021, including a total study population of more than 5000 participants, aged between 18 to 83 years, conducted in 8 countries. Find [Table S1](#) (in [Supplementary Materials](#)) for the summary and type of cognition and emotional processing. Thirteen studies were from the USA, five from the Netherlands, four from Canada, three from Spain, two from China and Germany, and one from the UK and UAE. According to the quality assessment index ([Supplementary Table S2](#)), twenty-one studies had good quality and three were fair quality.

We had 12 studies with sharing cognition, 17 with market cognition, and two had both conditions. Further, eight studies manipulated incidental emotions, whereas 23 had integral emotion processing (see [Table 1](#) for more details). Emotion increases trust in both communal and market cognitions, as expected, but a distinctive pattern of trust appeared in both cases.

Trust in communal vs. Market relationships

At first, we coded studies considering the definitions of communal sharing and market pricing relationships as described by Fisk (1992). Communal sharing relationships operated under equivalent and undifferentiated bounds. People in such relations focus on commonalities and disregard differences. They naturally try to be kind and helping toward people of their own type and intimacy is their core motivation in this all. However market pricing relations operate under the principal of proportionality attending ratios and rates. People in such calculate ratio of what you are paying and what others are giving you in return. Their core motivation is achievement. The respective codes like friends vs. foe expression decisions, touch stimulation etc., were categorized under communal




Figure 2. PRISMA diagram of the study selection and screening process.

Table 1. Frequencies and percentages of communal vs. market studies and the kinds of emotion manipulation.

Cognition	No. of Studies	Manipulation of Emotions	
		Incidental Emotions f (%)	Integral Emotions f (%)
Communal Sharing	12 (38.70)	5 (62.5)	10 (43.47)
Market Pricing	17 (54.83)	3 (37.5)	12 (52.17)
Both	2 (6.45)	0	1 (4.35)

relational manipulations whereas, economic exchange, customer service dynamics etc., were categorized under market pricing mode.

Further, manipulation of emotions was categorized under incidental and integral emotions based on the definitions by Västfjäll et al. (2016). Incidental emotions refer to the experience of emotion unrelated to the task at hand like listening to a sad movie made one unable to enjoy a party, later on. However, integral emotions include processing of emotion related to the task at hand such as solving a difficult question results in frustration and anger. Thus, emotions induced via movie clip or autobiographical memory task were coded under the category of incidental emotions whereas, processing of familial expression or information while making trust decisions were coded under integral emotion manipulation. Table 2 presents all the codes and categories along with

Table 2. Coding and categorization of the key concepts identified in the analysis.

Categorization	Coding f(%)
Communal Context	Friends vs. foe expression decisions 4(33.34)
	Touch stimulation 1(8.34)
	Facial attractiveness/emotional expression 7(58.34)
	Emotions of unfamiliar coworker 1(5.88)
Market Context	Hiring an employee 1(5.88)
	Decision making game/Economic Exchange 7(41.18)
	Buyer-seller dynamics/Customer Service 8(47.06)
	Emotion induced via video/movie clip 1(12.5)
Incidental Emotion (unrelated to the task, experiencing separately)	Auto-biographical memory task/information 7(87.5)
	Rating the facial expression 8(34.78)
Integral Emotion (emerging from the task/using the emotion to respond)	Emotional variability 2(8.69)
	Information/Visual feedback 4(17.39)
	Auditory expression 1(4.35)

respective frequencies and percentages (all Kappas $\geq .70$, $ps < .05$).

Next, as expected, we found that studies covering market pricing were less influenced by the trustee's emotions or decision tasks' properties but in communal interactions, emotional cues from the other party matter the most (Myers & Tingley, 2016; Schniter & Sheremeta, 2014). Also, people in power were rated

as less authentic in the emotional display, so they were regarded as less trustworthy (Kim et al., 2017). Similarly, smiling and attractive faces were rated more trustworthy than neutral ones (Strachan et al., 2016) under communal sharing cognition. Thus, we can conclude trust operates differently in communal and market relationships.

Role of emotions

Likewise, some studies demonstrate that faces with positive expressions were rated more trustworthy than negative ones (Slepian & Carr, 2019; Strachan et al., 2016). Also, even in market pricing manipulation, people in happy emotional conditions trusted their coworkers more than those with sad and angry expressions (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Similarly, happy partners were trusted the most, and angry ones were trusted the least, even in the cooperative context (Belkin & Rothman, 2017). Thus, we are able to conclude another of our arguments here that emotions are pertinent in both communal sharing and market pricing relationships though the functionality of this factor is relatively distinct. Moreover, The findings for our third question are presented below:

Incidental emotion and communal sharing Vs. Market pricing cognition

Incidental emotion processing results in a more trustworthy rating in market pricing conditions than communal sharing cognition. Whereas, no significant results for sharing cognition conditions were reported. Also, low certainty appraisal conditions like anxiety can reduce trust during economic interactions. Further, in a good mood, people trust others more than in a bad mood.

Integral emotion and communal sharing Vs. market pricing cognition

Integral emotion processing resulted in trust more outside the work context than inside the workplace. Whereas, warmth-liking behavior increases interpersonal trust in sharing cognition. However authentic displays of emotions resulted in more trust in both types of cognition. Also, feigned positive emotions were regarded as good in terms of trust at the workplace but had no effect outside the work. Finally, expression of emotion congruent with eye gaze results in more trust than incongruent expression.

Valence and arousal of emotions

People trusted others with positive emotions, more than the negative ones with high intensity in sharing cognition. Nevertheless, participants trusted the mild expression more than the intense expression in market interactions. Moreover, the surface display of anger was less appreciated in trustworthy ratings than the deep display, but the neutral display of emotion was regarded most in workplace settings.

All in all, we conclude the distinct dynamics of trust based under the diversified processing of emotion in communal vs. market relations. Also, in our results incidental emotions were manipulated more in communal sharing condition than market pricing (Table 1) but such processing effected trust more in market pricing condition than communal ones.

Discussion

We conducted a systematic and critical review of the trust studies integrating the affect-cognition dimensions of trust with the communal sharing and market pricing relational types. Initially, the idea was to answer why companies are not a family and how trust operates differently in these two – communal vs. market – distinct domains. Further, based on the directions available in trust literature, we attempted to present the role of emotions and uncover the enigma of whether emotions are relevant in market/professional relations or are just pertinent to communal/personal interactions. Our work explains the role of emotional expression and the type of relationships to help people understand what they need to expect and deliver in closely bonded sharing-driven relationships vs. agreement-based exchange-driven relationships. We only included the studies that manipulated emotions to find their impact on trust-building or re-building. In the findings, we analyzed the nature of emotions as incidental vs. integral through the focus of manipulation in peer-reviewed, high-quality studies.

We have more studies from exchange cognitions than sharing ones, and two out of the total had both kinds of mental processing, which we extracted from the type of interaction reported in the paper. Findings demonstrate that faces with positive expressions were rated more trustworthy than negative ones (Slepian & Carr, 2019). Also, people in happy emotional conditions trusted their coworkers more than those with sad and angry expressions (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Similarly, happy partners were trusted the most, and angry ones were trusted the least, even in the cooperative context (Belkin & Rothman, 2017). This

revealed that emotions are pertinent in both communal sharing and market pricing relationships.

Now, the core aspect of this attempt was to highlight the difference in the influence of emotions in both relational modes. We found that incidental emotional expression, when one is already experiencing some emotion or the state in which the prior emotional experience is influencing the trust decision of an individual, resulted in a more trustworthy rating in exchange relations than in communal or sharing conditions. As expected, people in the market or exchange conditions are less influenced by the trustee's emotions or decision tasks' properties but in communal interactions, emotional cues from the other party matter the most. Even during trust game economic exchange, participants transferred more money during initial interactions under the influence of incidental emotions (Capra, 2004; Myers & Tingley, 2016; Schniter & Sheremeta, 2014).

However, integral emotional processing, where one focuses on the decision task or the information available for trust decision, results in more trust outside the work setting than inside the workplace. Further, for emotional representation and context interaction, feigned happiness increased trust inside the work but had no effect outside the work/personal context (Levine & Wald, 2020). Also, emotional authenticity influences the perception of trust, and people in power were rated as less authentic in the emotional display, so they were less trustworthy (Kim et al., 2017). Similarly, a customer service representative with high emotional expression was rated less trustworthy than with mild emotional display (Cheshin et al., 2018). Whereas, smiling and attractive faces were rated more trustworthy than neutral ones (Strachan et al., 2016) under communal or sharing cognition. Additionally, positive emotional expression makes the person trustworthy and regarded as a friend, than those with negative expressions. Thus, focusing on the emotional cues increases trust in communal settings more than in a market cognition context.

Next, people trusted those with authentic displays of emotion while deciding from the surface displays or superficial displays of emotion, and participants with deep anger displays were trusted the most (Côté et al., 2013) and those with deeper anger displays were trusted less than neutral ones. Also, an authentic display of emotion influences trust more than an inauthentic expression, regardless of the observer's race (Houston et al., 2018). Gratitude and admiration increase trust (Robbins, 2016) again due to the experience of positive emotions. Also, emotional induction of warmth-liking, such as remembering a good event

with a loved one, increases trust in interpersonal relationships (Schweiger et al., 2014). In line with this, Strachan et al. (2016) highlighted the role of congruency, depicting that faces with neutral emotions can be trusted more if the eye gaze does not drift away than those who look away from the target. So, to conclude, authenticity, looking directly toward the target, and valence not only define the dynamics of a relationship but also influence trust, respectively.

Thus, the differential dynamics of trust and emotional specification suggest that trust operates distinctively in communal vs. market domains of life considering the aspect of emotional attachment in the former and the calculation of cost and benefits in the latter. This is how we displayed the cross-domain impact of trust in family dynamics and organizational context. Also, we presented an integrated picture of the affect and cognition dimensions of trust with communal sharing and market pricing types of relationship as a cross-disciplinary theoretical extension. Lastly, we addressed the role of emotion in the organizational context as suggested in the literature (Dirks & de Jong, 2022), particularly by gathering the evidence to answer to what extent it differed from the familial/personal context.

Critical consideration and future directions

Next, on a critical note, we would like to address that most of the studies conducted in general and all of the included ones, in particular, had no consideration for the type of emotion manipulated (integral vs. incidental) and how it can influence trust-building or rebuilding among participants. Some of the researchers pointed out this fact (Belkin & Rothman, 2017) as a need to address it because no decision-making can ever occur without incidental or integral (or sometimes both) processing of emotions (Russell, 2003).

Further, the motivation to design this review emerged from another gap in trust literature about how the type of relationship (communal vs. market) influences the processing of emotion manipulated by researchers. Importantly, the distinction in the processing of two modes of relations (Fiske et al., 2019; Zaleskiewicz et al., 2015) like one is more influenced by the affective cues (sharing cognition) than the other (market cognition) but still, we found no empirical demonstration of this idea integrating incidental or integral emotions. Thus, this unified review presents a clear stance for designing experimental investigation covering these aspects to protect the functioning of particular types of relationships as per their potential.

Lastly, we found some methodical concerns as conducive methodology and tailored mechanisms of building and rebuilding trust are essential to address these factors by addressing the role of emotion rather than survey experimentation (See Table S1 – Supplementary Material) without behavioral measures and randomization. Also, regarding the type of emotional influence, as in incidental emotion, one needs to be clear about which aspect of emotional experience influences one's decision-making. For instance, in our example at the start, the preoccupation with some task influencing the decision with the seller needs specificity of task pertinent to the exploration of trust decision. So, the interdependent influence of incidental vs. integral emotion will make the investigation more promising for understanding the process of trust in defined relationships.

Limitations of the study

We only included the peer-reviewed experimental studies in the review with some having no information about randomization. This maintained our focus on addressing the role of manipulation and understanding causality but narrowed the exploration by limiting it to one methodology. We suggest future studies include non-peer-reviewed studies to widen the scope and understanding of the idea, by managing the potential selection bias. Also, in these studies, participants' perspectives are not evident, like whether they have taken it as a close relationship or just an exchange one or if they were confused, as most are nowadays, mixing up their expectations and investments in the two distinct modes improperly.

Implications of the study

Our study integrates two strong factors explaining trust and extends the interdisciplinary perspective to debate the question of family vs. workplace dynamics. Here we present the specific implications of our exploration:

Theoretic implications

Previous work (such as Dirks & de Jong, 2022) demanded a cross-domain impacts and cross-disciplinary theoretical advancement of research on trust. They further pointed that influence of emotions and heuristics on trust is still unexplored in organizational context. Our study advances these claims both by integrating the cross-disciplinary such as family vs. organizational dynamics of trust and extended the

theoretical underpinnings of relational typologies in continuation with corresponding affective and cognitive dimensions (Figure 1). We declared that theoretical flow of incidental and integral division of emotions with respect to the type of relational mode helps people understand the difference of processing based on the context of functioning.

Practical implications

Our findings at first explain the thesis we intend to debate on that calling organizations a family is an unfair comparison. Thus, practically, we presented a blue print for organizations or industries to understand why this comparison is misleading and creates remorse at the wake of unrealistic expectations coming out of the metaphor highlight familial bonding. This will help trainers and practitioners to set clear distinction between the two essential spheres of life falling in work-life balance as well. Further, educationist can use this information to help people understand the nature of trust based on type of interaction to address the overlap between the two domains that result in disturbed functioning and ambiguous situations making people calculate love and expect genuine sharing in professional realms. Thus, to guide masses where to share and when to calculate.

Research implications

Lastly, this exploration opens up some related layers of the debate like what other factors contribute in the distinct nature of trust in communal vs. market relations. Also, some experimental explorations to establish the claim that communal relations operate under close emotional bonding whereas, market relations are guided by control which contradicts emotional bonding, will bring more clarity and strength to the notion. We aspire, future research will facilitate common public in making trust decisions effectively by understanding the contextual demands of the relationship.

Conclusion

We documented a review of experimental studies based on trust with its distinctive dynamic in communal sharing vs. market pricing cognitions or processing under the influence of incidental vs. integral emotion. This attempt has theoretically integrated the idea of affect and cognition-based trust dimensions with the type of relationship covering communal vs. market dynamics of life. Also, it opens the practical ground to fill in this gap through an empirical

investigation of emotional cues in each type of relationship, placing self-owned/preoccupied or target-driven emotional processing in the center. It facilitates the masses to understand and operate to address the specific requirements of a particular relationship rather than engaging in inappropriate behavior and experiencing suffering. As declared above, based on the distinctive nature of trust, we support the argument that a company is not a family.

Studies with human participants

Ethical standards

All ethical requirements were carefully considered.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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Data availability statement

Everything reported in the paper (Summary of the studies – Table S1 – Supplementary Material) and the information about the search syntax is openly available as a supplementary file in the research box:

<https://researchbox.org/2542>

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Supplemental Materials

Search Syntax

Web of Science

TS=("Trust" OR "Trustworthiness" OR "Trust vs. Mistrust" OR "Trust game") AND
TS=("Emotion" OR "Affective" OR "Feelings") AND TS=("experiment*" OR "manipulat*" OR
"treatment*" OR "condition*") NOT TS=("child*")

Psychinfo

TI=("Trust" OR "Trustworthiness" OR "Trust vs. Mistrust" OR "Trust game") AND
TI=("Emotion" OR "Affective" OR "Feelings") AND TI=("experiment*" OR "manipulat*" OR
"treatment*" OR "condition*") NOT TI=("child*")

Scopus

TITLE-ABS-KEY("Trust" OR "Trustworthiness" OR "Trust vs. Mistrust" OR "Trust game") AND
TITLE-ABS-KEY("Emotion" OR "Affective" OR "Feelings") AND TITLE-ABS-
KEY("experiment*" OR "manipulat*" OR "treatment*" OR "condition*") NOT TITLE-ABS-
KEY("child*")

Table S1Summary of the included studies ($N = 31$)

Study authors/date (country of study)	Aim of the study	Sample details	Experimental design	Mindset	Control	Trust Measurement	Results
Chen et al. (2022; China)	To test age differences in facial perception of trustworthiness and how affective processing impacts this decision	162 total participants with younger adults = 87 (46 women; aged 18–43 years, $M = 25.15$, $SD = 5.46$) and older adults = 93 (68 women; aged 61–86 years, $M = 71.11$, $SD = 6.38$)	Between-group design	Information processing – Market mindset Emotion Processing – paying attention to one's feelings while rating the other person; Communal cognition	Control: Gender Focused	30-trial face trustworthiness rating task	Older adults rated strangers (with untrustworthy or neutral cues) more trustworthy than younger adults (Cohen's $d = .78$) Affective processing makes older people more likely to detect negative cues and reduce the level of trust towards strangers (Cohen's $d = .61$). Emotion processing makes the trustworthiness rating similar for both older adults and younger adults but in information processing conditions older adults gave more trustworthy ratings ($\eta^2 = .11$).
Belkin & Rothman (2017; USA)	To examine the effect of emotions on initial trust at zero-acquaintance interactions (competitive setting)	402 US Citizens over 21 years of age	Between-group Design	Market = Competitive setting (informed as an opponent in a decision-making game but no actual play) Happiness Anger and Ambivalence Vs. No Emotion	No emotion	Scale to rate how much they trust the person (1-7 point)	A happy person was trusted the most and an angry one the least ($\eta^2 = .28$). Whereas, the no emotion (control) face was trusted even more than the ambivalent one.
Study 2	To examine the effect of emotions on initial trust	179 US citizens over 21 years of age	Between-group Design	Trust in partner Communal (cooperative setting)	Neutral/No emotion	2-item attitudinal trust scale	The happy partner was trusted the most, angry was trusted the least, even in the cooperative context ($\eta^2 = .42$).

				Same conditions			Ambivalence decreases initial trust and liking.
Erk et al. (2015, The Netherlands)	To test whether hand touch feedback increases touch in comparison to visual feedback	37 total participants; 14 men, aged from 19 to 50 years (M = 30.16, SD = 10.49). 18 participants (control group), 19 (experimental group) 7 men in each condition	Between-group design	Communal manipulation Feedback via, touch or (hepatic vs. visual feedback)	Visual feedback	Trust game	No significant results were found for the effect of touch-based feedback. Almost a similar amount of money was sent in both conditions.
Li, Y. et al. (2021; China)	To investigate the effect of facial age on Trust taking facial attractiveness and emotional expression into account	52 undergraduate and graduate students (30 females, age = 21.42 ± 2.56)	Within-group design	Communal	Neutral	Trust game	Older faces were trusted the most than younger ones. Happy faces were trusted the most while making an investment decision, and then neutral faces more than sad ones. Participants invested more money in highly attractive faces than low-attractive ones. Considering facial attractiveness and age, people invested more in low attractive, older faces than younger ones. Further, older faces with happy and sad emotions were trusted more than neutral ones.
Slepian & Carr (2019; USA)	To examine the effect of emotional variability on the judgment of trust (Study 2)	202 participants (M age = 39.90 years, SD age = 12.31 years; 53% female).	Within-subject Design	Communal Negative vs. positive expressions	Neutral Expressions	Rating how authentic and trustworthy the person looks	Faces with positive expression variability were considered more trustworthy than negative and neutral ones by the participants. High variability targets were recognized as more trustworthy than the low variability of emotions in neutral conditions.
Dunn & Schweitzer (2005; USA).	To test the effect of incidental emotions on trust in an unfamiliar co-worker	120 adults with an average age was 36.4 years (SD 17.2) participated and were evenly divided by gender (51% men).	Between-group design	Manipulation of happiness, anger, and sadness - Trusting unfamiliar co-worker Market	No Control condition/ group	The attitudinal trust measure and Specific Interpersonal Trust Scale	Participants in happy conditions trusted the unfamiliar co-worker more than the participants in angry and sad conditions. Those in the sad condition trusted the unfamiliar co-worker more than the participants in the angry condition.

Levine & Wald (2020; USA)	To investigate whether feigned happiness increases trust in a professional context	126 respondents (50.0% men with mean age = 30 years, mean work experience = 11 years participated in the study	Between-group design	Hiring a coworker – Market	No control group	Hiring the coworker task	Participants trusted the individuals who misrepresented their emotions more than those who expressed authentic negative emotions ($\eta^2 = 0.083$).
Study 2	To investigate whether feigned happiness increases trust in the professional context vs. the personal context	400 employees participated in the study using a Qualtrics panel (69.8% women, mean age = 38 years, mean work experience = 18 years, 42% others).	Between-group design	Expression inside the work or outside the work context Market vs. Communal	No control group	Three-item scale of cognitive trust	Feigned happiness was produced and created trust rather than authentic distress ($\eta^2 = 0.51$). Participants were trusted more outside the work context than inside the work ($\eta^2 = 0.02$). Importantly, in terms of emotional representation and context interaction, feigned happiness was found to be associated with increased trust inside the work but had no effect outside the work/personal context ($\eta^2 = 0.02$).
Strachan et al. (2016; UK)	The Effect of Positive Emotions on Trust	24 participants (21 female, mean age 20.46)	Within-group design	Communal Valid Vs. Invalid (looking toward the target or looking away from the target respectively)	No control group	Trustworthiness rating -100 to +100	Faces with neutral emotions can be trusted more if the eye gaze does not drift away than those who look away from the target. A significant increase in trustworthiness rating for positive (smiling) faces who look towards targets.
Aguado et al. (2011; Spain)	To evaluate faces for trustworthiness, valence (pleasantness or unpleasantness), and arousal	15 women and 5 men with an age = from 18 to 23 years (mean 19 years).	Within-group	Communal First impression of faces	No Control group	Trustworthiness rating on a 1 to 9 point scale	Trustworthiness positively relates with valence ($\eta^2 = .602$) whereas with arousal it associates negatively ($\eta^2 = .527$).
Study 2	To evaluate neutral faces paired with happy or angry expressions as friends or enemies	20 students (18 women and 2 men), ages = 18 and 24 years (mean 19.5 years)	Within-group	Communal Friend or enemy selection	No control group	Rating	Trustworthy faces were positive and rated as friends ($\eta^2 = .643$). Untrustworthy faces were rated as more negative and arousing than trustworthy ones ($\eta^2 = .365$).
Thierry et al. (2021; Canada)	To test whether subtle expressions of emotion alter the	30 Caucasian adults (13 women), with age	Within-group design	Communal (first impression)	Neutral	How trustworthy is this person?"	Happy identities were rated as more trustworthy than neutral ones,

	first impression of trustworthiness	= 18 to 49 years (M = 25.80 years) participated in the study.		24 photos showing Caucasian identities (12 men and 12 women), each displaying an expression of happy, angry, and neutral face were used.		trustworthiness rating on a 7 point scale	Neutral identities were rated as more trustworthy than angry ones.
Study 2	To investigate whether first impression of trustworthiness is mandatory to bias the perception of trustworthiness later on	131 young adults (60 women and 69 men, 2 others) with age = 18 to 28 years (M = 23.18 years) participated.	Within-group design	4 happy, 4 angry, and 4 novel/new faces Communal	Neutral (as attention check)	How trustworthy is this person?" trustworthiness rating on a 7 point scale	Subtle expression of happiness but not anger biased the later perception of participants. Participants not only rated them more trustworthy but also reported voting for them in the election of Mayor and agreed to give them loans. They concluded that the first impression of trustworthiness is mandatory for later perceptions based on happiness.
Schweiger et al. (2014; Germany)	To evaluate the effect of warmth-liking on interpersonal trust	The sample was based on N = 95; (mean age = 22.6 years, SD = 2.47, range 18–31)	Between-group design	Warmth-liking (WL) induction via movie clip or memory of a closed one vs. memory of a casual acquaintance Communal	Placebo control	Trust game	Emotional induction of warmth-liking increases interpersonal trust.
Kim et al. (2017; USA)	To evaluate whether power and emotional authenticity influence trust after the transgression	Sample included N = 512; 180 women) with age = 19 to 73 years, (M = 32.96 years)	Between-subject design	Market = Professional work setting Employee showing emotional expression	Neutral emotion	Four items were used to measure trust	Perceived emotional authenticity directly influences the level of trust in the person. People with high power were consistently rated as less emotionally authentic and thus, it affects the level of trust. Effect of emotional control, the ability to express emotions or to hide them, on the authenticity of emotions eventually influences trust.
Schniter & Sheremeta (2014; USA)	To find how emotions regulate the propensity to	458 participants (229 pairs)	Within-subject Design	Promise breaker vs. promise keeper	No control	Trust game	After the initial (trust game) interaction participants experience emotions and those

	message, apologize, or reextend trust and show trustworthiness			(Economic exchange)			emotions influence the level of trustworthiness among participants. Positive emotions experienced after successful trust game interaction encourage participants to trust the messages and reflect more trustworthiness than the negative emotional experience.
Tortosa et al. (2013; Spain)	To investigate the effect of emotion and race on Trust	22 (one left-handed, 20 female; 20 years old on average)	Mixed design (Within-subject emotion manipulation)	Economic Exchange/Social decision-making task	Neutral condition	Trust game	Participants transferred more money to the happy partners than the angry ones.
Cote et al. (2013; Canada)	To test the consequences of faking anger in negotiations	Participate included undergraduate students N = 130 (75 women and 55 men) with ages = 19 and 50 (M = 22.19 years)	Between-group design	Buyer – Seller Market	Control group/Neutral	Three items measure assessing test in the buyer was used.	Trust was reported less for those in surface-acting conditions than neutral ones ($d = .94$).
Study 2	To investigate and compare the surface-anger impact on trust ratings with deep-anger and neutral conditions simultaneously	140 undergraduate (66 men and 74 women) with ages = 18 and 28 (M = 20.87 years).	Between-group design	Buyer – Seller Market	Control group/Neutral	Three items measure assessing test in the buyer was used.	Face/Person with surface-anger display of emotion was trusted less than the deep-anger condition and deep-anger display was trusted less than the neutral one ($\eta^2 = .21$).
Schmitz et al. (2021; Germany)	To evaluate the effect of momentary mood on facial trustworthiness	Participants included 42 women, aged 21 to 50 (M = 29.88, SD = 7.50).	Within-subject design	Communal – facial rating	No control group	hypothetical distrust game	Negative mood was found to be associated with distrust
Capra (2004; USA)	To test mood-driven behavior in economic interactions	18 Participants	Within-group	Economic Interaction/Strategic Interaction - Market	No control	Trust game	Participants in positive mood were more trustworthy than those in negative mood conditions.

Myers & Tingley (2016; USA)	To find how emotional state influences behavior in the trust game	249 undergraduate students	Between-subject design	Economic interaction		Trust game	Negative emotions can reduce trust but only in low certainty appraisal conditions like anxiety.
Cheshin et al. (2018; Israel & Netherlands)	To explore the effect of visual expression of emotion on Trust	500 Israeli participants with an age = 25–35, M = 26.40, and 55% women were the part of the study.	Between-subject design	Service industry		Three items were used to measure trust	The service provided expressing intense emotions was perceived as less trustworthy than those with mild emotional expression ($\eta^2 = 0.043$).
Study 2	To explore the effect of Auditory expression of emotion on Trust	306 Israeli participants with age = 18 to 67 years, M = 25.75 years, and 50% women took part in the study.	Between Subject	auditory emotional displays by the customer representative	Neutral	Items	Customer service representative with intense emotional expressions was perceived as less trustworthy than those with mild emotional displays ($d = 0.83$).
Study 3	To explore the effect of written expression of emotion on Trust	150 Dutch undergraduates, age = 21.00, SD = 3.73, and 73.3% women	Between Subject	Display of emotions via textual statements by the service provider	Neutral	Items	Participants reported less trust in the service providers who responded with intensely emotional textual statements ($d = 0.99$).
Study 4	To explore the effect of emotional expression on Trust in real life service encounter	The sample was comprised of 162 individuals (47.5% women; M age = 30.78, SD = 10.85)	Between Subject	Real-life service encounters - incorporating a message by the service provider for watching a movie	No emotion	Items	Participants who interacted with the service provider having mild emotional expression reported more trust, more satisfaction from the service and were more likely to watch the movie ($d = 0.32$).
Zebrowitz et al. (2017; USA)	To investigate the Older Adults' positivity effect in their evaluations of trustworthiness	20 young adults (10 men) with an age range = 18 to 34 (M = 25.35, SD = 4.00) and 20 Older Adults (10 men) with an age range = 68 to 90 (M = 76.89, SD = 7.18)	Within-subject design	Communal facial expressions (attractiveness or trustworthiness)	Neutral	7-point scale for rating trustworthiness was used	Less attractive/Negative faces were reported as less trustworthy than medium or highly attractive/Positive ones ($\eta^2 = .568$). Older adults' positivity effect was confirmed by their higher ratings of trustworthiness than younger adults ($\eta^2 = .161$).

Houston et al. (2018; USA)	To evaluate the racial differences in trustworthiness rating for authentic positive displays of service provider	264 (211 Whites and 53 Blacks); age (M = 24 years, SD = 6.52)	Between-group	Market Hotel service Checking in the hotel and employee interaction	No control	Five-item measure for perceived trustworthiness	Regardless of the perceiver's race, an authentic display of emotions resulted in increased perceived trustworthiness than the unauthentic display ($\eta^2 = 0.08$).
Study 2	To test the racial difference in sensitivity to authenticity as a cue for trustworthiness	292 participants, 51% identified as White, and 72% were female, with an average age of 45 (SD = 15.41).	Between-group study	Foodservice interaction, Market The race of the service provider was manipulated (ingroup vs. outgroup interaction)	Neutral	5-items perceived trustworthiness scale	Based on the race of the observer, there was no difference in the effect of authentic display or inauthentic display on the perceived trustworthiness of the service provider. The study concluded, that there were no racial differences in sensitivity to authenticity as a cue for the trustworthiness of service providers.
Robbins (2016; UAE)	To investigate the effect of other praising emotions (gratitude and admiration) on Trust or not.	The sample of a Study 2a (relevant to our work) included 95 undergraduate students (39 percent men; M age = 20.78, SD = 4.41).	Multifactorial Design	trust a hypothetical auto mechanic or group project member Exchange cognition Car repair and group project (the person has sold you a computer and you're satisfied vs. not satisfied with is prior interaction)	No control	Bipolar scale for rating trust	Feelings of gratitude and admiration both resulted in an increase in trust but the effect of gratitude was greater than admiration.



Trust under watch: Relational models and the context-dependent nature of monitoring

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ABSTRACT

Trust and control are often portrayed as opposing forces in a hydraulic relationship. Across six preregistered experiments (total $N = 4086$) conducted in Australia, South Africa, the UK, and the US, we demonstrate that this relationship is context-dependent rather than universal. We examined how verification monitoring—a subtle form of control—affects trust in communal sharing (CS) versus market pricing (MP) relationships. Participants found monitoring more acceptable in MP than CS relationships (Experiment 1), and its introduction shifted perceptions of CS relationships toward a more market-like orientation (Experiments S1–S2). From the trustee's perspective, monitoring reduced trust in both relational contexts; from the trustor's view, it only undermined trust in CS relationships (Experiment 2). These patterns generalized across cultures, held across different trust levels (Experiment 3), and extended to behavioral choices (Experiment 4). Our findings challenge the universality of the hydraulic model, showing that while control mechanisms undermine trust in communal contexts where they violate norms of unconditional support, their effects in market contexts depend on whose perspective is considered—trustors or trustees.

1. Introduction

While monitoring is considered acceptable in market-based relationships, it could violate relational norms when used in a communal context. For example, imagine a parent who installs indoor security cameras to monitor their home while a caretaker watches their child. If the caregiver is a hired professional babysitter, monitoring may be seen as a reasonable precaution. However, if the caregiver is a close family member, such behavior is likely to be perceived as inappropriate. This contrast raises important, yet understudied, questions about how trust and monitoring-based control interact across different relational contexts. Is such control more readily accepted in market pricing than in communal sharing relationships? Does its presence influence people's perception of the nature of a relationship? And finally, does implementing monitoring affect trust in the same way in these two modes of relating?

Typically, trust and control are seen as opposing forces, forming a *hydraulic* relationship (e.g., Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Williamson, 1975). Whereas trust entails confidence in others' goodwill

and reliability, control relies on mechanisms to monitor and regulate behavior, potentially signaling a lack of trust. As a result, the introduction of control can erode the foundation of trust. In the present research, we examine this general hypothesis: that implementing monitoring-based control tends to undermine trust. We further propose that the association between trust and control depends on the type of relationship. Building on relational models theory (Fiske, 1992), we predict that this effect will differ across relational models. Specifically, control will have a substantially more detrimental effect on trust within communal sharing (CS) than within market-pricing (MP) contexts, reflecting the distinct psychological foundations of these two relational categories.

CS relationships—such as those between close friends or family members—are characterized by mutual care and shared resources without expectation of direct reciprocation. In such relationships, trust is indispensable for emotional closeness, interdependence, and long-term commitment. Without it, close bonds are unlikely to form or endure (Luhmann, 2000; Rusbult, Wieselquist, Foster, & Witcher, 1999).

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Hence, in CS relationships, introducing solutions based on control can signal distrust, potentially undermining closeness and damaging the relationship (Dempsey, Hammond, & Dixon, 2020). In contrast, MP relationships—such as business transactions—are governed by explicit agreements, where exchanges rely on proportionality rather than interpersonal care (Fiske, 1992). Although trust remains valuable in MP relationships (Arrow, 1974; Fukuyama, 1995), it is less indispensable for their functioning because formal mechanisms such as contracts can partially substitute for interpersonal trust by structuring expectations and behavior (Dekker, 2004). Accordingly, MP relationships often rely more heavily on formal rules and procedures (Gulati, 1995; Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006), which help to manage uncertainty, mitigate risk, and ensure compliance (Lazzarini, Miller, & Zenger, 2004). In this sense, trust and formal control mechanisms can operate as partially substitutable ways of regulating social interaction in MP contexts. As a result, mechanisms of control should be less detrimental in MP relationships.

While control can take many forms, including formal contracts, incentives, and monitoring, in our present work we focus on verification monitoring—that is, checking whether tasks or promises were fulfilled as agreed. Our choice to focus on monitoring is driven by two key reasons. First, monitoring represents a relatively subtle and indirect form of control, aimed at verifying information rather than directly constraining behavior. As such, it provides a conservative test of our theoretical framework. Specifically, if even this minimally intrusive form of control produces differential effects across relational contexts, then more directive forms of control (e.g., formal contracts) might be expected to yield similar or stronger effects. Second, many forms of control are inherently tied to specific relational contexts and may therefore be difficult to compare across them. For example, formal contracts are common in market pricing relationships but may appear inappropriate or norm-violating in communal sharing contexts, potentially introducing confounds related to perceived abnormality or relational mismatch. In contrast, monitoring constitutes a form of control that can be plausibly enacted in both relational contexts without being inherently atypical in either. Monitoring is common in MP exchanges (e.g., Crosno & Brown, 2015; Downes, Daellenbach, & Donnelly, 2023; Heide, Wathne, & Rokkan, 2007; Niehoff & Moorman, 1993), but it can also occur in CS relations (Araci-İyaydin, Toplu-Demirtaş, Akçabozan-Kayabol, & Fincham, 2022; Arikewuyo, Eluwole, & Özad, 2021; Vinkers, Finkenauer, & Hawk, 2011). This makes it particularly well-suited to isolating the relational interpretation of control. Accordingly, our findings speak most directly to monitoring as a form of control, while providing a basis for theorizing about how other control mechanisms may operate within the same relational logic.

The present research may contribute to the literature not only at a theoretical level but also in terms of practical implications. Understanding how monitoring-based control influences trust across relational contexts may have implications for personal, organizational, and economic domains. Identifying when control fosters versus erodes trust can reveal the psychological mechanisms that shape cooperation, governance, and relational dynamics in both personal and institutional settings.

2. Trust in communal sharing and market pricing relationships

Trust involves a willingness to be vulnerable (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995), positive expectations of others, and reliance on their actions despite the uncertainty of their intentions and behavior (Rousseau et al., 1998). This fundamental human capacity underlies a wide range of behaviors, from disclosing secrets to friends (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985) and showing up to work when compensation is delayed, to buying a used car (Akerlof, 1970). Thus, the primary functions of trust are to foster good relationships and to help people cope with uncertainty across different social domains (Rousseau et al.,

1998). However, the meaning of a good or successful relationship and, consequently, the nature of trust differ markedly between CS and MP relationships, which, in turn, affects the impact of monitoring-based control on trust.

In CS relationships, what constitutes a good relationship centers on building and sustaining the relationship itself, fostering long-term interdependence between partners (Rusbult et al., 1999). To build commitment and strengthen this bond, individuals must embrace uncertainty and act as though the other party is unconditionally trustworthy. Costly assessments of a partner's trustworthiness (Lewicki et al., 2006) or formal mechanisms such as contracts are typically avoided, and, if used, can substantially erode relationship quality (Clark, Lemay, Graham, Pataki, & Finkel, 2010).

MP relationships operate by entirely different principles. Here, relationship success depends on tangible results that satisfy one's interest rather than on emotional bonds. People extend trust to enable profitable exchanges, but without necessarily expecting a long-term interdependence (Fiske, 1991). In this context, trust serves a purely instrumental purpose by reducing cost, time, and effort. When buyers cannot gauge how much trust to extend to sellers, they may rely on formal contracts or monitoring as a form of control (Lewicki et al., 2006; Rousseau et al., 1998). Such tools reduce the need to rely solely on trust, allowing effective market relations even when interpersonal trust is low.

3. Trust and control

Control may be exercised through formal means such as contracts, monitoring, and incentives or via informal mechanisms such as social norms (Costa & Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007). Like trust, its purpose is to foster predictability of future behavior (Luhmann, 1997; Nooteboom, 2002). As noted earlier, the nature of trust–control dynamics varies across relationship models.

4. Trust and control in communal sharing relationships

In research on CS relationships, the link between trust and control is often described as *hydraulic*, meaning that higher levels of one correspond to lower levels of the other (also referred to as the substitution perspective). For instance, mistrust toward a romantic partner is associated with heightened jealousy and controlling behaviors (Yilmaz, Lajunen, & Sullman, 2023). However, a lack of trust may not only trigger controlling behaviors but also be caused by them. In communal contexts, control often manifests in harmful forms such as emotional and physical abuse, economic manipulation, coercion, intimidation, and social isolation, all of which can damage trust and degrade relationship quality (e.g., Graham-Kevan & Archer, 2008; Johnson, 2006; Stark, 2007).

Beyond these extreme cases, even subtle attempts to exert control in communal relationships are typically viewed negatively and labeled as intrusive. Intrusiveness can present itself in two ways: covertly, when done without consent (for example, accessing a partner's email without their knowledge), or overtly, when one directly interferes in another's personal life, such as by becoming overly involved in their decisions (Petronio, 1994). These actions have been linked to disagreement, anger, resentment, and trust breakdown (e.g., Hawk, Hale, Raaijmakers, & Meeus, 2008; Petronio, 1994). For instance, research has found that snooping through a partner's phone is associated with diminished trust, predicting increased conflict and a higher likelihood of relationship dissolution (Arikewuyo et al., 2021; Vinkers et al., 2011).

Even when exercised with good intentions—such as safeguarding a partner's well-being—control in close relationships can still have harmful consequences. For example, health-related social control, defined as a set of interpersonal strategies aimed at regulating another person's health behaviors, has been associated with psychological distress including sadness, guilt, hostility, and reactance (Lewis & Rook, 1999).

These negative outcomes often arise when individuals perceive control as a threat to their autonomy, prompting them to resist it or conceal their behaviors (Lewis & Rook, 1999; Scholz, Stadler, Berli, Lüscher, & Knoll, 2021).

5. Trust and control in market pricing relationships

In business and economic contexts, for which MP relationships are typical, control is viewed as far more acceptable than in CS relationships (Gulati, 1995; Lazzarini et al., 2004). Here, trust and control are seen as interchangeable and supplementary tools for reducing uncertainty: high trust reduces the need for formal control, whereas low trust increases it (Inkpen & Currall, 1997; Williamson, 1975). This substitution logic reflects the economic utility of trust—it promotes cooperation, lowers transaction costs, and facilitates information sharing (Arrow, 1974; Gulati, 1995; Powell, 1996). Empirical work supports this view—for instance, Costa (2003) found that trust within work teams correlates positively with cooperation and negatively with monitoring behaviors.

Beyond the substitution logic, some scholars studying MP relationships have proposed a complementary view of trust–control dynamics. This perspective, common in economic and organizational literature, suggests that trust and control are not inversely related but may reinforce one another. Formal control mechanisms can foster trust by providing structure and clarity (Vuorenmaa, 2024). In inter-organizational collaborations, formal contracts and institutional safeguards enhance predictability, which is crucial in environments marked by high uncertainty or ongoing change (Dodgson, 1993; Luhmann, 1997). Because no control system ensures full oversight of others' actions, and not all contingencies can be codified in contracts (Merchant, 1985; Speklé, 2001), even formal systems must partly rely on trust. Therefore, a basic level of trust is considered essential to mitigate opportunistic behavior (Axelrod, 1984; Birnberg, 1998). Some scholars focusing on MP contexts have even proposed a developmental relationship between trust and control, which can evolve in either direction (Lumineau, Long, Sitkin, Argyres, & Markman, 2023; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). In one pathway, formal control mechanisms can provide a structure that gradually fosters trust. In the other, particularly in high-risk settings where formal controls are initially impractical, trust may function as the starting point from which formal control systems later emerge.

Taken together, these perspectives suggest that the same act of monitoring-based control may carry different meanings across relational contexts. In communal relationships, monitoring may signal distrust and threaten the emotional foundation of the relationship, whereas in market relationships it may be viewed as a normative, even prudent, form of oversight. Based on this reasoning, we hypothesize that monitoring-based control will have a more detrimental impact on trust in communal sharing relationships than in market-pricing ones. At the same time, although control is more acceptable and sometimes even functional in market-pricing relationships, it is unlikely to be completely neutral. Market interactions remain social exchanges, and people generally dislike being monitored or constrained, even when such oversight is normative or expected. Consequently, we expect that control may still reduce trust to some extent in MP contexts, but its detrimental impact should be considerably smaller than in communal sharing relationships.

6. Overview of the current experiments and intended theoretical contribution

We conducted a series of six preregistered experiments to investigate whether the *hydraulic* link between trust and control is stronger for CS relationships than for MP relationships. First, we tested whether people find monitoring more appropriate in MP than in CS relationships

(Experiment 1). We then examined whether introducing verification monitoring into a certain relationship leads people to perceive the relationship as more market-like and less communal-like, compared to when monitoring is absent (Experiments S1 and S2 presented in Supplementary Materials, SM). In Experiment 2, we investigated whether monitoring leads to lower trust overall, with this trust-reducing effect being more pronounced in CS than MP contexts. Here, we also systematically tested whether this effect depended on the individual's role: the person introducing monitoring or the person subject to it. Experiment 3 tested whether the acceptability and use of monitoring in MP relationships would be stronger when the initial trust is low, and weaker when initial trust is high. Finally, moving beyond hypothetical scenarios, we used a behavioral economic game to explore actual monitoring decisions in trust-based interactions. We tested whether individuals would be more likely to apply monitoring when the game is framed as an MP rather than CS interaction (Experiment 4).

7. Transparency statement

This project adheres to ethical guidelines specified in the APA Code of Conduct and Declaration of Helsinki, and was approved by the Ethics Committee for Human Research of [BLINDED], decision number [BLINDED]. All participants in all studies provided informed consent by confirming their agreement within the survey system. Across studies, we report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and all measures used in the study, and we followed JARS (Kazak, 2018). All data, analyses codes, and output files are available at https://researchbox.org/4514&PEER_REVIEW_passcode=MZWAZS, and all study materials are available in the Supplementary Materials. All studies were preregistered. Data analysis was conducted using Jamovi and Mplus 8.10.

8. Experiment 1

Experiment 1 tested whether people perceive monitoring as more appropriate in MP relationships than in CS relationships. Participants evaluated six different scenarios (three communal and three market-related) in a within-subjects design, rating both the acceptability of specific monitoring measures and their willingness to implement them. As a manipulation check, and to control for additional confounding perceptions, participants evaluated how well each scenario matched the four relational models (Fiske, 1992). Additionally, we tested whether the effect of the MP vs. CS model persisted after controlling for the perception of the situations as representing Equality Matching (EM) and Authority Ranking (AR) models. As an exploratory analysis, we tested the indirect effects of relational model on acceptance and propensity to monitor the other party via perceptions of these situations as related to MP model and CS model (analyses included in SM).

8.1. Participants and procedure

The hypotheses, recruitment, sample size, exclusion criteria, and data analysis were preregistered at: https://aspredicted.org/2TB_Z5T. Power analysis with G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) for the paired-sample *t*-test assuming a small effect size of $d_z = 0.25$, at $\alpha = 0.05$ with a power of $1 - \beta = 0.95$ revealed that we need a sample of 210 participants to detect such an effect. This analysis was based on our focal theoretical comparison—namely, the within-subject difference between CS and MP conditions. The additional factors in the design were included to enhance generalizability rather than to test separate primary hypotheses. Specifically, we used a 2 (relationship model: CS vs. MP) $\times$ 3 (scenario: birthday gift vs. cooking vs. renovation) $\times$ 2 (DV type: acceptance of monitoring vs. propensity to monitor) within-subjects design, allowing us to examine whether the focal effect generalizes across different contexts and operationalizations.

Given our planned multilevel analysis and the absence of prior effect size estimates, we aimed to collect data from 210 participants. Three hundred twenty-seven U.S. participants from Prolific Academic started the study. One hundred ten participants failed the comprehension test and were not qualified for the actual study (see Procedure for details). The final sample consisted of $N = 217$ individuals (105 women, 107 men, 5 others, $M_{\text{age}} = 37.33$, $SD = 11.80$). Sensitivity power analysis using a Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 repetitions in Mplus 8.10 indicated that this sample size would achieve 95% power to detect a weak main effect of relational mode on appropriateness of control ($\beta = 0.06$), given our analytic approach and the conventional alpha level of 0.05.

We used a 2 (relationship model: CS vs. MP) $\times$ 3 (scenario: birthday gift vs. cooking vs. renovation) $\times$ 2 (DV type: acceptance of monitoring vs. propensity to monitor) within-subjects design. After providing informed consent and demographic information, participants learned about the four relational models (Fiske, 1992) and completed a comprehension test with eight questions (two per relational model; full wording of the descriptions and relevant questions provided in SM). Participants who failed the test were given one opportunity to reread the material and retake the test. If they failed again, they were disqualified and paid 0.30 GBP for their time. Qualified participants were redirected to the main study in exchange for 1.5 GBP.

In the main part of the study, participants read six scenarios presented in random order. The scenarios described three situations—buying a birthday gift, preparing party food, and renovating a flat—with each situation presented in both CS and MP versions. For instance:

“You asked your spouse to order a birthday gift for your child from an online shop, and they promised to do it right away so the parcel would arrive within four days” (CS).

“You ordered a birthday gift for your child from an online shop, and the seller declared an estimated delivery time of four days” (MP).

Participants first rated the extent to which each scenario represented the four relational models they had learned about. Subsequently, they were presented with the same scenarios again, now including information about suspected lapses in responsibility. For example:

“The birthday is today, but the parcel did not arrive. You suspect they forgot to order the item, but your spouse attributed the issue to unexpected delays in the carrier company due to bad weather” (CS).

“The birthday is today, but the parcel did not arrive. You suspect that the company forgot to send the item, but they attributed the issue to unexpected delays in the carrier company due to bad weather” (MP).

For each of the six scenarios, participants rated if it would be acceptable for them to introduce monitoring and how likely they would be to do so (for example, “Would it be acceptable to approach customer service to verify the reasons behind the delay?” and “How likely is it that you would approach customer service to verify the reasons behind the delay?”; full wording in SM). To indicate their responses, participants used a slider from 1 = *definitely not* to 7 = *definitely yes*.

8.2. Results

8.2.1. Manipulation checks

First, we tested the effectiveness of the relational model manipulation using a multilevel model in which perceptions of the scenarios as reflecting communal sharing, market pricing, equality matching, and authority ranking were treated as correlated dependent variables at both the within- and between-participant levels (see Supplementary Materials for full results). The analysis accounted for the nested structure of the data (scenarios within participants) and included scenario as a factor to examine whether the manipulation operated consistently across contexts. We used a Bayesian estimator in Mplus 8.10, with random intercepts for participants.

The results confirmed that the manipulation was highly effective: scenarios framed as market pricing were perceived as significantly more market-like and less communal than those framed as communal sharing, with substantially weaker effects observed for the remaining relational models. Although we observed some variation across scenarios in overall levels of perceived relational models, the effects of the relational model manipulation remained robust and directionally consistent across all scenarios. Interactions with scenario primarily reflected differences in the strength of the effects rather than their pattern, indicating that the manipulation reliably distinguished between relational contexts regardless of specific situational content.

8.2.2. Hypotheses testing

According to our preregistered analysis plan, we conducted a multilevel regression using a 2 (model: CS vs. MP) $\times$ 3 (scenario: birthday gift vs. cooking vs. renovation) $\times$ 2 (DV type: acceptance of monitoring vs. propensity to monitor) design. Full results of this analysis are presented in the SM. Here, we report a simplified version that collapses across scenarios: a multilevel regression with a 2 (model: CS vs. MP) $\times$ 2 (DV type: acceptance of monitoring vs. propensity to monitor) within-subjects design. The analysis included three scenarios per condition and used a Bayesian estimator in Mplus 8.10, with random intercepts for participants.

We expected a significant effect of relationship model, but we had no specific expectations regarding the main effect of DV type or its interaction. Consistent with our preregistered hypothesis, we found a significant main effect of relationship model on perceptions of monitoring, $\beta = 0.16$, Post. $SD = 0.02$, 95% CI [0.13, 0.20], $p < .001$, such that participants perceived monitoring to be more appropriate in market-like situations than in communal-like situations (Fig. 1). We also found a significant main effect of DV type, $\beta = 0.19$, Post. $SD = 0.02$, 95% CI [0.15, 0.22], $p < .001$, indicating that people rated the acceptability of monitoring higher than their own willingness to use it, across both relationship types. Finally, the interaction between DV type and relationship model was not significant, $\beta = -0.003$, Post. $SD = 0.02$, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.02], $p = .860$. The results supported our hypothesis that people perceive monitoring as more appropriate in market than communal relationships.

9. Experiment 2

Experiment 1 demonstrated that people see monitoring as more appropriate in MP situations than in CS situations. Two supplementary experiments (Experiments S1 and S2, reported in the SM) further investigated how the introduction of monitoring shapes the perceived nature of social interactions. Across both studies, we found that introducing




Fig. 1. Mean acceptance of monitoring and propensity to monitor by relational model. Error bars represent standard error (Experiment 1).

monitoring shifted participants' perceptions of CS situations: these situations were seen as less communal and more market-like when monitoring was present. This effect was particularly pronounced from the trustee's perspective (Experiment S2), suggesting that those subjected to monitoring are especially sensitive to its relational implications. In contrast, monitoring had only minimal effects on the perceived nature of MP situations, and these effects were limited to the trustee's perspective.

Importantly, these findings indicate that monitoring not only regulates behavior but also serves as a relational signal that can alter how a situation is construed. In particular, being monitored appears to push interactions toward a more market-oriented interpretation, especially in contexts that would otherwise be seen as communal.

Taken together, these results suggest that monitoring is more naturally aligned with MP than CS relationships and that its presence can reshape the perceived relational context—particularly for those who are being monitored. However, these studies focused on how monitoring influences relational perceptions rather than trust itself. Thus, it is not clear whether—and how—these shifts in relational construal translate into changes in trust.

Building on these findings, Experiment 2 directly tested whether introducing monitoring into relationships reduces trust. We expected stronger trust reduction effects in CS than MP relationships, as monitoring is less appropriate for CS than for MP relationships. We used the same CS and MP scenarios as in the previous studies, again manipulating whether the trustor monitored the other person's behavior. We operationalized trust as a latent variable composed of general, specific, and prospective trust.

As our previous experiments suggested, the detrimental effect of monitoring might be stronger from the trustee's perspective than from the trustor's perspective. Therefore, in the present study, we manipulated participants' perspectives to directly compare the effect of monitoring on trust from the trustor's (i.e., the person who introduces monitoring) and the trustee's (i.e., the person being monitored) perspectives. Participants were asked to evaluate the level of trust that the trustor has toward the trustee (either from the trustor's own perspective or from the trustee's perspective). We expected monitoring's detrimental effect on trust to be stronger from the trustee's than from the trustor's perspective, with this asymmetry being especially pronounced in CS relationships.

9.1. Participants and procedure

The hypotheses, recruitment, sample size, exclusion criteria, and data analysis were preregistered at: https://aspredicted.org/XLM_Z5J. We conducted a Monte Carlo power simulation, based on the effect size for the interaction between monitoring and relational model we found in Experiments S1 and S2 in the SM. The simulation indicated that to detect a similar effect ($\beta = 0.07$) with $\alpha = 0.05$ and power of 1 - $\beta = 0.95$, we needed a sample of 1200 participants. We recruited 1200 U.K. participants from Prolific Academic to participate in an online study in exchange for 1.5 GBP. Twenty-nine participants failed one or more attention checks and were excluded from analysis. The final sample consisted of $N = 1171$ individuals (599 women, 564 men, 8 other/prefer not to tell, $M_{age} = 46.11$, $SD = 15.46$). Sensitivity power analysis using a Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 repetitions in Mplus 8.10 indicated that this sample size would achieve 95% power to detect a weak two-way interaction on the between-participants ($\beta = 0.06$), given our analytic approach and the conventional alpha level of 0.05.

After providing informed consent and demographic information, participants were assigned to one of the eight conditions in a 2 (relational model: CS vs. MP) $\times$ 2 (monitoring: present vs. absent) $\times$ 2 (perspective: trustor vs. trustee) between-subjects design. They were asked to read three scenarios (same as in previous experiments), this time presenting either CS ($n = 563$) or MP ($n = 607$) interactions,

with monitoring present ($n = 552$) vs. absent ($n = 618$). A subset of participants was presented with these scenarios from a trustor's perspective ($n = 567$), as in Experiment S1, while the remaining participants were asked to adopt the perspective of a trustee ($n = 604$), as in Experiment S2 (see SM for full wording). After reading each scenario, participants were asked to rate three aspects of trust: general trust, specific trust, and prospective trust. The wording of all trust items was adapted to match both the relational context and the assigned perspective: in the trustor condition, participants reported their own trust toward the partner (e.g., "How much do you trust your spouse/seller in general?"), whereas in the trustee condition, they indicated how much they believed the partner trusted them (e.g., "How much does your spouse/customer trust you in general?").

Across conditions, the same three facets of trust were assessed: general trust, specific trust referring to the focal behavior in the scenario (e.g., placing or dispatching the order on time), and prospective trust reflecting willingness to rely on the partner in the future. Participants answered the three questions using a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all* to 7 = *very much*). Three items were used as indicators of trust—our dependent variable. As in previous experiments, participants responded to the attention checks embedded in the study: 1) provide today's date and 2) answer 'not at all' to this question.

9.2. Results

In line with our preregistration, we first tested the measurement model using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in Mplus 8.10 using Bayesian estimation. We constructed one dependent variable as a latent variable from the three trust items. The model converged well, with the three trust items loading onto a single factor at both between- and within-participant levels, indicating that each item contributed significantly to the dependent variable. The 95% confidence interval for the observed and the replicated χ^2 values included 0, [-18.26, 16.56], and the posterior predictive value $p = .496$. These results indicate a good fit for the unifactorial model of the trust items in our study.

Next, we conducted a multilevel regression in a 2 (model: MP vs. CS) $\times$ 2 (monitoring: present vs. absent) $\times$ 2 (perspective: trustor vs. trustee) between-subjects design, with scenarios nested within participants and the latent trust variable as our DV. We included random intercepts for participants.

In line with our preregistered hypothesis, we found a significant main effect of monitoring on trust: participants reported lower levels of trust when monitoring was present than when it was not (Table 1). We also found a significant main effect of the relational model on trust,

Table 1
Relational model, monitoring, and perspective as predictors of trust (Experiment 2).

Predictors	β	Post. SD	95% CI	p
Monitoring	-0.65	0.05	[-0.75, -0.54]	< 0.001
Relational Model	-0.84	0.05	[-0.94, -0.72]	< 0.001
Perspective	-0.36	0.05	[-0.45, -0.26]	< 0.001
Relational Model $\times$ Monitoring	0.15	0.04	[0.07, 0.28]	< 0.001
Perspective $\times$ Monitoring	-0.47	0.05	[-0.58, -0.37]	< 0.001
Perspective $\times$ Relational Model	0.24	0.05	[0.16, 0.33]	< 0.001
Perspective $\times$ Monitoring $\times$ Relational Model	-0.01	0.04	[-0.09, 0.07]	0.860

Note. Relational Model (MP vs CS); Monitoring (introduced vs. not introduced); Perspective (trustee vs. trustor); Post. SD = standard deviation of the posterior distribution, 95% CI = 95% credible intervals.

with participants reporting lower levels of trust in MP than CS situations. Further, we found a significant main effect of perspective on trust, such that participants taking the trustee perspective reported lower levels of trust than those taking the trustor perspective. Importantly, all two-way interactions were significant. However, we did not find a significant three-way interaction.

We then decomposed the significant interactions by analyzing the effects of monitoring separately for each perspective within each relational model (Table 2). As predicted, monitoring decreased trust in both perspectives, but this effect was stronger from the trustee's than the trustor's perspective. Additionally, monitoring's detrimental effects on trust were stronger in CS than MP situations, as evident in Table 2.

In line with our expectations, from the trustor's perspective, the presence (vs. absence) of monitoring decreased trust in CS situations, $\beta = -0.34$, Post. $SD = 0.10$, 95% CI $[-0.52, -0.15]$, $p < .001$ (Fig. 2). However, in MP situations, $\beta = -0.01$, Post. $SD = 0.08$, 95% CI $[-0.18, 0.14]$, $p = .920$, monitoring did not significantly affect perceptions of trust.

In contrast, from the trustee's perspective, the decrease in trust was evident for both CS situations, $\beta = -1.26$, Post. $SD = 0.09$, 95% CI $[-1.44, -1.08]$, $p < .001$ and MP situations, $\beta = -0.97$, Post. $SD = 0.10$, 95% CI $[-1.20, -0.77]$, $p < .001$. Finally, the detrimental effects of monitoring on trust in both CS and MP situations were significantly stronger from the trustee's perspective than from the trustor perspective, with $\beta = 0.93$, Post. $SD = 0.13$, 95% CI $[0.65, 1.15]$,

$p < .001$ for CS and $\beta = 0.95$, Post. $SD = 0.14$, 95% CI $[0.71, 1.23]$, $p < .001$ for MP situations.

To examine the robustness of these effects across different contexts, we conducted additional analyses including scenario type as a moderator (see SM). Although overall levels of trust varied across scenarios, the core pattern of results remained consistent. In particular, the effects of monitoring were systematically stronger from the trustee's than the trustor's perspective and more detrimental in CS than in MP contexts across all scenarios. The observed interactions with scenario primarily reflected differences in the magnitude of effects rather than changes in their direction, suggesting that the findings were not driven by idiosyncratic features of specific situations.

In summary, we demonstrated that the introduction of monitoring significantly decreased trust; however, this decrease varied by both perspective and relational model. Monitoring significantly decreased trust in CS situations from both perspectives but only affected MP situations from the trustee's perspective. The detrimental effects were consistently stronger from the trustee's than the trustor's perspective across both relational models. We also found that, regardless of the presence of monitoring, trust was generally lower in the MP relationships compared to the CS relationships.

10. Experiment 3

The experiments presented so far in this paper have been conducted with American and British samples, typically characterized as WEIRD cultures (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). To strengthen the cultural generalizability of our findings, in Experiment 3 we tested whether the effects observed in Experiment 1 would replicate in a different cultural context. We selected South Africa because its social, historical, and economic landscape differs substantially from Western contexts in ways that may shape patterns of cooperation and trust (Fukuyama, 1995). Thus, Experiment 3 served as a conceptual replication aimed at examining the robustness of our results beyond the Western samples used in earlier studies.

Importantly, in Experiment 2 we observed that, in the absence of monitoring, baseline levels of trust were higher in CS than in MP relationships, both from the trustor's perspective and in trustees' expectations of how much they are trusted. This pattern raises the possibility that differences in baseline trust may contribute to differences in how monitoring is evaluated across relational contexts. Therefore, in Experiment 3, we tested whether variation in initial trust levels can account for, or moderate, the relationship between relational model and monitoring.

Table 2

Relational model and monitoring as predictors of trust: Trustor's vs. Trustee's perspective.

Predictors	Trustor				Trustee			
	β	Post. SD	95% CI	p	β	Post. SD	95% CI	p
Monitoring	-0.17	0.07	[-0.30, -0.05]	0.012	-1.12	0.08	[-1.30, -0.97]	< .001
Relational model	-1.09	0.08	[-1.23, -0.93]	< .001	-0.60	0.07	[-0.72, -0.46]	< .001
Relational model $\times$ Monitoring	0.16	0.06	[0.03, 0.28]	0.012	0.14	0.07	[0.02, 0.26]	0.008

Note. Relational Model (MP vs CS); Monitoring (introduced vs. not introduced); Post. SD = standard deviation of the posterior distribution, 95% CI = 95% credible intervals.




Fig. 2. Trustor's (left) and Trustee's (right) perception of the trustor's trust by the relational model and monitoring condition. Error bars represent standard error (Experiment 2). Latent dependent variables are scaled in standardized units.

toring acceptance. Specifically, we manipulated the perceived reliability of the interaction partner, thereby varying initial levels of trust within both communal and market relations, and measured people's acceptance of monitoring and their willingness to use it in three different situations. We focused on relatively high versus moderate levels of trust (rather than high vs. low) to maintain ecological validity, as a complete absence of trust would be unrealistic in the scenarios we used. The present design allows us to directly address this issue by testing whether the observed effects stem from baseline differences in trust or from variations in how monitoring is interpreted across relational contexts.

As in Experiment 1, we hypothesized that monitoring would be considered more appropriate in MP than in CS relationships. Furthermore, we expected this effect to be moderated by the initial level of trust, such that the difference between MP and CS relationships would be stronger when the initial level of trust was lower than when it was higher.

10.1. Participants and procedure

The hypotheses, recruitment, sample size, exclusion criteria, and data analysis were preregistered at: <https://aspredicted.org/ngysgw38.pdf>. We based our sample size calculation on the results of Experiment 1, where we manipulated relational models and measured whether people would accept and were willing to introduce monitoring in these situations. We found that the effect size of the model manipulation (within-subjects) on our DV was $\beta = 0.16$. However, in this experiment, we planned to manipulate relational models in a between-subjects design. As the effect sizes in such designs are usually smaller than in within-subjects designs (Sherman & Rivers, 2021), and as we additionally manipulated the level of trust, we assumed the effect in the planned experiment would be half as strong ($\beta = 0.08$). We ran a Monte Carlo power simulation for a priori power with $\alpha = 0.05$ and the power of $1 - \beta = 0.95$ and found that we would need 580 participants for a two-group design to detect the proposed effect. With our 2×2 between-subjects design, we aimed to recruit 1160 participants.

We recruited 1160 South African participants from Prolific Academic to participate in an online study in exchange for 1.5 GBP. We excluded 334 participants who failed either of the attention checks. The final sample consisted of $N = 826$ individuals (399 women, 424 men, 3 other/prefer not to tell, $M_{\text{age}} = 29.91$, $SD = 13.43$). Sensitivity power analysis using a Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 repetitions in Mplus 8.10 indicated that this sample size would achieve 95% power to detect a weak two-way interaction on the between-participants level ($\beta = 0.16$), given our analytic approach and the conventional alpha level of 0.05.

We conducted the experiment using a 2 (relational model: CS vs. MP) $\times 2$ (initial trust level: high vs. medium) between-subjects design. Participants were assigned to one of four conditions and read three scenarios similar to those used in the previous experiments. In each scenario, initial trust was manipulated by varying the described reliability of the interaction partner based on prior experience. In the high-trust condition, the partner (e.g., spouse or store) was portrayed as consistently dependable, whereas in the medium-trust condition, the partner was described as having occasionally failed to follow through on prior commitments. All other aspects of the scenarios were held constant (see SM for full wording). For each scenario, participants responded to two questions, rating their acceptance of monitoring and willingness to monitor using a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all* to 7 = *very much*). Participants also completed two attention check questions: (1) "Provide today's date", and (2) "Answer 'not at all' to this question".

10.2. Results

As preregistered, we conducted a multilevel analysis in a 2 (relational model: CS vs. MP; between-subjects) $\times 2$ (trust: high vs. medium; between-subjects) $\times 2$ (DV: acceptance of monitoring vs.

willingness to monitor; within-subjects) design with scenarios nested within participants (Table 3). As expected, the main effect of the relational model was significant, such that participants perceived monitoring more favorably in MP than in CS relationships. We also found a significant main effect of trust: Monitoring was perceived more favorably in the medium-trust condition than in the high-trust condition. However, contrary to our expectations, the interaction between the relational model and trust level was not significant.

Although the interaction between the two manipulations was not significant, confirming that both main effects held consistently, we report the effects separately for each DV. (Fig. 3). For acceptance of monitoring, we found a significant effect of trust manipulation, such that it was lower in the high trust than in the medium trust condition, $\beta = -0.24$, Post. $SD = 0.02$, 95% CI $[-0.29, -0.19]$, $p < .001$. Also, participants accepted the presence of monitoring more in the MP condition compared to the CS condition, $\beta = 0.12$, Post. $SD = 0.02$, 95% CI $[0.07, 0.16]$, $p < .001$. However, the interaction between the relational model and trust was not significant, $\beta = 0.02$, Post. $SD = 0.03$, 95% CI $[-0.03, 0.07]$, $p = .580$.

Similarly, participants were less willing to use monitoring in the high-trust than in the medium-trust condition, $\beta = -0.27$, Post. $SD = 0.02$, 95% CI $[-0.32, -0.23]$, $p < .001$. Monitoring was also rated as more acceptable in the MP condition than the CS condition, $\beta = 0.16$, Post. $SD = 0.04$, 95% CI $[0.07, 0.24]$, $p < .001$. Again, the interaction between model and trust was not significant, $\beta = 0.001$, Post. $SD = 0.02$, 95% CI $[-0.04, 0.05]$, $p = .980$.

In summary, we found that monitoring was perceived as more acceptable in medium- than high-trust situations and in MP than CS relationships. The absence of significant interactions indicates that trust level and relational model exert independent influences on monitoring perceptions, with no evidence that one factor moderates the other. The finding that the CS vs. MP difference in monitoring acceptance remained consistent regardless of initial trust level suggests that relational context effects are robust across varying levels of pre-existing trust.

11. Experiment 4

In experiments presented thus far, we investigated the interplay of monitoring and trust in CS and MP relationships using hypothetical decisions—scenario-based manipulations and declarative measures. In Experiment 4, we examined behavioral monitoring decisions to substantiate our findings. We employed an adapted version of the Cheap Talk Game (CTG; Gneezy, 2005)—a situation that requires trust. In the original version of this game, Player X (Informer) knows the payoffs associated with two available options and communicates a recommendation to Player Y (Decider), who ultimately decides between these options. Importantly, Player Y does not know which option is more beneficial, and Player X's message carries no binding obligation. This means Player X can deliberately mislead Player Y to influence the decision in a

Table 3

Relational model and level of trust as predictors of monitoring perception (Experiment 3).

Predictors	β	Post. SD	95% CI	p
Trust	-0.25	0.02	$[-0.29, -0.21]$	< 0.001
Model	0.10	0.02	$[0.06, 0.14]$	< 0.001
DV type	-0.01	0.01	$[-0.03, 0.01]$	0.428
Trust $\times$ Model	0.01	0.02	$[-0.03, 0.05]$	0.660
DV type $\times$ Trust	-0.02	0.01	$[-0.05, -0.001]$	0.050
DV type $\times$ Model	-0.01	0.01	$[-0.03, -0.001]$	0.015
Trust $\times$ Model $\times$ DV type	-0.01	0.01	$[-0.03, 0.01]$	0.430

Note. Trust (high vs. medium); Relational Model (MP vs CS); DV type (Acceptance of monitoring vs. Willingness to monitor); Post. SD = standard deviation of the posterior distribution, 95% CI = 95% credible intervals.




Fig. 3. Acceptance of monitoring (left) and willingness to introduce monitoring (right) by the relational model and initial trust level. Error bars represent standard error (Experiment 3).

preferred direction. Hence, the Cheap Talk Game requires trust because Player X has an incentive to misrepresent information for personal gain, and Player Y must decide whether to rely on Player X's recommendation despite the risk of deception.

In our experiment, we modified the rules of this game so that Player Y could exercise costly monitoring. Specifically, this player could pay for information about whether the message from Player X was truthful or not. Player Y's decisions on whether to "buy" this information served as our measure of monitoring.

Additionally, while in our previous experiments we tried to make our two relational conditions as similar as possible, the nature of the situations—with different roles and relationship constellations, e.g., father vs. contractor or godson vs. chef—might have triggered different associations beyond the MP/CS distinction, and thus could have been partly responsible for the differences we found. Therefore, in Experiment 4, we used a game with the same structure across conditions, but only framed it as either the Friendship Task (the CS condition) or the Wall Street Task (the MP condition) (see Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004 for a similar procedure). As a part of such a framing, we also labeled the actors as "Friend X/Friend Y" in the CS condition and "Trader X/Trader Y" in the MP condition.

As in Experiment 1, we hypothesized that participants would be more likely to apply monitoring when the task was framed as the Wall Street Task (MP) rather than the Friendship Task (CS). We also tested whether this effect holds after controlling for whether Friend X/Trader X was truthful in the previous round and whether the participant paid for monitoring in the previous round.

11.1. Participants and procedure

The hypotheses, recruitment, sample size, exclusion criteria, and data analysis were preregistered at: <https://aspredicted.org/yp3y-jx35.pdf>. We based our sample size calculation on the results of Experiment 1, where we manipulated relational models and measured whether people would accept and be willing to introduce monitoring in these situations. We performed a Monte Carlo simulation power analysis using Mplus 8.10. Assuming a relational model manipulation effect equal to $\beta = 0.16$ (the effect we found in Experiment 1), significance of $\alpha = 0.05$, and power of $1 - \beta = 0.95$, we would need a sample of 900

participants to detect the desired effect in the multilevel logistic regression planned for data analysis.

Nine hundred and ninety-one Australian participants from Prolific Academic started the study. Eighty-one failed the comprehension test twice and were disqualified from the actual study (see Procedure for details). Of the 910 participants who qualified for the study, 901 completed it, but 157 failed at least one of the attention checks. Hence, the final sample included $N = 744$ individuals (416 women, 317 men, 11 other/prefer not to tell, $M_{\text{age}} = 36.50$, $SD = 12.47$). Sensitivity power analysis using a Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 repetitions in Mplus 8.10 indicated that this sample size would achieve 95% power to detect a main effect of relational model on the between-participants level of $\beta = 0.24$, given our analytic approach and the conventional alpha level of 0.05.

After providing informed consent and demographic information, participants were assigned to one of two conditions framed as "Friendship Task" ($n = 391$) or "Wall Street Task" ($n = 353$). They were asked to read the general instructions and answer three comprehension-check questions assessing their understanding of the rules (full wording of the descriptions and relevant questions are provided in SM). Those who failed were redirected to re-read the rules and retake the comprehension test. If they failed again, they were disqualified and paid only 0.30 GBP for participation in this phase. Those who answered all the questions correctly were redirected to participate in the main study (the game) in exchange for 1.80 GBP plus a potential bonus, depending on their decisions.

In the main part of the experiment, participants were informed that they would be randomly assigned to the role of either Friend/Trader X (i.e., Informer) or Friend/Trader Y (i.e., Decider), and would be matched with ten different Prolific users also participating in the study. In our design, all participants were actually assigned to the role of Friend/Trader Y (Decider), and the messages from each Friend/Trader X were preprogrammed in the experimental software. Participants were given information about the payment scheme and asked to play ten rounds of the Friendship/Wall Street Task with different Friend/Trader X partners (see the details about the instructions, payment structure, and preprogrammed decisions of Friend/Trader X in the SM). After receiving the recommendation from Friend/Trader X in each round, participants decided which payment option would be binding. Before mak-

ing this decision, they could pay 0.25 GBP for information about whether the Friend/Trader X message was truthful (costly monitoring). This sum was deducted from the bonus earned in the round (0.50 or 1.00 GBP, depending on the payment structure and the participant's decision). We used participants' responses as our dependent variable (1 = paid for monitoring, 0 = did not pay for monitoring). Finally, they were reminded about the recommendation from Friend/Trader X and, if they had paid for it, informed about the actual payment structure and whether the recommended option was more beneficial for them. After that, their task was to choose one option that would be binding, and they were informed about the bonus they would receive if this round was chosen for payment.

After ten rounds, participants responded to two manipulation check questions: "To what extent did you think this task resembles close relations between two people (e.g., friends or family members)?" and "To what extent did you think this task resembles commercial relations between two people (e.g., business or trade)?" Responses were made on a scale from -5 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much*) (Kuzminska, Gasirowska, Helka, & Zaleskiewicz, 2024).

11.2. Results

To test the effectiveness of our relational model manipulation, we conducted a 2(condition: MP vs. CS; between-subjects) $\times$ 2(perception of the task: market-like vs. communal-like; within-subjects) mixed ANOVA. We found a significant main effect of the dimension of perception, $F(1, 742) = 478.4, p < .001, \eta^2_p = 0.392$, such that, on average, participants perceived their task more as market-like ($M = 1.57, SD = 2.51$) than communal-like ($M = -1.45, SD = 2.87$). The main effect of condition (MP vs. CS) was not significant, $F(1, 742) = 1.26, p = .262, \eta^2_p = 0.002$. As expected, we found a significant interaction between the dimension of perception and experimental condition, $F(1, 742) = 29.10, p < .001, \eta^2_p = 0.038$. Post-hoc comparisons with Bonferroni correction revealed that participants perceived the Friendship Task as more communal-like ($M = -1.16, SD = 2.99$) than the Wall Street Task ($M = -1.76, SD = 2.71$), $t(742) = 2.85, p = .027$, Cohen's $d = 0.21$. In turn, the Wall Street Task was perceived as more market-like ($M = 2.05, SD = 2.25$) than the Friendship Task ($M = 1.14, SD = 2.64$), $t(742) = 5.01, p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 0.37$. These results attest to the effectiveness of our experimental manipulation.

We conducted a multilevel probit¹ regression using relational model (MP vs. CS) as a between-subjects IV and paying for monitoring (yes/no) as the DV to test our preregistered hypothesis. We also included random intercepts for participants and rounds. In line with our predictions, we found a significant main effect of condition (relational model) on the propensity to use monitoring, $\beta = 0.16$, Post. $SD = 0.06$, 95% CI [0.03, 0.24], $p < .001$, such that participants were 1.57 times more likely to apply monitoring when the task was framed as the Wall Street Task (Odds = 0.17) than the Friendship Task (Odds = 0.11) (Fig. 4).

Moreover, we conducted an exploratory analysis using multilevel probit regression using the decisions from rounds 2–10, adding the two moderators to the previous regression: (1) whether Friend/Trader X was cheating in the previous round, and (2) whether the participant paid for monitoring in the previous round. The effect of the relational model on monitoring remained significant, $\beta = 0.14$, Post. $SD = 0.06$, 95% CI [0.01, 0.25], $p = .020$. The effect of whether the participant paid for monitoring in the previous round on monitoring in the subsequent round was significant and positive, $\beta = 0.25$, Post. $SD = 0.03$, 95% CI [0.20, 0.31], $p < .001$, indicating that the participants were 1.82 times more likely to pay for monitoring after doing so in the previ-




Fig. 4. Probability of using monitoring by the relational model in the Cheap Talk game. Error bars represent standard error (Experiment 4).

ous round (odds = 0.26) than when they did not pay for monitoring in the previous round (odds = 0.14). Additionally, the effect of whether Friend/Trader X deceived in the previous round on monitoring was marginally nonsignificant and positive, $\beta = 0.12$, Post. $SD = 0.09$, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.31], $p = .066$, with participants being 1.32 times more likely to pay for monitoring after being deceived in the previous round (odds = 0.23) than when they were not deceived in the previous round (odds = 0.17). Finally, none of the interactions were significant, respectively: a) interaction between relational model and monitoring $\beta = -0.04$, Post. $SD = 0.03$, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.02], $p = .134$; b) interaction between relational model and previous deception $\beta = -0.01$, Post. $SD = 0.03$, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.04], $p = .806$; c) interaction between previous deception and previous monitoring $\beta = 0.03$, Post. $SD = 0.03$, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.09], $p = .236$; d) and the three-way interaction between relational model, previous monitoring, and previous deception $\beta = 0.04$, Post. $SD = 0.02$, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.08], $p = .180$.

Overall, our findings indicated that the relational model affected the propensity to exercise costly monitoring, with this tendency being higher in the MP than the CS framing. Importantly, this effect remained significant after controlling for prior experience of deception and previous monitoring decisions.

11.3. General discussion

Across six preregistered experiments conducted in four countries, we demonstrated that the relationship between control (operationalized as verification monitoring) and trust differs between CS and MP relationships, with monitoring being more acceptable and less detrimental to trust in market contexts than in communal ones. Experiment 1 showed that people find monitoring more appropriate in MP relationships than in CS relationships. Supplementary Experiments S1 and S2 demonstrated that introducing monitoring makes relationships appear more transactional and less communal. These effects were more pronounced in CS than MP relationships and affected both those implementing the monitoring and those being monitored, with stronger effects for the latter. Experiment 2 revealed that trust was overall lower in MP than CS relationships, and that monitoring lowered overall reported trust, with stronger negative effects for CS than MP relationships. We also systematically investigated whether this effect depends on whether someone initiates or is subjected to monitoring and again found that it is stronger for the trustee than for the trustor. Experiment 3 found that monitoring is more acceptable when initial trust is lower. However, monitoring was perceived more positively in MP than CS relationships, irrespective of initial trust level. Finally, Experiment 4 moved beyond

¹ This was a deviation from preregistration: we preregistered conducting logit regression, but Mplus 8.10 allows only for probit regression in cross-classified data structures.

hypothetical scenarios, using a behavioral economics game to examine actual monitoring in a trust-based interaction. As predicted, individuals were more inclined to engage in costly monitoring when the game was framed as a market interaction ("Wall Street Task") rather than a communal interaction ("Friendship Task").

11.4. Theoretical contribution

Our findings seem to make several important contributions to the understanding of trust-control relationships across relational contexts. First, we provide empirical support for a hydraulic model of trust and control. Yet, whereas traditional perspectives have posited a generalized substitution relationship between trust and control (Rousseau et al., 1998; Williamson, 1975), our findings demonstrate that this relationship is context-dependent rather than universal. In CS relationships, where mutual care and shared identity are central, our results strongly support the hydraulic view: introducing monitoring violates communal expectations and results in distrust. Our findings for the MP relationships, by contrast, are more complex. Most importantly, acceptance of monitoring in MP contexts is significantly higher than in CS contexts, suggesting that monitoring is more aligned with MP relational logic. In sum, we demonstrate that the trust-control relationship is relationally contingent rather than monolithic.

Beyond this general pattern, our findings also revealed an important asymmetry: From the trustor's perspective, monitoring in MP contexts had minimal effect on trust, but trustees consistently interpreted it as signaling distrust. This suggests that, although organizational theories often posit a complementarity between trust and control in market-based exchanges, the psychological experience of being monitored may still create a weak hydraulic link: people are reluctant to be monitored across relational contexts, and monitoring tends to erode the sense of being trusted. Even if monitoring may seem like legitimate self-interest protection to those who initiate it, it still communicates doubt to those subjected to it. The psychological meaning of being monitored may extend beyond relational norms and reflect broader concerns about autonomy, recognition of one's capabilities, and interpersonal respect (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Identity Theory suggests that when someone distrusts us, it might disrupt our self-view creating identity discrepancy and producing distress (Stets & Serpe, 2013). Thus, our results complicate the complementarity view in MP contexts, suggesting that—even in market exchanges—control mechanisms may carry relational costs that also warrant theoretical attention.

Our results point to a broader theoretical insight: control mechanisms do more than regulate behavior—they fundamentally reshape how relationships are perceived and experienced. We thus extend relational models theory (Fiske, 1992) by demonstrating that control itself can shift relationship perceptions. Our findings show that introducing monitoring into CS relationships not only reduces trust but makes them appear more market-like. This suggests that control mechanisms serve as signals that redefine the nature of relationships themselves, supporting both Expectancy Violations Theory (Burgoon, 2015) and Relational Schemas Theory (Baldwin, 1992). According to Expectancy Violations Theory, monitoring in CS relationships constitutes a negative violation of norms centered on mutual care and unconditional support, triggering psychological discomfort and relational strain. Relational Schemas Theory offers a complementary explanation: In CS schemas, trust is assumed rather than earned, and introducing control represents a betrayal of relational expectations that undermines the shared identity defining these relationships. By contrast, MP relationships activate schemas where monitoring and formal rules are expected elements that align with self-interested behavior and reflect the transactional structure rather than signaling distrust.

Monitoring in CS relationships violates expected relational norms of unconditional unity and care, undermining trust for both those who do the monitoring and those who are being monitored. This phenomenon

aligns with the concept of taboo trade-offs (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; McGraw & Tetlock, 2005), where introducing market-based logic (here, control via monitoring) into sacred domains (communal bonds based on care and solidarity) creates moral outrage and relationship degradation. Monitoring essentially transforms interactions that should remain sacred and governed by communal norms into secular, transactional exchanges governed by market principles. This boundary violation may explain monitoring's destructive effects in CS contexts—it signals a shift from mutual care to calculated oversight, thereby violating communal bonds and triggering reactions that extend beyond trust reduction to broader relational devaluation.

Importantly, while relational context is often clearly defined by the situation, its perception might also depend on individuals' personal characteristics. For example, some individuals tend to perceive most relationships with others as communal (*communal orientation*), while others introduce elements of cost-benefit analysis characteristic of MP relationships into relationships with their close ones (*exchange orientation*; Clark & Mills, 2012; Gasiiorowska, Kuzminska, & Zaleskiewicz, 2025). People with higher exchange orientation might thus be more likely to introduce some form of control into their relationships because they view them as more market-like.

Beyond individual differences, some relational contexts inherently mix CS and MP elements. Family businesses exemplify such contexts, as do situations where a family member invests in a close relative's entrepreneurial venture. These situations reflect a blend of communal, altruistic motivations and business-oriented, market rationalities (Steier, 2003). Since, as we have demonstrated, verification monitoring is perceived differently in CS and MP relationships, such mixed relationships might be especially challenging. Control strategies that work in one context (at work) might be destructive in another (at home). Steier's (2003) case study illustrates this dilemma—a father investing in his child's business avoided conventional business controls to preserve their relationship. The venture proceeded without clear terms and expectations, formal screening, or valuation processes, and ultimately failed. This example demonstrates both the risks of applying purely communal norms to business contexts and the difficulty of integrating mechanisms of control into relationships governed by communal logic. In such settings, efforts to introduce control are often resisted, and trust is favored as the primary coordinating mechanism.

11.5. Potential psychological mechanisms

Several psychological mechanisms may help explain why monitoring is less readily accepted in CS than MP relationships. First, the signal that control sends differs across relational contexts. In MP relationships, monitoring is interpreted diagnostically—as a sign of rationality, caution, or legitimate self-interest protection—especially by those who introduce such mechanisms. Such behavior aligns with normative expectations in market contexts where parties are assumed to act in their own interests (Fiske, 1991). In contrast, in CS relationships, monitoring may be perceived as strategic or manipulative, signaling a fundamental lack of trust that violates the expectations of mutual care and unconditional support. In these relationships, control is more directly linked to trust, and its introduction creates stronger emotional reactions. As Falk and Kosfeld (2006, p. 2) observed, "When asked for their emotional perception of control, most agents who react negatively say that they perceive the controlling decision as a signal of distrust and a limitation of their choice autonomy." This emotional reaction is particularly pronounced in communal contexts where autonomy restrictions violate established relational norms and expectations of unconditional acceptance.

Second, the effects observed in our studies may be related to the complex relationship between control and power across different relational contexts (e.g., Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Lammers, Stoker, Rink, & Galinsky, 2016). Having power entails controlling others; conversely, exercising control can increase

one's power within a relationship. However, the acceptability of power varies significantly across relational models. In MP relationships, explicit power differences and control mechanisms are often institutionally sanctioned and expected—employers monitor employees, creditors oversee debtors, and buyers verify seller claims. These power asymmetries align with the transactional nature of market exchanges, where parties protect their interests through legitimate control mechanisms. CS relationships present more complex power dynamics. While some communal relationships naturally involve power imbalances (parent-child, mentor-mentee, caregiver-patient), these are typically justified by care and protection rather than self-interest. When control is introduced into egalitarian communal relationships (spouse-spouse, friend-friend), it may be perceived as an illegitimate attempt to establish dominance where mutual respect is expected. This norm violation may explain why monitoring is particularly damaging to trust in communal contexts where power should ideally be shared or exercised benevolently rather than strategically.

Third, monitoring may also influence trust through processes described by compensatory control theory. According to this perspective, when individuals experience a threat to personal control or autonomy, they are motivated to restore a sense of order, structure, and predictability in their environment (e.g., Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009). One way of achieving this is to adopt more structured, rule-based, or system-oriented modes of thinking. Prior research shows that market-oriented thinking can serve such a compensatory function by enhancing perceived structure and control (Gasiorowska & Zaleskiewicz, 2021, 2023a, 2023b). Although these studies examined relational preferences rather than responses to monitoring, they offer a useful psychological backdrop for interpreting our findings. Being monitored may not only signal distrust but also threaten perceived autonomy or influence within the interaction. In response, individuals may shift toward a more calculative, market-pricing orientation as a way of restoring a sense of order and control. In the context of close relationships—where people typically avoid market-like norms (Gasiorowska & Zaleskiewicz, 2021)—this shift may be particularly aversive, helping explain why trustees in our studies reported reduced trust when monitoring was introduced in communal contexts. This compensatory control account complements our primary interpretation. Whereas our main argument emphasizes that monitoring functions as a relational signal, the present perspective suggests that shifts toward market-oriented thinking may also serve a regulatory function in response to perceived loss of autonomy.

11.6. Limitations and further research directions

Our research has several limitations that should be acknowledged. First, although our findings are based on multiple scenarios, the set of stimuli remains limited. Across studies, we relied on a small number of carefully constructed scenarios designed to instantiate CS and MP relationships in a controlled manner. While this approach allows for conceptual clarity, it does not fully capture the breadth and variability of real-world relational situations. In particular, different forms of communal and market relationships may vary along additional dimensions (e.g., stakes, familiarity, norms, expectations), which could influence how monitoring is perceived. To address concerns related to stimulus-specific effects, we employed multiple scenarios within each study and analyzed the data using multilevel modeling, allowing us to estimate effects that generalize across scenarios while treating scenario-specific variance as residual. Moreover, additional analyses showed that the relational model manipulation robustly shaped participants' perceptions across all scenarios, with only modest variation in effect strength. Nevertheless, future research would benefit from adopting a broader stimulus-sampling approach, incorporating a larger and more diverse set of relational situations to more fully capture the variability within CS and MP relationships.

Relatedly, our research design primarily involved established relationships and relatively low-stakes situations, which may not capture the full complexity of trust-control links across different relationship stages. The temporal dynamics of trust-control relationships likely differ across relational contexts—control might be more tolerable in early stages of CS relationships when trust is still being established, compared to mature stages where monitoring may violate established expectations of unconditional support. Conversely, MP relationships may exhibit flatter temporal patterns, where control remains consistently acceptable regardless of relationship duration. In addition, our findings may not generalize to different relationship models that involve power asymmetries or care responsibilities (e.g., mentoring, caregiving, and therapeutic relationships), where monitoring might serve different functions and carry various meanings. Finally, the specific content domains we examined (gift ordering, cooking, and renovation) represent relatively low-stakes situations. In higher-stakes domains such as financial decisions, health management, or safety-critical situations, monitoring may be interpreted differently and may have distinct implications for trust. Future research should therefore systematically examine how relationship stage, relational structure, and situational stakes jointly moderate the trust-control dynamics identified in the present work.

Second, all experiments were conducted online, which may limit ecological validity. Although online methods offer important advantages, including access to large, diverse, and cross-cultural samples, they necessarily abstract away from the richness of face-to-face interactions. Future research could extend the present findings using laboratory or field paradigms involving live interaction—for example, by studying pairs of participants (e.g., friends vs. strangers) engaged in joint tasks, or by experimentally assigning relational norms (communal vs. exchange) within the same interaction. Monitoring could then be operationalized behaviorally (e.g., allowing participants to verify a partner's actions or performance), enabling researchers to examine how control affects trust in real-time interpersonal exchanges.

Third, our research focused specifically on verification monitoring—a subtle, information-based form of control. This choice was theory-driven: monitoring represents a relatively nonintrusive form of control that can be plausibly enacted across both communal and market contexts, allowing us to isolate relational interpretations without introducing strong norm violations. As such, it provides a conservative test of our theoretical framework. However, other forms of control might show varying patterns of acceptability depending on relational context. Indeed, a contextual perspective suggests that whether trust and control act as substitutes or complements may depend on the type of control (Das & Teng, 2001; Lui & Ngo, 2004). Hence, some forms of control (based on shared goals, values, and norms) might be more preferred in communal contexts than others (formal control, such as strict rule-setting and performance monitoring). Future research should systematically examine whether more intrusive forms of control (e.g., directive control) show even stronger differential effects, or whether some forms of control might be preferred in communal contexts when they signal care for others' wellbeing (e.g., health-related monitoring).

Fourth, our findings may be moderated by additional relational dimensions that were not systematically varied in the present research. Although our studies focused on the communal-market distinction, real-world relationships often involve overlapping relational models (Fiske, 1991, 1992), as well as variation in hierarchy (e.g., authority ranking), relationship history, and role structure. While Experiment 4 attempted to isolate relational framing by using anonymous interactions with minimal contextual information, even such designs cannot fully capture the complexity of naturally occurring relationships. Future research could examine how factors such as power asymmetry, relationship duration, or prior reputation interact with relational models to shape responses to monitoring.

Fifth, individual and cultural differences may further moderate the observed effects. For example, individuals with anxious attachment styles, who show lower desire for relational autonomy and hold beliefs such as “the person who controls their partner loves them” (Aracı-İyaydin et al., 2022; Gruda & Kafetsios, 2022; Van Petegem, Beyers, Brenning, & Vansteenkiste, 2013; Waldinger et al., 2003) may show weaker negative associations between control and trust compared to those with secure attachment styles. Similarly, a different perception of the meaning of interpersonal control in a communal relationship might also occur in different cultural contexts. Whereas dignity cultures emphasize individual autonomy, honor and face cultures may be more accepting of paternalistic styles across relationships (Tai & Tsai, 2003; Thompson, Segura, Cruz, Arnita, & Whiffen, 2022). As a result, the negative link between control and trust might be more pronounced in dignity cultures, where self-worth is closely tied to autonomy and personal freedom (Smith et al., 2021) compared to honor and face cultures.

12. Conclusion

This research shows that trust–control dynamics depend on how people interpret the relational context. Monitoring reliably reduced trust in communal relationships, as predicted by the hydraulic view. Results for market relationships presented a more complicated picture: control left trustors unaffected, yet trustees still perceived it as a sign of distrust. Thus, our findings underscore that the psychological meaning of being monitored carries relational costs even in market exchanges.

Open practices

All data, analysis code, output files, and links to study preregistrations associated with this article are openly available at https://researchbox.org/4514&PEER_REVIEW_passcode=MZWAZS. All study materials are available in the Supplementary Materials.

CRedit authorship contribution statement

Anna O. Kuzminska: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Project administration, Methodology, Investigation, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptualization. **Maryam Khan:** Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Methodology, Investigation, Formal analysis. **Pelin Kesebir:** Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Methodology, Conceptualization. **Tomasz Zaleskiewicz:** Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Supervision, Methodology, Conceptualization. **Agata Gasiorowska:** Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Visualization, Validation, Supervision, Software, Resources, Project administration, Methodology, Investigation, Funding acquisition, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptualization.

Declaration of generative AI and AI-assisted technologies in the writing process

During the preparation of this paper, the authors used InStatext, Grammarly 1.135.2.0, and Claude Sonnet 4 for proofreading and grammar purposes. After using these tools/services, the authors reviewed and edited the content. The authors take full responsibility for said content.

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Declaration of competing interest

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Appendix A. Supplementary data

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Supplemental Materials

for

Trust Under Watch: Relational Models and the Context-Dependent Nature of Monitoring

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1 Auxiliary analyses for Experiment 1

1.1 Manipulation checks

To test the effectiveness of our relational model manipulation, we conducted a multilevel analysis using a 2 (relational model: CS vs. MP) within-subject design, with perceived representation of communal sharing, market pricing, equality matching, and authority ranking as four correlated dependent variables measured at both within- and between-participant levels. We included equality matching and authority ranking not because our scenarios were intended to activate these models, but to demonstrate that the situations we constructed were perceived primarily in terms of CS or MP, rather than reflecting the other two models distinguished in Relational models theory (Fiske, 1992). Because each participant evaluated three scenarios, observations were nested within participants; therefore, we included random intercepts. We used a Bayesian estimator in Mplus 8.10. Because the scenario was a three-level categorical variable, we recoded it using effect coding into two dummy variables: D1 (cooking vs. birthday gift) and D2 (renovation vs. birthday gift). Full results are reported in Table S1.

Overall, the manipulation of relational models was effective. Scenarios framed as market-pricing were perceived as significantly more MP-like and less CS-like than those framed as communal sharing. These effects were substantial and clearly stronger than those observed for EM and AR. In addition, we observed systematic differences between scenarios in how they were perceived across the four relational dimensions. In particular, the *cooking* and *renovation* scenarios were perceived as less MP and more AR compared to the *birthday gift* scenario, regardless of whether they were presented in a market or communal version. We also found significant interactions between model manipulation and scenario type, indicating that the strength of the manipulation varied across scenarios. However, these interaction effects were

relatively modest in magnitude. Importantly, when scenario variability was accounted for, the effects of model manipulation on CS and MP remained the strongest and most robust. These patterns are visualized in Figure S1.

Table S1.


Relational model (MP vs. CS) and scenario as predictors of perception of the scenarios as related to communal sharing, market pricing, equality matching, and authority ranking models (Experiment 1)

Paths	β	Post. <i>SD</i>	95% CI	<i>p</i>
<i>Within-participants level</i>				
Model → CS	-.55	.02	[-.59, -.53]	< .001
Model → MP	.53	.01	[.51, .56]	< .001
Model → EM	-.11	.01	[-.14, -.07]	< .001
Model → AR	.07	.02	[.04, .10]	< .001
D1 → CS	.18	.04	[.12, .25]	< .001
D1 → MP	-.39	.04	[-.46, -.33]	< .001
D1 → EM	-.12	.03	[-.19, -.06]	< .001
D1 → AR	.66	.03	[.60, .74]	< .001
D2 → CS	.13	.04	[.06, .20]	< .001
D2 → MP	-.24	.03	[-.29, -.16]	< .001
D2 → EM	-.14	.03	[-.21, -.07]	< .001
D2 → AR	.42	.04	[.34, .48]	< .001
D1 × Model → CS	.11	.03	[.06, .17]	< .001
D1 × Model → MP	-.26	.03	[-.32, -.18]	< .001
D1 × Model → EM	.16	.04	[.09, .23]	< .001
D1 × Model → AR	.19	.04	[.13, .26]	< .001
D2 × Model → CS	-.15	.03	[-.21, -.09]	< .001
D2 × Model → MP	.03	.03	[-.05, .09]	.400
D2 × Model → EM	.20	.04	[.12, .28]	< .001
D2 × Model → AR	.13	.04	[.05, .21]	< .001
CS ↔ MP	-.20	.01	[-.22, -.18]	< .001
CS ↔ EM	.02	.01	[.00, .05]	.040
CS ↔ AR	-.19	.01	[-.21, -.17]	< .001
MP ↔ EM	-.08	.01	[-.11, -.06]	< .001
MP ↔ AR	-.08	.01	[-.10, -.05]	< .001
EM ↔ AR	-.12	.01	[-.13, -.09]	< .001
<i>Between-participants level</i>				

CS $\longleftrightarrow$ MP	.07	.01	[.05, .11]	< .001
CS $\longleftrightarrow$ EM	.13	.03	[.09, .21]	< .001
CS $\longleftrightarrow$ AR	.03	.02	[-.01, .07]	.140
MP $\longleftrightarrow$ EM	.08	.03	[.03, .14]	< .001
MP $\longleftrightarrow$ AR	.02	.02	[-.03, .06]	.360
EM $\longleftrightarrow$ AR	.19	.04	[.12, .28]	< .001

Figure S1.

Relational model (MP vs. CS) and scenario as predictors of perception of the scenarios as related to communal sharing, market pricing, equality matching, and authority ranking models (Experiment 1)



Note: Scenario 1 = birthday gift, 2 = cooking, 3 = renovation. Bars represent standard errors.

1.2 Main preregistered analysis

According to our preregistered analysis plan, we conducted a multilevel analysis in a 2 (mode: CS vs. MP) $\times$ 3 (scenario: birthday gift, cooking, renovation) $\times$ 2 (DV: acceptance of control vs. willingness to use control) within-subject design. The data were nested within participants. We used a Bayesian estimator in Mplus 8.10 to calculate indirect effects. As the scenario was a multinomial variable with three levels, we recoded it into two dummy variables

using effect coding, with D1 for birthday gift vs. cooking comparison, and D2 for birthday gift vs. renovation comparison.

We expected to find a significant effect of relational model, but we did not have any specific expectations concerning other main effects or interactions. In line with our preregistered hypothesis, we found a significant main effect of the model on perceptions of control, $\beta = .17$, Post. $SD = .02$, 95% CI [.14, .19], $p < .001$, such that participants perceived control as more appropriate in market-like situations than in communal-like situations. The main effect of the DV type was also significant, $\beta = -.18$, Post. $SD = .02$, 95% CI [-.21, -.15], $p < .001$, such that acceptance for implementing control in market-like situations was higher than the willingness to implement it. The main effects of the type of scenario were further significant for both dummy variables, D1: $\beta = -.52$, Post. $SD = .04$, 95% CI [-.59, -.46], $p < .001$, and D2: $\beta = .21$, Post. $SD = .04$, 95% CI [.13, .29], $p < .001$, indicating that participants were less eager to accept and use control in the cooking scenario as compared to the birthday gift scenario, whereas they were more eager to do so in the renovation scenario as compared to the birthday scenario.

Furthermore, the interaction between the DV type and relational mode was not significant, $\beta = .003$, Post. $SD = .02$, 95% CI [-.03, .04], $p = .900$, as were the two-way interactions between the DV type and D2, $\beta = .003$, Post. $SD = .04$, 95% CI [-.06, .08], $p = .920$, and both three-way interactions between scenario, mode, and DV type, respectively D1: $\beta = .02$, Post. $SD = .04$, 95% CI [-.06, .09], $p = .560$, and D2: $\beta = .03$, Post. $SD = .04$, 95% CI [-.03, .11], $p = .300$. However, we found significant interactions between D1 and mode, $\beta = -.16$, Post. $SD = .03$, 95% CI [-.23, -.09], $p < .001$; D2 and mode ($\beta = -.16$, Post. $SD = .04$, 95% CI [-.24, -.09], $p < .001$); and the DV type and D1 ($\beta = -.16$, Post. $SD = .03$, 95% CI [-.23, -.09], $p < .001$). We

decomposed these interactions, investigating the effects of relational mode and DV type separately for each scenario.

For the first scenario (birthday gift), we found a significant effect of relational mode, $\beta = .27$, Post. $SD = .03$, 95% CI [.22, .32], $p < .001$, and a significant effect of the DV type, $\beta = -.16$, Post. $SD = .03$, 95% CI [-.21, -.11], $p < .001$. The interaction between the two factors was non-significant, $\beta = -.01$, Post. $SD = .03$, 95% CI [-.06, .04], $p = .600$.

For the second scenario (cooking), we also found a significant effect of relational mode, $\beta = .10$, Post. $SD = .02$, 95% CI [.07, .14], $p < .001$, and a significant effect of the DV type, $\beta = -.24$, Post. $SD = .02$, 95% CI [-.29, -.21], $p < .001$. Again, the interaction between these two factors was non-significant, $\beta = .002$, Post. $SD = .02$, 95% CI [-.03, .04], $p = .940$.

Finally, for the third scenario (renovation), we found a similar significant effect of relational mode, $\beta = .14$, Post. $SD = .03$, 95% CI [.09, .18], $p < .001$, and a significant effect of the DV type, $\beta = -.19$, Post. $SD = .03$, 95% CI [-.25, -.14], $p < .001$. The interaction between the two manipulations was again non-significant, $\beta = .03$, Post. $SD = .03$, 95% CI [-.01, .09], $p = .220$.

These findings supported our assumption that the relational mode affects the perception of monitoring as appropriate, such that it is higher in the MP mode than in the CS mode. Although this effect was more pronounced for the birthday gift scenario, compared to the renovation scenario and cooking scenario, it was significant in all these scenarios.

1.3 Robustness check. Perception of relationships as resembling four relational models as mediators.

We further hypothesized that the effect of relational mode would remain robust after accounting for participants' perceptions of all four relational models proposed by Fiske (1992):

communal sharing, market pricing, equality matching, and authority ranking. We included equality matching and authority ranking not because our scenarios were intended to activate these modes, but precisely to demonstrate that the situations we constructed are indeed perceived primarily as CS or MP, rather than reflecting the alternative two models. Moreover, including all four relational models allowed us to test whether it is specifically the perception of a situation as communal-like and market-like—and not resemblance to equality matching or authority ranking—that predicts people’s acceptance of and willingness to use control. This analytic approach deviates from our preregistration, which planned to examine equality matching and authority ranking perceptions as covariates separately from communal sharing and market pricing perceptions as mediators. We combined all four relational models into a single multilevel SEM to provide a clearer, more coherent test of whether our scenarios are uniquely perceived as CS or MP, and whether these perceptions drive responses to control.

To this end, we conducted a multilevel structural equation analysis examining the effects of relational model (CS vs. MP) and DV type (acceptance of control vs. willingness to use control) on our dependent variable, while controlling for the four dimensions of perception at both the between-participant and within-participant levels. We also modeled the effect of mode on these four dimensions at the within-participant level and allowed them to correlate at both levels. A random intercept for participants was included. Full results are reported in Table S2.

Table S2.

Relational model (MP vs. CS) and DV type as predictors of perception of control as acceptable.

Perception of the scenarios as related to communal sharing, market pricing, equality matching and authority ranking models as mediators (Experiment 1)

Paths	β	Post. <i>SD</i>	95% CI	<i>p</i>
<i>Within-participants level</i>				
Model $\rightarrow$ DV	0.10	0.02	[.06, .14]	< .001
DV type $\rightarrow$ DV	-0.18	0.02	[-.21, -.15]	< .001
DV type * Model $\rightarrow$ DV	0.00	0.02	[-.03, .03]	0.980
CS $\rightarrow$ DV	-0.07	0.03	[-.13, -.01]	< .001
MP $\rightarrow$ DV	0.06	0.03	[.00, .12]	0.020
AR $\rightarrow$ DV	-0.09	0.03	[-.13, -.04]	< .001
EM $\rightarrow$ DV	-0.01	0.03	[-.06, .05]	0.620
Model $\rightarrow$ CS	-0.55	0.01	[-.58, -.53]	< .001
Model $\rightarrow$ MP	0.53	0.02	[.50, .56]	< .001
Model $\rightarrow$ EM	-0.10	0.02	[-.14, -.08]	< .001
Model $\rightarrow$ AR	0.07	0.02	[.05, .11]	< .001
CS $\longleftrightarrow$ MP	-0.23	0.01	[-.25, -.20]	< .001
CS $\longleftrightarrow$ EM	0.02	0.01	[-.01, .03]	.100
CS $\longleftrightarrow$ AR	-0.16	0.01	[-.19, -.14]	< .001
MP $\longleftrightarrow$ EM	-0.08	0.01	[-.10, -.06]	< .001
MP $\longleftrightarrow$ AR	-0.13	0.01	[-.15, -.11]	< .001
EM $\longleftrightarrow$ AR	-0.13	0.01	[-.14, -.10]	< .001
<i>Between-participants level</i>				
CS $\rightarrow$ DV	0.09	0.15	[-.16, .41]	0.480
MP $\rightarrow$ DV	-0.21	0.10	[-.41, -.02]	0.020
AR $\rightarrow$ DV	0.11	0.08	[-.10, .26]	0.120
EM $\rightarrow$ DV	0.11	0.09	[-.07, .27]	0.320
CS $\longleftrightarrow$ MP	0.07	0.02	[.04, .11]	< .001
CS $\longleftrightarrow$ EM	0.13	0.03	[.09, .19]	< .001
CS $\longleftrightarrow$ AR	0.04	0.02	[-.02, .07]	0.220
MP $\longleftrightarrow$ EM	0.08	0.02	[.03, .13]	< .001
MP $\longleftrightarrow$ AR	0.02	0.02	[-.02, .08]	0.260
EM $\longleftrightarrow$ AR	0.20	0.03	[.14, .27]	< .001

The total effect of the relational model on the perception of control as appropriate was significant, $\beta = .16$, Post. *SD* = .02, 95% CI [.13, .19], $p < .001$. Confirming the effectiveness of our relational model manipulation, we found strong and significant effects of the relational

model (MP vs. CS) on communal perception (negative) and market perception (positive). Moreover, we found that MP scenarios were perceived as resembling authority ranking to a greater extent and equality matching to a lesser extent than CS scenarios, but these effects were much weaker than those on communal and market perception. Four dimensions of perception of the scenarios were significantly, but weakly, associated with each other at both within- and between-participant levels. We also found significant associations between perceptions of scenarios as resembling communal sharing, market pricing, and authority ranking, and our DV at the within-participants level, whereas at the between-participants level, only the perception of scenarios as market-like was associated with the appropriateness of using monitoring. Most importantly, on the within-participant level, we found significant indirect effects of mode on DV via communal perception, $\beta = .04$, Post. $SD = .02$, 95% CI [.01, .07], $p < .001$, and via market perception, $\beta = .03$, Post. $SD = .02$, 95% CI [.002, .06], $p = .020$. The indirect effect via authority ranking perception was also significant but weak and negative, $\beta = -.01$, Post. $SD = .002$, 95% CI [-.01, -.003], $p < .001$, whereas the indirect effect via equality matching was not significant, $\beta = .001$, Post. $SD = .003$, 95% CI [-.01, .01], $p = .610$.

In sum, our results show that the relational model manipulation (MP vs. CS) successfully shaped how participants perceived the scenarios, and that these perceptions—especially seeing a situation as communal-like or market-like—played a central role in explaining responses to control. Overall, the findings indicate that it is the communal vs market relational meaning people assign to an interaction, rather than resemblance to the other two relational models, that drives whether they view monitoring as acceptable and are willing to use it.

2 Auxiliary analyses for Experiment 2


To provide a robustness check of our results from Experiment 2, we tested whether the observed effects were consistent across the three scenarios. We conducted a multilevel regression in a 2 (model: MP vs. CS) $\times 2$ (monitoring: present vs. absent) $\times 2$ (perspective: trustor vs. trustee) between-subjects design, with scenarios nested within participants and the latent trust variable as the dependent variable. Because the data were nested within participants, we included random intercepts in the model. We used a Bayesian estimator in Mplus 8.10. Because the scenario was a three-level categorical variable, we recoded it using effect coding into two dummy variables: D1 (cooking vs. birthday gift) and D2 (renovation vs. birthday gift). Full results are reported in Table S3 and Figure S2.

Table S3.*Relational model, monitoring, perspective, and scenario as predictors of trust (Experiment 2)*

Predictors	β	Post. SD	95% CI	<i>p</i>
Within-participants level				
D1	1.92	.08	[1.77, 2.08]	< .001
D2	2.01	.08	[1.86, 2.18]	< .001
Between-participants level				
Monitoring	-.48	.04	[-.56, -.41]	< .001
Relational Model	-.66	.04	[-.74, -.59]	< .001
Perspective	-.24	.04	[-.31, -.17]	< .001
Relational Model $\times$ Monitoring	.14	.04	[.07, .21]	< .001
Perspective $\times$ Monitoring	-.36	.04	[-.43, -.29]	< .001
Perspective $\times$ Relational Model	.19	.04	[.13, .26]	< .001
Perspective $\times$ Monitoring $\times$ Relational Model	-.01	.04	[-.08, .06]	.784
Cross-level interactions				
D1 $\times$ Monitoring	-.61	.06	[-.72, -.49]	< .001
D1 $\times$ Relational Model	.89	.06	[.77, 1.01]	< .001
D1 $\times$ Perspective	.16	.06	[.05, .27]	.004
D1 $\times$ Relational Model $\times$ Monitoring	-.36	.06	[-.48, -.25]	< .001
D1 $\times$ Perspective $\times$ Monitoring	-.44	.06	[-.55, -.32]	< .001
D1 $\times$ Perspective $\times$ Relational Model	-.20	.06	[-.31, -.10]	< .001
D1 $\times$ Perspective $\times$ Monitoring $\times$ Relational Model	-.19	.06	[-.30, -.08]	< .001
D2 $\times$ Monitoring	-.05	.06	[-.16, .06]	.378
D2 $\times$ Relational Model	.53	.06	[.42, .65]	< .001
D2 $\times$ Perspective	.47	.06	[.35, .58]	< .001
D2 $\times$ Relational Model $\times$ Monitoring	-.29	.06	[-.40, -.18]	< .001
D2 $\times$ Perspective $\times$ Monitoring	-.07	.06	[-.18, .05]	.254
D2 $\times$ Perspective $\times$ Relational Model	-.10	.06	[-.21, .01]	.076
D2 $\times$ Perspective $\times$ Monitoring $\times$ Relational Model	-.20	.06	[-.31, -.09]	< .001

Figure S2.

Relational model, monitoring, perspective, and scenario as predictors of trust (Experiment 2)



Note: Scenario 1 = birthday gift, 2 = cooking, 3 = renovation. Bars represent standard errors

3 Experiment S1

In Experiment S1, we used the same three scenarios (birthday gift, cooking, and renovation) and either communal or market-related framing, as in Experiment 1, but we additionally manipulated whether monitoring was present or absent, and measured participants' perceptions of the presented situations. Based on the assumption that control defined in terms of monitoring contradicts the psychological essence of CS relationships, but is perceived as more natural in MP relationships, we predicted that when monitoring is present (vs. when it is absent), people would perceive a given relationship as less communal and more market-like. Moreover, we assumed that this effect would be stronger for relationships that resemble the CS relational model than those that resemble the MP relational model.

Participants and procedure

The hypotheses, recruitment, sample size, exclusion criteria, and data analysis were preregistered at: <https://aspredicted.org/pc36-q698.pdf>. We conducted a power analysis with G*Power, which revealed that assuming a small effect of monitoring manipulation, that is Cohen's $f = 0.15$ ($\eta^2 = .03$), at $\alpha = .05$ with the power of $1 - \beta = .95$, we would need a sample of 580 participants in a 2×2 between-subjects design to detect such an effect. Thus, we recruited 580 U.S. participants from Prolific Academic to participate in an online study in exchange for 1.5 GBP. Eighteen participants failed the attention check and were excluded from analysis. The final sample consisted of $N = 562$ individuals (274 women, 282 men, 6 other/prefer not to tell, $M_{\text{age}} = 40.01$, $SD = 17.79$). Sensitivity power analysis using a Monte Carlo simulation with 1,000 repetitions in Mplus 8.10 indicated that this sample size would achieve 95% power to detect a weak interaction between relational and control model on the between-participants level ($\beta = .09$), given our analytic approach and the conventional alpha level of .05.

Participants were assigned to one condition in a 2 (relational model: CS vs. MP) $\times$ 2 (monitoring: present vs. absent) between-subjects design. After giving informed consent and providing demographic information, participants were asked to read three scenarios (same as in Experiment 1 in the main manuscript), presented in CS ($n = 292$) or MP ($n = 270$) framing, either with information about the presence of monitoring (for example: “You decided to approach customer service to verify the reasons behind the delay”, $n = 266$) or without such information (for example, “You can’t wait for the parcel to arrive”, $n = 296$) (see section 4.2 in this Supplementary Materials for full wording of the scenarios).

After reading each of the three scenarios, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which the situation resembled a communal or market relationship, answering four questions based on Bohns et al. (2016) that have been used in previous research (Zaleskiewicz et al., 2020). The two items employed to measure market perception were: “To what extent does this situation feel like a business transaction?” and “To what extent do you think one person is concerned about getting something from the other in this situation?” ($r = .38, p < .001$). The two items measuring communal perception were: “To what extent does this situation feel like interacting with a close friend or family member?” and “To what extent is one person concerned about the other person’s needs in this situation?” ($r = .39, p < .001$). Participants answered the four questions in random order using a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all* to 7 = *very much*). As part of the study, participants also responded to two attention-check questions: (1) provide today’s date and (2) answer ‘not at all’ to this question.

Results

According to our preregistered analysis plan, we conducted a multilevel analysis in a 2 (model: CS vs. MP) $\times$ 2 (monitoring: present vs. absent) between-subjects design, with scenarios

nested in participants, market orientation, and communal orientation as DVs (correlated), and using Bayesian estimation in Mplus 8.10.

For the communal perception, we found a significant effect of relational model, $\beta = -.57$, Post. $SD = .02$, 95% CI $[-.62, -.53]$, $p < .001$, such that participants perceived MP situations as less communal-like than CS situations. In line with our preregistered hypothesis, we also found a significant main effect of monitoring, $\beta = -.08$, Post. $SD = .02$, 95% CI $[-.12, -.03]$, $p < .001$, such that participants perceived the scenarios as less communal-like when monitoring was present than when it was absent. Additionally, we found a significant interaction effect between the two manipulations, $\beta = .06$, Post. $SD = .02$, 95% CI $[.01, .11]$, $p = .014$.


Concerning market perception, we found a significant effect of relational model manipulation, $\beta = .56$, Post. $SD = .03$, 95% CI $[.50, .62]$, $p < .001$, suggesting that participants perceived MP scenarios as more market-like than CS scenarios. Contrary to our expectations, we did not find a significant effect of monitoring, $\beta = .01$, Post. $SD = .03$, 95% CI $[-.04, .05]$, $p = .700$. However, the interaction between the two factors was significant, $\beta = -.08$, Post. $SD = .03$, 95% CI $[-.13, -.03]$, $p < .001$. The association between communal and market-like perception on the between-participants level was not significant, $\beta = .02$, Post. $SD = .02$, 95% CI $[-.02, .05]$, $p = .170$, whereas on the within-participants level it was significant and negative, $\beta = -.15$, Post. $SD = .01$, 95% CI $[-.18, -.13]$, $p < .001$.

We further decomposed these interactions by separately analyzing the effect of monitoring in the CS and MP conditions (Figure S1). For the CS condition, we found a significant effect of monitoring on both communal perception: $\beta = -.17$, Post. $SD = .04$, 95% CI $[-.24, -.08]$, $p < .001$, and market perception, $\beta = .10$, Post. $SD = .04$, 95% CI $[.03, .21]$, $p < .001$. However, we did not find significant effects of monitoring for the MP condition, respectively $\beta =$

$-.03$, Post. $SD = .04$, 95% CI $[-.12, .06]$, $p = .370$ for communal perception and $\beta = -.08$, Post. $SD = .05$, 95% CI $[-.18, .02]$, $p = .120$ for market perception.

Figure S1.

Mean communal perception and market perception of the situations by the relational model and monitoring condition. Error bars represent standard errors (Experiment S1).



To summarize, as expected, the introduction of monitoring altered the perception of communal situations, making them appear less communal and more market-like than when monitoring was absent. However, we did not find such an effect on the perception of MP situations. Overall, these results suggest that from the perspective of a trustor, monitoring is more aligned with MP situations than with CS situations.

4 Experiment S2

In Experiment S2, we aimed to test the same hypotheses as in Experiment S1, but from the perspective of the trustee. We tested whether people perceive a given relationship as more market-like and less communal-like when the other party monitors their actions, compared with when the other party does not. Furthermore, we predicted that these effects would be stronger for relationships resembling the CS model than for relationships resembling the MP model. We used the same six scenarios as in previous experiments, manipulated monitoring (present vs. absent) as in Experiment S1, and measured participants' perceptions of the given situations.

Participants and procedure

The hypotheses, recruitment, sample size, exclusion criteria, and data analysis were preregistered at: https://aspredicted.org/TLN_8NK. We conducted a power analysis with G*Power, which revealed that assuming a small effect of the monitoring manipulation, that is Cohen's $f = 0.15$ ($\eta^2 = .03$), at $\alpha = .05$ with the power of $1 - \beta = .95$, we would need a sample of 580 participants in a 2x2 between-subjects design to detect such an effect. Thus, we recruited 581 U.S. participants from Prolific Academic to participate in an online study in exchange for 1.5 GBP. Fifteen participants failed the attention check and their data was excluded from analysis. The final sample consisted of $N = 566$ individuals (271 women, 286 men, 9 other/prefer not to tell, $M_{\text{age}} = 40.12$, $SD = 13.24$). Sensitivity power analysis using a Monte Carlo simulation with 1,000 repetitions in Mplus 8.10 indicated that this sample size would achieve 95% power to detect a weak interaction between relational and control model on the between-participants level ($\beta = .09$), given our analytic approach and the conventional alpha level of .05.

Participants were assigned to one condition in a 2 (relational model: CS vs. MP) $\times$ 2 (monitoring: present vs. absent) between-subjects design. After providing informed consent and

demographic information, participants read the three scenarios, the same as in Experiment S1, but rewritten from the perspective of the trustee. Depending on condition, the scenarios were presented in CS ($n = 279$) or MP ($n = 287$) versions, together with information about monitoring ($n = 268$) or without such information ($n = 298$) (see section 4.3. in this Supplementary Materials for full wording of the scenarios). After reading each of the three scenarios, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which the situation resembled a communal or market situation, answering four questions based on Bohns et al. (2016), the same as in Experiment S1, and presented in random order ($r = .38, p < .001$ for the market perception and $r = .24, p < .001$ for the communal perception). This study also included two attention check questions: 1) provide today's date and 2) answer 'not at all' to this question.

Results and Discussion

According to our preregistered analysis plan, we conducted a multilevel analysis in a 2 (model: CS vs. MP) $\times$ 2 (monitoring: present vs. absent) design, with scenarios nested in participants, market orientation and communal orientation as DVs (correlated), and using a Bayesian estimation in Mplus 8.10.


As in the previous experiment, we found a significant effect of relational model on communal perception, $\beta = -.53$, Post. $SD = .03$, 95% CI $[-.59, -.48]$, $p < .001$, such that participants perceived MP situations as less communal-like than CS situations. In line with our preregistered hypothesis, we also found a significant main effect of monitoring on communal perception, $\beta = -.20$, Post. $SD = .03$, 95% CI $[-.26, -.15]$, $p < .001$, such that participants perceived the scenarios as less communal-like in the presence of monitoring than in its absence. Additionally, we found a significant interaction between the two manipulations, $\beta = .07$, Post. $SD = .03$, 95% CI $[.01, .13]$, $p = .010$.

As expected, we found a significant effect of monitoring on market perception, $\beta = .05$, Post. $SD = .03$, 95% CI [.001, .11], $p = .040$. We also found a significant effect of relational model on market perception, $\beta = .54$, Post. $SD = .03$, 95% CI [.49, .59], $p < .001$, suggesting that participants perceived MP scenarios as more market-like than communal ones. The interaction between the two factors was significant, $\beta = -.07$, Post. $SD = .03$, 95% CI [-.12, -.02], $p = .020$. The association between communal and market-like perception on the between-participants level was not significant, $\beta = .02$, Post. $SD = .02$, 95% CI [-.01, .05], $p = .170$, but it was significant and negative on the within-participants level, $\beta = -.11$, Post. $SD = .01$, 95% CI [-.13, -.00], $p < .001$.

We further decomposed the interactions to analyze the effect of monitoring separately for the CS and MP conditions (Figure S2). For the CS scenarios, we found a significant effect of monitoring's presence on both communal perception: $\beta = -.29$, Post. $SD = .04$, 95% CI [-.38, -.22], $p < .001$ and market perception, $\beta = .14$, Post. $SD = .04$, 95% CI [.04, .20], $p = .010$. Also, for the MP scenarios we found a significant effect of monitoring on communal perception, $\beta = -.17$, Post. $SD = .05$, 95% CI [-.23, -.08], $p < .001$, but we did not find such an effect on market perception, $\beta = -.01$, Post. $SD = .05$, 95% CI [-.10, .10], $p = .820$.

Figure S2.

Mean communal perception and market perception of the situations by the relational model and monitoring condition. Error bars represent standard errors (Experiment S2).



To summarize, in line with our hypotheses, monitoring by the trustor affected the perception of communal situations, making them appear less communal and more market-like than when no monitoring was present. What is more, these effects were stronger from the perspective of the trustee than from the perspective of the trustor (see the results of Experiment S1). In contrast, for the MP scenarios, monitoring had no significant influence on market-like perception, but it reduced communal perception of these scenarios.

5 Materials

5.1 Materials for Experiment 1

Instructions:

On the next few pages, you will be asked to:

- (1) **Learn** about the properties of four relational models you will be presented with.
- (2) **Perform a test** to check your understanding of these relational models. Understanding the differences between these models is essential for the subsequent task.
- (3) **Evaluate 12 short scenarios** by assessing the extent to which each scenario represents the four relational models you have learned about.

Please make sure to read all the instructions and tasks carefully and give them your full attention.

Please note that **if you fail** the relational models comprehension test more than once, you will not be able to participate in the main part of the study. Instead, you will be compensated with 0.30 GBP bonus for the first part of the study.

When you are ready to continue, please click the arrow located in the lower right corner.

This is a learning phase.

Please carefully read the descriptions of relational models provided below. Some of these models are similar to each other. Please try to look for the elements that differentiate them.

Communal sharing (CS) relationship: Such relationships are based on a conception of some bounded group of people as equivalent and undifferentiated. In this kind of relationship, the members of a group or dyad treat each other as all the same, focusing on commonalities and disregarding distinct individual identities. People in a CS relationship often think that it is natural to be relatively kind and altruistic to people of their own kind. The main motivation in CS is intimacy.

Authority ranking (AR) relationship: Such relationships are based on a model of asymmetry among people who are linearly ordered along some hierarchical social dimension. The salient social fact in an AR relationship is whether a person is above or below the other person. People higher in rank have prestige, prerogatives, and privileges that their inferiors lack, but subordinates are often entitled to protection and pastoral care. Authorities often control some aspects of their subordinates' actions. The main motivation in AR is power.

Equality matching (EM) relationship: Such relationships are based on a model of even balance, as in turn taking, tit-for-tat retaliation, or eye-for-an-eye revenge. People are primarily concerned about whether a relationship is balanced, and keep track of how far out of balance it is. They often mark their relationship with concrete operations of comparing or counting-out items in one-for-one correspondence. The idea is that each person is entitled to the same amount as each other person in the relationship. The main motivation in EM is desire for equality.

Market pricing (MP) relationship: Such relationships are based on a model of proportionality; people attend to ratios and rates. People in an MP relationship reduce all the relevant features under consideration to a single value metric and organize their interactions with reference to ratios of this metric. For example, the ratio of what you pay to what the

other person gives you in return. Money is the prototypical medium of MP relations, but many MP relationships do not involve money. The main motivation in MP is achievement.

This is a comprehension test

Please read the questions presented below and choose the right answer for each of them, based on what you have learned on the previous page.

Please remember that this is a comprehension check. If you fail to answer all these questions correctly, you will be asked to read the descriptions of the relational models again and retake the test.

1. Which relational model is characterized by a focus on commonalities within a group, disregarding individual identities, and emphasizing kindness and altruism among the members?
 - a) Equality matching (EM)
 - b) Authority ranking (AR)
 - c) Communal sharing (CS)
 - d) Market pricing (MP)

2. In which relational model do individuals in a group keep track of whether the relationship is balanced, often resorting to turn-taking or tit-for-tat behavior?
 - a) Equality matching (EM)
 - b) Authority ranking (AR)
 - c) Communal sharing (CS)
 - d) Market pricing (MP)

3. Which relational model is primarily concerned with linear hierarchies where individuals are ordered based on prestige and power, with authorities controlling aspects of their subordinates' actions?
 - a) Equality matching (EM)
 - b) Authority ranking (AR)
 - c) Communal sharing (CS)
 - d) Market pricing (MP)

4. Which relational model is characterized by interactions based on ratios and rates, where people reduce relevant features to a single value metric and organize interactions accordingly?
 - a) Equality matching (EM)
 - b) Authority ranking (AR)
 - c) Communal sharing (CS)
 - d) Market pricing (MP)

5. Which relational model characterizes relationships where everyone is treated the same, they share common interests, and cherish closeness and warmth?
 - a) Equality matching (EM)
 - b) Authority ranking (AR)
 - c) Communal sharing (CS)
 - d) Market pricing (MP)

6. In which relational model do relationships have a clear order where some people have more power and importance than others?
- a) Equality matching (EM)
 - b) Authority ranking (AR)
 - c) Communal sharing (CS)
 - d) Market pricing (MP)
7. In which relational model do people pay attention to how much they give and take, using a specific measure to guide their interactions with others?
- a) Equality matching (EM)
 - b) Authority ranking (AR)
 - c) Communal sharing (CS)
 - d) Market pricing (MP)
8. In which relational model are people focused on making sure things are fair by keeping things equal and using straightforward actions to maintain balance?
- a) Equality matching (EM)
 - b) Authority ranking (AR)
 - c) Communal sharing (CS)
 - d) Market pricing (MP)

Thank you for completing the test!

Now, please read the following 6 scenarios presented on the following pages and rate the extent to which they represent each of the relational models that you have learned about in the previous section.

Birthday Gift Scenario:

You asked your spouse to order a birthday gift for your child in an online shop, and they promised to do it right away so the parcel would arrive within four days **(CS)**.

You ordered a birthday gift for your child from an online shop, and the seller declared an estimated delivery time of four days **(MP)**.

Cooking Scenario:

You organize a retirement party for your friend, and Tom, your godson who serves as a sous chef in a local restaurant, has volunteered to take charge of the cooking. You asked him to use all organic products instead of conventional ones and he assured you he'll do that **(CS)**.

You organize a retirement party for your friend. You hired Tom, who serves as a sous chef in a local restaurant, to take charge of the cooking. You asked him to use all organic products instead of conventional ones and he assured you he'll do that **(MP)**.

Renovation Scenario:

Your father has taken on the responsibility of renovating your new apartment. He assured you that he would handle it diligently and quickly, as you are eager to move in as soon as possible **(CS)**.

You have hired a renovation contractor for your new apartment. He assured you that he would handle it diligently and quickly, as you are eager to move in as soon as possible **(MP)**.
Q: To what extent does the above scenario reflect each of the following relational mode? (0 not at all _____ 100 Very much)

- a) Equality matching (EM)
- b) Authority ranking (AR)
- c) Communal sharing (CS)
- d) Market pricing (MP)

Thank you for completing the first part!

Now, we will ask you to read the scenarios again and respond a different pair of questions.

Birthday Gift Scenario:

You asked your spouse to order a birthday gift for your child in an online shop, and they promised to do it right away so the parcel would arrive within four days. The birthday is today, but the parcel did not arrive. You suspect they forgot to order the item, but your spouse attributed the issue to unexpected delays in the carrier company due to bad weather **(CS)**.

You ordered a birthday gift for your child from an online shop, and the seller declared an estimated delivery time of four days. The birthday is today, but the parcel did not arrive. You suspect that the company forgot to send the item, but they attributed the issue to unexpected delays in the carrier company due to bad weather **(MP)**.

- 1) Would it be acceptable to approach customer service to verify the reasons behind the delay?
- 2) How likely is it that you would approach customer service to verify the reasons behind the delay?

Cooking Scenario:

You organize a retirement party for your friend, and Tom, your godson who serves as a sous chef in a local restaurant, has volunteered to take charge of the cooking. You asked him to use all organic products instead of conventional ones and he assured you he'll do that **(CS)**.

You organize a retirement party for your friend. You hired Tom, who serves as a sous chef in a local restaurant, to take charge of the cooking. You asked him to use all organic products instead of conventional ones and he assured you he'll do that **(MP)**.

- 1) Would it be acceptable to check Tom's shopping for the preparation of the party's meal?
- 2) How likely is it that you would check Tom's shopping for the preparation of the party's meal?

Renovation Scenario:

Your father has taken on the responsibility of renovating your new apartment. He assured you that he would handle it diligently and quickly, as you are eager to move in as soon as possible **(CS)**.

You have hired a renovation contractor for your new apartment. He assured you that he would handle it diligently and quickly, as you are eager to move in as soon as possible **(MP)**.

- 1) Would it be acceptable to drop in and ensure everything is going as planned?
- 2) How likely is it that you would drop in and ensure everything is going as planned?

5.2 Materials for Experiment S1

Please read the scenarios presented on the following pages and respond to the questions.

Birthday Gift Scenario:

CS: You asked your spouse to order a birthday gift for your child in an online shop, and they promised to do it right away so the parcel would arrive within four days. The birthday is today, but the parcel did not arrive. You suspect they forgot to order the item, but your spouse attributed the issue to unexpected delays in the carrier company due to bad weather.

MP: You ordered a birthday gift for your child from an online shop, and the seller declared an estimated delivery time of four days. The birthday is today, but the parcel did not arrive. You suspect that the company forgot to send the item, but they attributed the issue to unexpected delays in the carrier company due to bad weather.

You can't wait for the parcel to arrive **(no control)**

You decided to approach customer service to verify the reasons behind the delay **(control)**

Cooking Scenario:

CS: You organize a retirement party for your friend, and Tom, your godson who serves as a sous chef in a local restaurant, has volunteered to take charge of the cooking. You asked him to use all organic products instead of conventional ones and he assured you he'll do that.

MP: You organize a retirement party for your friend. You hired Tom, who serves as a sous chef in a local restaurant, to take charge of the cooking. You asked him to use all organic products instead of conventional ones and he assured you he'll do that.

You can't wait to taste the meals Tom will prepare **(no control)**

You decided to check Tom's shopping for the preparation of the party's meal **(control)**

Renovation Scenario:

CS: Your father has taken on the responsibility of renovating your new apartment. He assured you that he would handle it diligently and quickly, as you are eager to move in as soon as possible.

MP: You have hired a renovation contractor for your new apartment. He assured you that he would handle it diligently and quickly, as you are eager to move in as soon as possible.

You can't wait for the renovation to be finished **(no control)**

You decided to drop in and ensure everything is going as planned **(control)**

DV-Questions:**DV1: Market perception:**

To what extent does this situation feel like a business transaction?

To what extent do you think one person is concerned about getting something from the other in this situation?

DV2: Communal perception:

To what extent does this situation feel like interacting with a close friend or family member?

To what extent is one person concerned about the other person's needs in this situation?

5.3 Materials for Experiment S2**Birthday Gift Scenario:**

CS: Your spouse has asked you to order a birthday gift for your child from an online store and you have promised to take care of it immediately so that the package arrives within four days. Unfortunately, the birthday is today and the parcel has not yet arrived. Your spouse suspects that you may have forgotten to order the item, but you explained that the problem was caused by unexpected delays with the shipping company due to the bad weather.

You know that your spouse can't wait for the parcel to arrive **(no control)**

You found out that your spouse decided to approach customer service to verify the reasons behind the delay **(control)**

MP: A customer has ordered a birthday gift for their child from your online store and you have given an estimated delivery time of four days. Unfortunately, the birthday is today and the package has not yet arrived. The customer suspects that you may have forgotten to ship the item, but you explained that the problem was caused by unexpected delays with the shipping company due to bad weather.

You know that the customer can't wait for the parcel to arrive **(no control)**

You found out that the customer decided to approach customer service to verify the reasons behind the delay **(control)**

Cooking Scenario:

CS: You are a sous chef at a local restaurant. When your godfather asked you to take charge of the cooking for their friend's retirement party, you were excited to help. They specifically requested that you use only organic products instead of conventional ones. You assured them that you would do that.

You know that your godfather can't wait to taste the meals you will prepare **(no control)**
You found out that your godparent decided to check your shopping for the preparation of the meal **(control)**

MP: You are a sous chef at a local restaurant. You were hired to take charge of the cooking for a retirement party your customer organizes for their friend. They specifically asked you to use all organic products instead of conventional ones. You assured them that you would do that.
You know that your client can't wait to taste the meals you will prepare **(no control)**
You found out that your client decided to check your shopping for the preparation of the meal **(control)**

Renovation Scenario:

CS: You have taken on the responsibility of renovating your child's new apartment. You assured them that you would handle it diligently and quickly, knowing how eager they are to move in as soon as possible.

You know that your child can't wait for the renovation to be finished **(no control)**
You found out that your child decided to drop in and ensure everything is going as planned **(control)**

MP: You are a renovation contractor, and you were hired to renovate a new apartment. You assured the client that you would handle it diligently and quickly, knowing how eager they are to move in as soon as possible.

You know that your client can't wait for the renovation to be finished **(no control)**
You found out that your client decided to drop in and ensure everything is going as planned **(control)**

DV-Questions:

DV1: Market perception:

To what extent does this situation feel like a business transaction?

To what extent do you think one person is concerned about getting something from the other in this situation?

DV2: Communal perception:

To what extent does this situation feel like interacting with a close friend or family member?

To what extent is one person concerned about the other person's needs in this situation?

5.4 Materials for Experiment 2

Birthday Gift Scenario:

CS/Trustor perspective: You asked your spouse to order a birthday gift for your child in an online shop, and they promised to do it right away so the parcel would arrive within four days. The birthday is today, but the parcel did not arrive. You suspect they forgot to order the item, but your spouse attributed the issue to unexpected delays in the carrier company due to bad weather.

1. How much do you trust your spouse in general?
2. How much do you trust that your spouse placed the order on time?
3. How much would you entrust your spouse with placing the order on time in the future?

CS/Trustee perspective: Your spouse has asked you to order a birthday gift for your child from an online store and you have promised to take care of it immediately so that the package arrives within four days. Unfortunately, the birthday is today and the parcel has not yet arrived. Your spouse suspects that you may have forgotten to order the item, but you explained that the problem was caused by unexpected delays with the shipping company due to the bad weather.

1. How much does your spouse trust you in general?
2. How much does your spouse trust you that you placed the order on time?
3. How much would your spouse entrust you with placing the order on time in the future?

MP/Trustor perspective: You ordered a birthday gift for your child from an online shop, and the seller declared an estimated delivery time of four days. The birthday is today, but the parcel did not arrive. You suspect that the company forgot to send the item, but they attributed the issue to unexpected delays in the carrier company due to bad weather.

1. How much do you trust the seller in general?
2. How much do you trust that the seller had dispatched the order on time?
3. How much would you entrust the seller with dispatching an order on time in the future?

MP/Trustee perspective: A customer has ordered a birthday gift for their child from your online store and you have given an estimated delivery time of four days. Unfortunately, the birthday is today and the package has not yet arrived. The customer suspects that you may have forgotten to ship the item, but you explained that the problem was caused by unexpected delays with the shipping company due to bad weather.

1. How much do you think your customer trusts you in general?
2. How much do you think your customer trusts that you dispatched the order on time?
3. How much do you think your customer would entrust you with dispatching an order on time in the future?

Cooking Scenario:

CS/Trustor perspective: You organize a retirement party for your friend, and Tom, your godson who serves as a sous chef in a local restaurant, has volunteered to take charge of the cooking. You asked him to use all organic products instead of conventional ones and he assured you he'll do that.

1. How much do you trust Tom in general?
2. How much do you trust that Tom had used all organic products instead of conventional ones?
3. How much would you entrust Tom with cooking the dinner in the future?

CS/Trustee perspective: You are a sous chef at a local restaurant. When your godparent asked you to take charge of the cooking for their friend's retirement party, you were excited to help. They specifically requested that you use only organic products instead of conventional ones. You assured them that you would do that.

1. How much do you think your godfather trusts you in general?
2. How much do you think your godfather trusts that you would use all organic products instead of conventional ones?
3. How much do you think your godfather would entrust you with cooking dinner in the future?

MP/Trustor perspective: You organize a retirement party for your friend. You hired Tom, who serves as a sous chef in a local restaurant, to take charge of the cooking. You asked him to use all organic products instead of conventional ones and he assured you he'll do that.

1. How much do you trust Tom in general?
2. How much do you trust that Tom had used all organic products instead of conventional ones?
3. How much would you entrust Tom with cooking the dinner in the future?

MP/Trustee perspective: You are a sous chef at a local restaurant. You were hired to take charge of the cooking for a retirement party your customer organizes for their friend. They specifically asked you to use all organic products instead of conventional ones. You assured them that you would do that.

1. How much do you think your customer trusts you in general?
2. How much do you think your customer trusts that you would use all organic products instead of conventional ones?
3. How much do you think your customer would entrust you with cooking the dinner in the future?

Renovation Scenario:

CS/Trustor perspective: Your father has taken on the responsibility of renovating your new apartment. He assured you that he would handle it diligently and quickly, as you are eager to move in as soon as possible.

1. How much do you trust your father in general?
2. How much do you trust that your father would renovate your apartment diligently and quickly?

3. How much would you entrust your father to renovate your apartment in the future?

CS/Trustee perspective: You have taken on the responsibility of renovating your child's new apartment. You assured them that you would handle it diligently and quickly, knowing how eager they are to move in as soon as possible.

1. How much do you think your child trusts you in general?
2. How much do you think your child trusts that you would ensure the renovation is done diligently and quickly?
3. How much do you think your child would entrust you with renovating their apartment in the future?

MP/Trustor perspective: You have hired a renovation contractor for your new apartment. He assured you that he would handle it diligently and quickly, as you are eager to move in as soon as possible.

1. How much do you trust your contractor in general?
2. How much do you trust that your contractor will renovate your apartment diligently and quickly?
3. How much would you entrust your contractor to renovate your apartment in the future?

MP/Trustee perspective: You are a renovation contractor, and you were hired to renovate a new apartment. You assured the client that you would handle it diligently and quickly, knowing how eager they are to move in as soon as possible.

1. How much do you think your customer trusts you in general?
2. How much do you think your customer trusts that you would ensure the renovation is done diligently and quickly?
3. How much do you think your customer would entrust you with renovating their apartment in the future?

5.5 Materials for Experiment 3

Birthday Gift Scenario:

CS/Medium Trust: You have asked your spouse to order a birthday present for your child from an online store and they have promised to do it immediately so that the package arrives within four days. Your spouse has sometimes forgotten to do things you have asked them to do, but they are much better at online shopping than you are. Today is your child's birthday, but the package has not arrived. Your spouse attributes the problem to unexpected delays by the carrier due to bad weather.

CS/High Trust: You have asked your spouse to order a birthday present for your child from an online store and they have promised to do it immediately so that the package arrives within four days. Your spouse has never forgotten to do things you have asked them to do, and they are much better at online shopping than you are. Today is your child's birthday, but the package has not arrived. Your spouse attributes the problem to unexpected delays by the carrier due to bad weather.

MP/Medium Trust: You have ordered a birthday present for your child from an online store and the seller has given an estimated delivery time of four days. You have had mixed experiences with this store, but the gift you wanted to order was only available there. Today is your child's birthday, but the package has not arrived. However, the seller attributed the problem to unexpected delays by the carrier due to bad weather.

MP/High Trust: You have ordered a birthday present for your child from an online store and the seller has given an estimated delivery time of four days. You had previously had a very good experience with this store and the gift you wanted to order was only available there. Today is your child's birthday, but the package has not arrived. The seller attributed the problem to unexpected delays by the carrier due to bad weather.

Cooking Scenario:

CS: You organize a retirement party for your friend, and Tom, your godson who is a sous chef at a local restaurant, volunteers to handle the cooking. You asked him to use all organic products instead of conventional ones, and he assured you he would do that. However, since Tom has a habit of occasionally forgetting important details, you worry that he may have overlooked your request for organic ingredients (**Medium Trust**).

You organize a retirement party for your friend, and Tom, your godson who is a sous chef at a local restaurant, volunteers to handle the cooking. You asked him to use all organic products instead of conventional ones, and he assured you he would do that. Since Tom has never forgotten important details in the past, you are confident that he will remember to use the organic produce as planned (**High Trust**).

MP: You organize a retirement party for your friend and hire Tom, a sous chef at a local restaurant, to handle the cooking. You asked him to use all organic products instead of conventional ones, and he assured you he would do that. However, as Tom has a habit of occasionally forgetting important details, you are concerned that he may have overlooked your request for organic ingredients (**Medium Trust**).

You organize a retirement party for your friend and hire Tom, a sous chef at a local restaurant, to handle the cooking. You asked him to use all organic products instead of conventional ones, and he assured you he would do that. Since Tom has never forgotten important details in the past, you are confident that he will remember to use the organic produce as planned (**High Trust**).

Renovation Scenario:

CS: Your father has taken on the responsibility of renovating your new apartment. He assured you that he would handle it diligently and quickly, as you are eager to move in as soon as possible. Although he is eager to be engaged in the project, he has sometimes failed to complete similar projects in a timely manner in the past. Therefore, you are worried that he might not complete the renovation on time (**Medium Trust**).

Your father has taken on the responsibility of renovating your new apartment. He assured you that he would handle it diligently and quickly, as you are eager to move in as soon as possible. He is eager to be engaged in the project, and he has reliably and timely completed similar projects in the past. Therefore, you are confident that he will complete the renovation on time (**High Trust**).

MP: You hired a renovation contractor to renovate your new apartment. He has assured you that he would handle the work diligently and quickly, as you are eager to move in as soon as possible. Although he is eager to be engaged in the project, he has sometimes failed to complete similar projects in a timely manner in the past. Therefore, you are worried that he might not complete the renovation on time (**Medium Trust**).

You hired a renovation contractor to renovate your new apartment. He has assured you that he would handle the work diligently and quickly, as you are eager to move in as soon as possible. He is eager to be engaged in the project, and he has reliably and timely completed similar projects in the past. Therefore, you are confident that he will complete the renovation on time (**High Trust**).

DV-Questions:

Birthday gift Scenario:

- Would it be acceptable to approach customer service to secretly verify the reasons behind the delay?
- How likely is it that you would approach customer service to secretly verify the reasons behind the delay?

Cooking Scenario:

- Would it be acceptable to secretly check Tom's shopping for the preparation of the party's meal?
- How likely is it that you would secretly check Tom's shopping for the preparation of the party's meal?

Renovation Scenario:

- Would it be acceptable to drop in secretly and ensure everything is going as planned?
- How likely is it that you would drop in secretly and ensure everything is going as planned?

5.6 Materials for Experiment 4

Please read these instructions carefully, as we will ask you some comprehension questions later.

"Wall Street/Friendship Task"

In this experiment, you will take part in ten decision-making rounds, during which you will be randomly paired with other participants from Prolific. Your identity will remain anonymous to the other participants. Any money earned during the experiment will be sent to you via Prolific next week.

For all ten rounds, you will be assigned a specific role: either Trader X/Friend X or Trader Y/Friend Y. You will retain this role for all ten rounds, with each role having distinct information and responsibilities. The process will remain consistent across rounds. Each round will be independent, featuring a randomly assigned new partner and task version. Please note that only one round will be selected randomly for payment at the end of the experiment.

Overview of the "Wall Street/Friendship Task"

In each round, you and the other participant will encounter one of two versions of the task, labeled 1 and 2. Each version presents two options, with different monetary payouts for you and the other participant. For example, one version might look like this:

"Wall Street/Friendship Task"

- **Option A:** £2 for Trader X/Friend X and £1 for Trader Y/Friend Y
- **Option B:** £1 for Trader X/Friend X and £2 for Trader Y/Friend Y

How the "Wall Street/Friendship Task" works

- 1) At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned to your role (Trader X/Friend X/Friend Y or Trader Y) and will keep this role for all ten rounds.
- 2) In each round, a version of the task will be randomly selected.
 - Trader X/Friend X will be informed of which version is in play for that round.
 - Trader Y/Friend Y will not know which version is in play
- 3) Trader X/Friend X can send one of the following messages to Trader Y/Friend Y:
 - "Option A would be better for you"
 - "Option B would be better for you"
- 4) After receiving this message, Trader Y/Friend Y will choose either Option A or Option B.
 - Trader Y/Friend Y's choice will determine the payouts for both participants in that round.
 - Trader Y/Friend Y will not know the monetary amounts associated with the options or whether Trader X's message is truthful.

This is a comprehension test:

Please read the questions below and choose the right answer for each of them, based on what you have learned on the previous page.

Please remember that this is a comprehension check. If you fail to answer all these questions correctly, you will be asked to reread the instructions and retake the test. If you fail them twice, you will be asked to return the study and you will be paid 0.50 GBP.

1) Who makes the final decision on which option (A or B) determines the payouts for both participants in the Option Task?

- a) Friend/Trader X
- b) Friend/Trader Y

- 2) What information is available to Friend/Trader Y?
 - a) The chosen version of the task and the specific monetary payouts.
 - b) A message from a Friend/Trader X.
- 3) What information does Friend/Trader X have that Friend/Trader Y does not when deciding which message to send?
 - a) The monetary payouts for each option in the chosen version of the task.
 - b) The exact amount of money Friend/Trader Y will receive after the task.

TASK

Please read the instructions and information about the actual task carefully.

- You will now be matched with ten other participants from Prolific, one after another, in ten successive rounds. You were assigned the role of **Trader Y** and the other persons will be assigned the role of **Trader X**. You will not know each other's identities.
- There are two versions of the Wall Street Task (versions 1 and 2), each offering different monetary payments between you and Trader X. **The structure of the task will remain the same throughout the ten rounds, as follows:**

- Wall Street Task – Version 1

- Option A: £1 to Trader X, £1 to Trader Y
- Option B: £1.5 to Trader X, £0.5 to Trader Y

- Wall Street Task – Version 2

- Option A: £1.5 to Trader X, £0.5 to Trader Y
- Option B: £1 to Trader X, £1 to Trader Y
- We will randomly select one version of the task, and **Trader X will be informed** of which version has been chosen. **You, however, will not know** which version is selected.

Trader X will send you one of the following messages:

- “Option A would be better for you”
- OR
- “Option B would be better for you”

Based on the message you will receive from Trader X, **you can choose either Option A or Option B**. Remember that you are free to choose whichever option you prefer by deciding to follow Trader X's advice or not. You will not know the monetary payouts of each option or the specific version of the chosen task.

Question before Decision (About Control)

Before you make the decision, you may spend 0.25 GBP to find out whether the information from Trader X is truthful. If you do that, this money will be subtracted from your final payment.

What is your decision?

I am spending 0.25 GBP to get the additional information

I am NOT spending 0.25 GBP to get the additional information

References

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